Martin E. Johnstone

In Bowling v. Commonwealth, Thomas C. Bowling appealed the Fayette Circuit Court’s denial of his motion for relief under CR 60.02 and CR 60.03, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons and the Eighth Amendment prohibit the execution of individuals with the mental age of a juvenile, and seeking a new sentencing hearing. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. The court reasoned that Kentucky already had a statute, KRS 640.040, prohibiting the execution of offenders under sixteen at the time of Bowling’s trial, so Roper created no new protection that Bowling could not have asserted earlier, and he had procedurally defaulted the claim by not raising it at trial or in prior proceedings. Additionally, the court found that Bowling was not entitled to a new sentencing hearing because arguments regarding the mitigating value of juvenile mental age could have been made at his original trial in 1990.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from the 2004 election for Kentucky State Senator in the 37th District, where Dana Seum Stephenson defeated Virginia L. Woodward but faced a challenge alleging she failed to meet the six-year residency requirement under Section 32 of the Kentucky Constitution. After the Jefferson Circuit Court disqualified Stephenson and the Franklin Circuit Court addressed related injunctions and certification issues, the Kentucky Supreme Court reviewed the lower courts' authority. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Section 38 of the Kentucky Constitution grants each legislative house exclusive power to judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members, so the judiciary lacked jurisdiction to disqualify Stephenson or dictate Senate seating. The decision emphasized constitutional separation of powers and precedents supporting legislative authority over incoming members' qualifications.

electionsprocedure

In Wood v. Commonwealth, Nathaniel Wood was convicted by a jury in Barren Circuit Court of capital murder, capital kidnapping, kidnapping, first-degree criminal trespass, second-degree assault, and violation of a protective order after an incident in which he assaulted his ex-girlfriend, shot her and her companion during a confrontation, abducted her, and barricaded himself in a home during a police standoff. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole on the capital charges, along with additional prison terms and jail time on the other counts. Wood appealed as of right, raising nine issues including challenges to the sufficiency of evidence for aggravating circumstances found by the jury (such as a substantial history of assaultive convictions and the existence of a protective order), alleged errors in jury selection regarding prospective jurors' ability to consider mitigation, and other trial rulings. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences in full, holding that the evidence supported the aggravators, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying challenges for cause to five jurors, and that Wood's remaining claims lacked merit.

criminal law

This case involved a negligence lawsuit filed by Samuel Wilkey against Office, Inc. d/b/a Club Olympic, a health club, after Wilkey slipped and fell while entering the club's swimming pool, allegedly due to unsafe pool steps, resulting in shoulder injuries. A jury in Warren Circuit Court found in favor of the club using standard "bare bones" jury instructions on the duty of ordinary care. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the instructions failed to adequately convey a business owner's specific affirmative duties to business invitees, such as reasonable inspection and warning of discoverable dangers. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment, reasoning that Kentucky law permits bare bones instructions focused on duties, with details to be addressed in closing arguments, and that the given instructions did not misstate the law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Joyce Ann Lewis challenging the Kentucky Retirement Systems' (KERS) procedure for reviewing her second application for disability retirement benefits after her initial application was denied, claiming the agency's use of a single medical examiner violated statutory requirements for up to three examiners. Lewis sought a declaratory judgment in circuit court without completing the administrative hearing process. The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that Lewis was required to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, as no final agency order had been issued and no exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine applied. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust remedies.

procedurelabor & employment

This case concerned whether the Fayette County Board of Education provided M.R.D., a student with a learning disability, a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and related Kentucky law, and whether his parents were entitled to reimbursement for his private school tuition. After administrative hearings and lower court proceedings denied reimbursement, the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered reimbursement following a modified de novo review. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals applied the incorrect standard of review and that the administrative decisions were supported by substantial evidence showing the school district had complied with FAPE requirements through annual IEPs and related services. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Fayette Circuit Court judgment affirming the denial of reimbursement.

civil rights

The case involved Jason Weaver, who was released pretrial on his own recognizance subject to home incarceration with an electronic monitor and strict movement limits after being charged with assault and criminal abuse. When Weaver failed to report as required and could not be located, he was indicted for second-degree escape. The trial court dismissed the escape charge, finding that home incarceration as a pretrial condition was merely a constraint incidental to release on bail and thus excluded from the escape statute's definition of custody. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the home incarceration qualified as custody under KRS 520.010(2) because no bail had been set and statutes like KRS 431.517 and KRS 532.220(2) explicitly allow escape prosecutions for violations of such pretrial home incarceration. The Court reasoned that the restrictions were substantive conditions of release rather than incidental to bail, and distinguished this from typical bail constraints.

criminal law

This case involved claims of racial discrimination and retaliation in employment under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act brought by Sandra Brooks against her employer, the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority. At trial, Brooks prevailed on her retaliation claim but not on discrimination; the Court of Appeals affirmed the discrimination loss and reversed the retaliation win. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, addressing issues including the after-acquired evidence doctrine and the interpretation of retaliation claims consistently with federal law under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Johnson v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, possessing methamphetamine, possessing drug paraphernalia, and possessing marijuana, and sentenced to twenty years in prison. On appeal, he challenged the authentication of an incriminating letter, the trial court's decision to send the letter to the jury, the jury instructions on manufacturing, and the lack of a facilitation instruction, among other issues. The court reversed the methamphetamine possession conviction, holding that it violated double jeopardy because it was based on the same methamphetamine for which he was convicted of manufacturing, but affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences after finding no error in the authentication of the letter under KRE 901, the jury instructions, or other claims. The opinion applied precedents such as Blockburger v. United States to determine that the two drug convictions punished the same conduct.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the validity of an occupational tax ordinance enacted by the Knox County Fiscal Court to raise revenue. Citizens and taxpayers challenged the ordinance, arguing among other things that the county failed to satisfy statutory notice and publishing requirements under KRS 67.077(2) by not certifying a summary of the proposed ordinance. The trial court upheld the ordinance, finding substantial compliance sufficient, and the Court of Appeals reversed on the publishing issue while affirming on vagueness and open-meetings claims. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the statute's use of "shall" imposed a mandatory requirement of strict compliance with certification, which the county did not meet, rendering the ordinance invalid.

taxesprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Eddie Philpot, a classified state employee dismissed by the Tourism Development Cabinet for misconduct including poor work performance and misuse of state property. Philpot appealed to the Kentucky Personnel Board but did not file exceptions to the hearing officer's recommended order upholding the dismissal, which the Board adopted. He then sought judicial review in circuit court, which dismissed the petition; the Court of Appeals reversed, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed that decision and upheld the dismissal. The Court held that while filing exceptions is not an administrative remedy requiring exhaustion under KRS 13B.140, the failure to file limits judicial review to issues where the final order differs from the recommended order, leaving Philpot with no cognizable claim. The Court also clarified that the recommended order sufficiently advised parties of their exception rights as required by statute.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Spears v. Commonwealth, the appellant pled guilty to two counts of first-degree robbery, first-degree rape, and first-degree burglary, receiving a sixty-year sentence, and appealed the denial of a continuance for an alternative sentencing plan and his dual robbery convictions on double jeopardy grounds. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the motion for continuance was properly denied because the defendant's status as a violent offender under KRS 439.3401 precluded probation or alternative sentencing. The court further ruled that the guilty plea waived the double jeopardy challenge, and that the indictment described two distinct robbery offenses separated by time and location, thus not constituting multiple punishments for the same offense.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a class action lawsuit challenging Kentucky's 'no pass-no drive' statute (KRS 159.051), which requires revocation or denial of driver's licenses for 16- and 17-year-old students who drop out or are declared academically deficient, but applies only in school districts that operate approved alternative education programs. The trial court ruled the statute unconstitutional on equal protection, substantive due process, and related grounds, including discrimination against students with disabilities, while the Court of Appeals upheld its constitutionality. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, concluding that the law violates equal protection under the U.S. and Kentucky Constitutions because it creates an arbitrary distinction in treatment based on whether a student's district has implemented an alternative program.

civil rights

Michael Ostendorf was severely injured when the Clark forklift he was operating tipped over after colliding with another vehicle at an airport, leading him and his wife to sue Clark Equipment Co. for strict product liability, negligent design, failure to retrofit the forklift with operator restraints, negligent conduct of a voluntary retrofit campaign, and breach of warranty, while also seeking punitive damages. The trial court granted summary judgment to Clark, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the strict liability and negligent design claims. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, ruling that the state does not recognize a common law duty to retrofit products that were not defective when sold and that Clark's voluntary retrofit program did not create liability absent evidence of reliance, inconsistent action, or increased risk under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A. The court declined to adopt Restatement (Third) § 11 on post-sale duties and did not address the constitutionality of the punitive damages statute as it had not been ruled on below.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Terry Anderson, convicted of second-degree assault, who moved for a new trial after discovering that one juror had a prior felony conviction. The trial court granted the motion, finding the juror unqualified under KRS 29A.080 because the governor's executive order restored only the rights to vote and hold public office. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reinstated the new-trial order, reasoning that the plain language of the 1997 order and the relevant constitutional provisions limited restoration to those two rights and did not extend to jury service.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Riley v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of first- and second-degree burglary along with being a persistent felony offender and received a twenty-year sentence. On appeal, Riley argued that the trial court erred by failing to personally inquire whether he was knowingly waiving his right to testify, particularly in light of prior disputes with his counsel, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the burglary convictions rather than mere receipt of stolen property. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that trial courts have no affirmative duty to inquire into a defendant's waiver of the right to testify unless there is reason to believe counsel is preventing the defendant from testifying, and that the evidence—including eyewitness accounts, sales of stolen items, and forensic links—was sufficient under precedent to prove each burglary element. The court also declined to address ineffective-assistance claims raised in pro se post-trial motions because such claims are generally not considered on direct appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between insurance companies over liability coverage for a car accident that occurred one day after a vehicle sale but before the title documents were processed with the county clerk. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled that the dealer seller, J.D. Byrider, remained the owner for insurance purposes under prior case law, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed and held that the buyer, Wayne Chandler, was the owner. The court's reasoning centered on a 1994 statutory amendment to KRS 186A.220, which changed the timing of ownership transfer for dealers selling vehicles, distinguishing the case from the earlier Nantz precedent that applied pre-amendment law.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved Ronnie Earl Norris, Sr., who was convicted by a Fayette Circuit Court jury of two counts of incest against his minor daughter and sentenced to consecutive ten-year prison terms. Norris appealed, raising several claims including the trial court's refusal to admit evidence that his wife had been acquitted of incest charges involving their son. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the exclusion of the acquittal evidence was error because the prosecution had introduced testimony creating the impression that the wife had committed the acts. The court reasoned that this ruling prevented the defense from rehabilitating its witness and addressing the misleading impression left with the jury. Other claims regarding directed verdicts and peremptory challenges were rejected.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over insurance coverage after a 1996 fire destroyed seven warehouses at Heaven Hill Distilleries, damaging bourbon whiskey that the company was storing for customers. Heaven Hill paid millions in damages to the owners through subrogated insurance claims and sought reimbursement from its commercial general liability policy with Kemper, which denied coverage and filed a declaratory judgment action. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Kemper, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Kentucky Supreme Court reinstated the summary judgment, holding that the policy's Care, Custody or Control Exclusion barred coverage for damage to property under Heaven Hill's control. The court reasoned that the pollution exclusion endorsement did not restore coverage because exclusions independently limit the broad insuring agreement and must be read separately from each other, with no ambiguity created by their interaction.

business & regulatoryproperty

Gloria LaFleur sued Shoney's Inc. after falling and injuring herself at its Fifth Quarter restaurant, seeking damages for medical expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering, and other losses. During discovery, she provided initial interrogatory answers claiming only about $6,685 in medical expenses and lost wages while stating that other amounts were undetermined or would be supplemented. She later attempted to disclose much higher figures shortly before trial, but the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that this violated CR 8.01(2) as interpreted in Fratzke v. Murphy, limiting her recoverable damages to the amounts stated in her timely interrogatory responses. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the larger jury award and remand for entry of a reduced judgment based solely on the disclosed figures.

proceduretorts & liability