This case addressed whether Kentucky's five-year statutes of limitation on claims against builders for defective construction (KRS 413.120(14) and 413.135) could constitutionally bar recovery for injuries occurring in 1978 from work completed in 1971. The court held that the statutes did not violate Sections 14, 54, and 241 of the Kentucky Constitution. It distinguished the earlier decision in Saylor v. Hall, which had struck down the same statutes as applied to a 1969 death from 1955 construction, because that case turned on the existence of a cause of action at the time the limitation laws were enacted; here the decisive question was whether such a remedy existed when the Constitution was adopted in 1891. Because third-party negligence claims against builders for latent defects were not recognized until decades later, the constitutional provisions protecting established remedies did not apply, and the court reversed the Court of Appeals.
The case involved Higdon Food Service suing former employee Gene Walker and his new employer Kesterson Food Company to enforce a noncompetition covenant in Walker's employment contract that restricted him from competing or soliciting customers for one year after leaving. The trial court granted an injunction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the contract lacked consideration and mutuality because Walker was an at-will employee. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed, holding that the employment agreement itself provided sufficient consideration for the covenant, and that the contract implied a good faith requirement for termination, making it enforceable.
The case involved Gregory Richmond's conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to sell, based on evidence from a car search after an arrest and a deposition taken from his then-wife Kim, who had been involved in the events. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, ruling that a search warrant for Richmond's impounded car was valid even though issued by a district judge from another judicial district after local judges were unavailable. The court also held that the wife's deposition was properly conducted in a trial-like setting presided over by the judge, with cross-examination by defense counsel present, satisfying confrontation requirements and rendering marital privilege objections inapplicable or waived, with no prejudicial errors found in other trial aspects.
The case concerned challenges to provisions of Kentucky's Distilled Spirits and Wine Fair Trade Act (KRS 244.380 et seq.), which required producers and wholesalers to enter contracts setting minimum resale prices for wine and liquor with statutory markups, enforced through unfair competition penalties and license revocation. The Franklin Circuit Court ruled that key sections violated the U.S. Commerce Clause, the Sherman Antitrust Act, and sections of the Kentucky Constitution. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the invalidation under federal antitrust law, holding that the statutes did not qualify for state action immunity because they permitted private price-setting with only mechanical state markups and lacked sufficient state supervision or control over final prices. The court distinguished the scheme from valid state regulation and found no meaningful protection under the 21st Amendment, while modifying the judgments to remove state constitutional conclusions.
This case concerned whether Kentucky's no-fault Motor Vehicle Reparations Act provisions limiting a no-fault insurer's recoupment rights against a third-party tortfeasor violate Sections 14 and 54 of the state constitution, which guarantee remedies by due course of law and prohibit legislative limits on recoveries for death, personal injury, or property damage. The court affirmed the lower ruling that the statutes are constitutional. It reasoned that no independent (non-derivative) common-law right of indemnity existed for casualty insurers at the time of the 1891 constitution, that any such right would be subject to legislative alteration under Section 233, and that Sections 14 and 54 apply only to direct tort actions rather than an insurer's separate indemnity claim. The opinion distinguishes subrogation (which follows the insured's limited rights) from indemnity and notes that insurers doing business in the state consent to regulatory limits.
The case concerned the construction of a will establishing the Mary Cofer Trigg Trust Fund, which directed quarterly income from an initial 700 shares of bank stock (later increased by dividends to thousands of shares) to the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, with other trust income going to various charities. The trial court ruled that dividend shares passed to the other charities and that the Seminary bequest created a dry, passive trust, so the shares passed outright to the Seminary; the Court of Appeals affirmed the dry-trust holding but reversed on the dividend shares. The Supreme Court held that the trust was active because the trustee had ongoing duties to collect and pay income, vote shares, and prudently manage the investment, and that a state statute expressly included stock dividends in the legacy, so all shares remained in the trust corpus for the Seminary's benefit. The court explained that charitable trusts are exempt from the rule against perpetuities and that passivity and duration are distinct issues, leading to reversal in part of the lower courts' decisions with directions to enter a new judgment.