John S. Palmore

This case addressed whether Kentucky's five-year statutes of limitation on claims against builders for defective construction (KRS 413.120(14) and 413.135) could constitutionally bar recovery for injuries occurring in 1978 from work completed in 1971. The court held that the statutes did not violate Sections 14, 54, and 241 of the Kentucky Constitution. It distinguished the earlier decision in Saylor v. Hall, which had struck down the same statutes as applied to a 1969 death from 1955 construction, because that case turned on the existence of a cause of action at the time the limitation laws were enacted; here the decisive question was whether such a remedy existed when the Constitution was adopted in 1891. Because third-party negligence claims against builders for latent defects were not recognized until decades later, the constitutional provisions protecting established remedies did not apply, and the court reversed the Court of Appeals.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Higdon Food Service suing former employee Gene Walker and his new employer Kesterson Food Company to enforce a noncompetition covenant in Walker's employment contract that restricted him from competing or soliciting customers for one year after leaving. The trial court granted an injunction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the contract lacked consideration and mutuality because Walker was an at-will employee. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed, holding that the employment agreement itself provided sufficient consideration for the covenant, and that the contract implied a good faith requirement for termination, making it enforceable.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Gregory Richmond's conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to sell, based on evidence from a car search after an arrest and a deposition taken from his then-wife Kim, who had been involved in the events. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, ruling that a search warrant for Richmond's impounded car was valid even though issued by a district judge from another judicial district after local judges were unavailable. The court also held that the wife's deposition was properly conducted in a trial-like setting presided over by the judge, with cross-examination by defense counsel present, satisfying confrontation requirements and rendering marital privilege objections inapplicable or waived, with no prejudicial errors found in other trial aspects.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned challenges to provisions of Kentucky's Distilled Spirits and Wine Fair Trade Act (KRS 244.380 et seq.), which required producers and wholesalers to enter contracts setting minimum resale prices for wine and liquor with statutory markups, enforced through unfair competition penalties and license revocation. The Franklin Circuit Court ruled that key sections violated the U.S. Commerce Clause, the Sherman Antitrust Act, and sections of the Kentucky Constitution. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the invalidation under federal antitrust law, holding that the statutes did not qualify for state action immunity because they permitted private price-setting with only mechanical state markups and lacked sufficient state supervision or control over final prices. The court distinguished the scheme from valid state regulation and found no meaningful protection under the 21st Amendment, while modifying the judgments to remove state constitutional conclusions.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case concerned whether Kentucky's no-fault Motor Vehicle Reparations Act provisions limiting a no-fault insurer's recoupment rights against a third-party tortfeasor violate Sections 14 and 54 of the state constitution, which guarantee remedies by due course of law and prohibit legislative limits on recoveries for death, personal injury, or property damage. The court affirmed the lower ruling that the statutes are constitutional. It reasoned that no independent (non-derivative) common-law right of indemnity existed for casualty insurers at the time of the 1891 constitution, that any such right would be subject to legislative alteration under Section 233, and that Sections 14 and 54 apply only to direct tort actions rather than an insurer's separate indemnity claim. The opinion distinguishes subrogation (which follows the insured's limited rights) from indemnity and notes that insurers doing business in the state consent to regulatory limits.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned the construction of a will establishing the Mary Cofer Trigg Trust Fund, which directed quarterly income from an initial 700 shares of bank stock (later increased by dividends to thousands of shares) to the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, with other trust income going to various charities. The trial court ruled that dividend shares passed to the other charities and that the Seminary bequest created a dry, passive trust, so the shares passed outright to the Seminary; the Court of Appeals affirmed the dry-trust holding but reversed on the dividend shares. The Supreme Court held that the trust was active because the trustee had ongoing duties to collect and pay income, vote shares, and prudently manage the investment, and that a state statute expressly included stock dividends in the legacy, so all shares remained in the trust corpus for the Seminary's benefit. The court explained that charitable trusts are exempt from the rule against perpetuities and that passivity and duration are distinct issues, leading to reversal in part of the lower courts' decisions with directions to enter a new judgment.

property

The case involved homeowners who bought a new home in 1972 and sued the builders in 1980 after it burned down in 1978 due to a claimed electrical wiring defect, alleging breach of implied warranty. The trial court dismissed the suit as time-barred under KRS 413.135, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the statute unconstitutional as applied. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the dismissal, reasoning that since the implied warranty claim for new home purchases did not exist under state law when the limitations statute was enacted in 1966, the constitutional protections did not prevent the statute from barring the later-arising cause of action.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

This case was a disciplinary proceeding brought by the Kentucky Bar Association against attorney Richard J. Gangwish II for violating SCR 3.135 through two published advertisements offering discounted legal services. The Board of Governors found violations after the respondent ran a church bulletin ad for wills at $15 with a coupon and a chamber of commerce brochure offering a 20% discount on legal services to members, without submitting the ad for review. The court held that the advertisements were not protected speech under the First Amendment because they promoted discounts rather than fixed prices for routine services, contrary to the limits recognized in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, and were misleading. It therefore adopted the recommendation of a public reprimand and assessed costs against the respondent.

free speechbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a challenge by Kentucky's Commissioner of Agriculture to a 1981 executive order by the Governor that transferred functions, personnel, and funds from the Department of Agriculture to a newly created Energy and Agriculture Cabinet. The trial court ruled the order invalid as unauthorized by statute, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that KRS 12.025(1) permits reorganization only of statutory administrative departments and does not extend to the constitutionally established Department of Agriculture. The court further reasoned that the Governor possesses no independent constitutional authority to reorganize executive agencies in this manner, as such power rests with the General Assembly. The opinion also addressed appellate procedure, clarifying that a cross-appeal was unnecessary for the prevailing party to argue alternative grounds supporting the judgment.

procedure

In King v. Venters, the appellant sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals to require the Pike Circuit Court judge to dismiss two indictments or grant a post-indictment preliminary hearing to determine probable cause. The court affirmed the denial of relief, ruling that no law or constitutional provision requires an indictment to rest on probable cause and that a preliminary hearing serves only to decide whether to detain a defendant until the grand jury acts. The reasoning emphasized that the trial on the merits is the stage for testing evidence, that grand juries and elected prosecutors provide sufficient screening, and that the validity of an indictment cannot be attacked on grounds of insufficient evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a discovery dispute in a personal injury lawsuit arising from a car accident in which plaintiff James Murphy, Jr. sought the contents of a statement defendant Elizabeth Beerbower had given her liability insurer after the accident but before she had retained counsel. The trial court ordered production of the statement, but the Court of Appeals granted a writ of prohibition barring discovery on the ground that the communication was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a report from an insured to her liability insurer concerning a covered event is privileged because the insurer acts as an agent for transmitting the information to an attorney for the insured's protection, especially given the policy's cooperation requirement and the insurer's duty to provide counsel. The court reasoned that an insured should not be penalized for relying on the insurer rather than personally retaining counsel.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a challenge by candidate J.L. Thomas to prevent W.E. Lyons and Jacob Asher from appearing on the ballot for the urban county council primary because they failed to obtain the required 100 signatures on their nominating petitions under KRS 89.440. The trial court ruled in favor of Thomas, but the Court of Appeals held that KRS 118.176 did not apply to nonpartisan primaries. The Supreme Court reversed, determining that KRS 118.176 does apply to such primaries, that the signature requirement is constitutional as it applies equally in nonpartisan elections unlike the partisan context in cited federal precedent, and that the candidates were ineligible, allowing the remaining qualified candidates to proceed to the general election ballot.

electionsprocedure

This case concerns Roger Dale Crawley’s effort to block a retrial on a persistent felony-offender charge in Jefferson Circuit Court. After an earlier conviction on that charge was reversed for insufficient evidence regarding Crawley’s age, the U.S. Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Burks v. United States held that double jeopardy bars retrial following reversal for evidentiary insufficiency. The Kentucky Supreme Court determined that its prior reversal effectively amounted to an acquittal under Burks, rendering any new trial invalid. It further held that an ordinary appeal would not adequately protect against the double-jeopardy violation. The court therefore issued a writ of prohibition preventing the trial judge from retrying Crawley on the persistent-offender count.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute among neighboring landowners in Allen County over an old passway, with one party prompting the county fiscal court to formally accept it as a county road under KRS Chapter 178. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the fiscal court's 1976 order was invalid because the passway was not a public road at the time. The court reasoned that formal acceptance as a county road requires an existing public road or proper establishment procedures, and here the passway had seen no public use for over 30 years—only intermittent private access to abandoned farms—despite occasional county maintenance. The trial court's finding of public-road status was deemed clearly erroneous, leading to reversal of the Court of Appeals and remand to set aside the order.

propertyprocedure

This case arose when the Public Advocate, an executive branch official, filed a complaint seeking a declaration of rights to obtain periodic access to and copies of records compiled by the Administrative Office of the Courts under KRS 532.075(6) for the Kentucky Supreme Court's mandatory review of death sentences, including data on similar cases for proportionality analysis. The proceeding was transferred to and treated by the Supreme Court as an ex parte application for relief. The court denied the petition, holding that the materials are compiled solely for the court's internal use in exercising its judicial review functions under the statute and are not subject to compelled disclosure to the executive branch or the public until the court has examined them. The core reasoning emphasized separation of powers, the judiciary's authority to control its own processes and records under the state constitution, and the distinction between case records and internal deliberative materials used to inform sentencing review.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Harold Whorton's appeal from a judgment imposing consecutive prison terms totaling 230 years after convictions on 10 counts of first-degree robbery, two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, and two counts of first-degree attempted robbery arising from three separate restaurant robberies. Whorton contended that the trial court erred by denying his request for a bifurcated trial so he could testify solely on mitigating factors such as his military service and by refusing to give requested instructions defining reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence. The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that bifurcation is not authorized by statute except in persistent-offender or capital cases and that the instructions given to the jury adequately covered the required legal principles under state law, thereby affirming the convictions and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved four leasehold interests in real estate at the Greater Cincinnati Airport in Boone County, Kentucky, owned by the Kenton County Airport Board. The property valuation administrator assessed these leaseholds for ad valorem taxes, and the assessments were upheld by the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals and the Boone Circuit Court. The appellants argued that the leaseholds were exempt under KRS 183.138 and that the taxation was unconstitutionally discriminatory under Section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution. The court held that the leaseholds were taxable because they had fair market value and the rights were owned by the lessees rather than the exempt governmental owner, and that any statutory exemption would violate Section 174. It further found no unconstitutional discrimination, as there was no evidence of conscious violation of tax uniformity principles despite non-assessment of similar leaseholds.

taxesproperty

This case involved a claim by an illegitimate child to establish an ownership interest in real property through inheritance from his father under Kentucky law. The Kentucky Supreme Court had previously affirmed dismissal of the claim based on KRS 391.090, which permitted inheritance from the father only if the parents had married. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Trimble v. Gordon, the court reconsidered and held that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment by creating an unconstitutional distinction based on legitimacy. The judgment was affirmed as to the dismissal of Count 1 on venue grounds but reversed as to Count 2, with the ruling applying prospectively from April 26, 1977, except in pending litigation.

family lawcivil rights

This case concerned lessees of a portion of a larger tract of land who sought to enforce a right of first refusal clause in their lease after one of the three co-owners sold his undivided interest to another co-owner without notice. The trial court denied specific performance, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court's judgment. The court reasoned that the lease referred to a sale by the 'lessor' to an outside party, and when the original lessor died the co-owners collectively became the lessor, so a transfer among them did not introduce a new owner outside that group or trigger the clause. The decision turned on the specific language of the lease and the absence of any external purchaser.

property

The case involved Morris Wells, convicted of murdering James Byrge following a hung jury in an earlier trial. After Wells's ex-wife remarried him and claimed spousal privilege to avoid testifying at the second trial, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to introduce her testimony from the first trial. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the life sentence, ruling that procedural rules on depositions and former testimony superseded an older statute limiting such evidence and that unavailability due to privilege justified admitting the prior testimony. The court also found other claimed errors, including admission of evidence from a search and certain prosecutorial remarks, to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

criminal lawprocedure