Irma S. Raker

The case involved the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland bringing charges against attorney Samuel Edward Hensley for multiple violations of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct and a state statute on trust money. The violations stemmed from two client matters, including failure to appear in court or communicate with clients, mishandling of retainer and settlement funds, abandonment of a case without returning unearned fees, failure to respond to Bar Counsel inquiries, and misrepresenting his license to practice law in another state. After the respondent did not participate in the proceedings, the circuit court made findings of fact, and the Court of Appeals determined that the misconduct warranted disbarment. The court reasoned that the pattern of neglect, dishonesty, and non-cooperation, with no mitigating factors presented, required disbarment to protect the public and deter similar conduct.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland charging attorney Jonathan Christian Dailey with violating professional conduct rules, including MLRPC 1.6(a) and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) as well as corresponding MARPC provisions, after he solicited and received funds from a client as purported investments shortly after her settlement, misappropriated the money, and repeatedly provided her with false information. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County made findings of fact and conclusions of law following an evidentiary hearing, determining that Dailey had taken advantage of the client's lack of legal sophistication and trust in him. The Court of Appeals concluded that disbarment was the appropriate sanction based on the intentional dishonest conduct, the presence of multiple aggravating factors such as a pattern of misconduct and refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing, and the absence of any mitigating factors.

criminal lawprocedure

In Moser v. Heffington, a plaintiff who brought a civil defamation action against the defendants was also facing related criminal charges and sought to stay the civil proceedings to avoid waiving her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County denied the stay, finding that the plaintiff had already waived the privilege to the same extent by testifying at a deposition in the same proceeding, and later granted the defendants’ motion for judgment after the plaintiffs presented no evidence at trial. The Court of Appeals held that a deposition and trial constitute part of the same proceeding for Fifth Amendment purposes, that trial courts must balance the parties’ rights and interests when considering a stay (including docket concerns), and that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the stay or err in granting judgment. The Court reversed the Court of Special Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s judgment.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

This case concerned a civil defamation lawsuit brought by Kristi Heffington against the Mosers, where Heffington, facing parallel criminal charges, moved to stay the civil proceedings to avoid waiving her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County did not abuse its discretion in denying the stay and properly granted the Mosers’ motion for judgment after the Heffingtons presented no evidence at trial. The court reasoned that a deposition and the subsequent trial constitute the same proceeding, so Heffington’s waiver of the privilege at her deposition extended to trial. It further concluded that the trial court had appropriately balanced the defendants’ interest in timely resolution against the plaintiff’s rights and considered docket impacts when denying the indefinite stay. Finally, because the plaintiffs consented to an abbreviated proceeding with no evidence offered, the motion for judgment under Maryland Rule 2-519 was correctly granted.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC and White Flint Express Realty Group Limited Partnership over whether White Flint could recover attorney’s fees from Bainbridge under their easement agreement for a construction project. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that the contract's indemnification provision in Article 19 expressly authorized the recovery of attorney’s fees in a first-party breach of contract action. The court reasoned that the agreement's language providing for payment of attorney’s fees tied to actions for breach was sufficient to override the American Rule against fee shifting, distinguishing it from precedents where such language was absent or limited to third-party claims.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case concerned a contract dispute between Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC and White Flint Express Realty Group Limited Partnership over an easement agreement tied to a construction project, specifically whether the agreement allowed recovery of attorney’s fees in a first-party action for breach. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the Court of Special Appeals’ ruling that White Flint was entitled to attorney’s fees. Maryland follows the American Rule barring prevailing-party fee awards except where the parties have agreed otherwise, and the court interpreted the contract’s language in Article 19 as expressly authorizing such recovery by tying fees to breach actions without the notice or defense-assumption clauses that would limit it to third-party claims. The decision rested on standard principles of contract interpretation applied to the easement agreement’s terms.

business & regulatoryproperty