Irma S. Raker

The case involved the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland bringing charges against attorney Samuel Edward Hensley for multiple violations of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct and a state statute on trust money. The violations stemmed from two client matters, including failure to appear in court or communicate with clients, mishandling of retainer and settlement funds, abandonment of a case without returning unearned fees, failure to respond to Bar Counsel inquiries, and misrepresenting his license to practice law in another state. After the respondent did not participate in the proceedings, the circuit court made findings of fact, and the Court of Appeals determined that the misconduct warranted disbarment. The court reasoned that the pattern of neglect, dishonesty, and non-cooperation, with no mitigating factors presented, required disbarment to protect the public and deter similar conduct.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland charging attorney Jonathan Christian Dailey with violating professional conduct rules, including MLRPC 1.6(a) and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) as well as corresponding MARPC provisions, after he solicited and received funds from a client as purported investments shortly after her settlement, misappropriated the money, and repeatedly provided her with false information. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County made findings of fact and conclusions of law following an evidentiary hearing, determining that Dailey had taken advantage of the client's lack of legal sophistication and trust in him. The Court of Appeals concluded that disbarment was the appropriate sanction based on the intentional dishonest conduct, the presence of multiple aggravating factors such as a pattern of misconduct and refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing, and the absence of any mitigating factors.

criminal lawprocedure

In Moser v. Heffington, a plaintiff who brought a civil defamation action against the defendants was also facing related criminal charges and sought to stay the civil proceedings to avoid waiving her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County denied the stay, finding that the plaintiff had already waived the privilege to the same extent by testifying at a deposition in the same proceeding, and later granted the defendants’ motion for judgment after the plaintiffs presented no evidence at trial. The Court of Appeals held that a deposition and trial constitute part of the same proceeding for Fifth Amendment purposes, that trial courts must balance the parties’ rights and interests when considering a stay (including docket concerns), and that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the stay or err in granting judgment. The Court reversed the Court of Special Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s judgment.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

This case concerned a civil defamation lawsuit brought by Kristi Heffington against the Mosers, where Heffington, facing parallel criminal charges, moved to stay the civil proceedings to avoid waiving her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County did not abuse its discretion in denying the stay and properly granted the Mosers’ motion for judgment after the Heffingtons presented no evidence at trial. The court reasoned that a deposition and the subsequent trial constitute the same proceeding, so Heffington’s waiver of the privilege at her deposition extended to trial. It further concluded that the trial court had appropriately balanced the defendants’ interest in timely resolution against the plaintiff’s rights and considered docket impacts when denying the indefinite stay. Finally, because the plaintiffs consented to an abbreviated proceeding with no evidence offered, the motion for judgment under Maryland Rule 2-519 was correctly granted.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC and White Flint Express Realty Group Limited Partnership over whether White Flint could recover attorney’s fees from Bainbridge under their easement agreement for a construction project. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that the contract's indemnification provision in Article 19 expressly authorized the recovery of attorney’s fees in a first-party breach of contract action. The court reasoned that the agreement's language providing for payment of attorney’s fees tied to actions for breach was sufficient to override the American Rule against fee shifting, distinguishing it from precedents where such language was absent or limited to third-party claims.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case concerned a contract dispute between Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC and White Flint Express Realty Group Limited Partnership over an easement agreement tied to a construction project, specifically whether the agreement allowed recovery of attorney’s fees in a first-party action for breach. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the Court of Special Appeals’ ruling that White Flint was entitled to attorney’s fees. Maryland follows the American Rule barring prevailing-party fee awards except where the parties have agreed otherwise, and the court interpreted the contract’s language in Article 19 as expressly authorizing such recovery by tying fees to breach actions without the notice or defense-assumption clauses that would limit it to third-party claims. The decision rested on standard principles of contract interpretation applied to the easement agreement’s terms.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned whether defendant Tyshon Jones, who had been acquitted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, second-degree specific-intent murder, and robbery charges, could be retried for second-degree felony murder with first-degree assault as the predicate felony. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Special Appeals' judgment barring the retrial but did so on the ground that first-degree assault cannot serve as a predicate for felony murder. The court overruled its prior decision in Roary v. State and held that the merger doctrine prevents the underlying assault from being treated as a separate and independent offense when it is an integral element of the resulting homicide. The decision rested on the merger principle rather than double-jeopardy grounds.

criminal law

In this murder case, petitioner James Desmond Jones was convicted of second-degree murder and handgun use after police investigated calls from a victim's phone linked to his wife, leading officers to the family property where they spoke with relatives, obtained consent to enter buildings, and seized a rental car containing evidence. Jones moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that a "No Trespassing" sign made the officers trespassers and rendered their entry and subsequent search unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, and the Court of Appeals likewise affirmed, holding that the sign did not create a reasonable expectation of privacy that would bar officers from approaching the front door to conduct a lawful investigation. The court reasoned that the officers' conduct was consistent with the implied license to enter curtilage for legitimate police business and that any consent obtained negated Fourth Amendment concerns. The decision also noted that the petitioner's state constitutional claim under Article 26 tracked the federal analysis.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a tort action in which Jane Correia sued Johns Hopkins Hospital and an elevator maintenance company after she was injured when an elevator at the hospital malfunctioned and stopped abruptly, requiring her to undergo back and hip surgery. The jury was instructed that the hospital as owner owed passengers the highest degree of care practicable under the circumstances, while the maintenance company owed only ordinary reasonable care; the jury found the hospital negligent and awarded damages but found the maintenance company not negligent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Maryland common law requires elevator owners and operators to meet the heightened standard of care applicable to common carriers because passengers rely on them for safety, a principle rooted in public policy that applies regardless of whether elevators are automatic or maintained by independent contractors.

torts & liability

In Myer v. State, the defendant was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor and related offenses after a bench trial in which a three-year-old victim's videotaped interview with a social worker was admitted into evidence. The defendant had declined to cross-examine the child during her live testimony but sought to recall her for cross-examination on the videotape's contents after it was formally offered and admitted near the end of the State's case. The court held that the trial judge abused its discretion by denying that request, reasoning that the late admission of the out-of-court statement created a need for additional cross-examination to address potential inconsistencies or credibility issues raised by the recording itself. The decision focused on the defendant's opportunity to confront the witness regarding the newly admitted evidence under principles of fairness and evidentiary procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a passenger, David Maurer, who was injured in a car accident caused by his underage friend driving under the influence and who then sued his own insurer, Penn National, for underinsured motorist benefits after settling with the driver's insurer. At trial, the court instructed the jury on contributory negligence and assumption of the risk, including that violation of a statute is evidence of negligence, and referenced statutes criminalizing driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher and using false identification to obtain alcohol. The Court of Appeals held that these instructions were erroneous because the referenced statutes were irrelevant to the passenger's alleged contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. It therefore reversed the judgment for the insurer and remanded for a new trial limited to damages.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether officers and directors of tenant corporation Intracel could be held personally liable for trespass after the company, facing financial difficulties and rent default, left behind hazardous biological, chemical, and radioactive materials on the leased premises in Rockville, Maryland, following termination of its ten-year lease in 2001. ARE Acquisitions, the landlord, sued the individual and affiliated corporate defendants for trespass (among other claims) after incurring cleanup costs, alleging unauthorized entry and abandonment of materials. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the trespass count, but the Court of Special Appeals reversed; the Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that the petitioners' actions did not amount to trespass under Maryland law because merely leaving chattels behind after lease termination does not constitute an unauthorized entry onto the property, and it remanded with directions to affirm the Circuit Court's judgment.

propertytorts & liability

The case was a disciplinary proceeding brought by the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland against attorney Wayne Isaiah McBroom. The Court of Appeals of Maryland issued an order reprimanding the respondent for professional misconduct after reviewing a joint petition submitted by the parties. The reprimand was imposed for violations of Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication), 1.5(b) (fees), 1.16(d) (termination of representation), and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). The court adopted the sanctions and reasons set forth in the joint petition without additional factual findings or analysis in the order itself.

procedure

This case involved a challenge by multiple used car dealers in Prince George's County to a zoning ordinance (CB 87) that imposed a minimum 25,000 square foot lot size requirement on used vehicle, mobile home, and camping trailer sales lots, along with a three-year amortization period for compliance. The dealers filed a direct action in circuit court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on due process and equal protection grounds, without first pursuing any administrative relief. The court held that the dealers were required to invoke and exhaust available administrative remedies, such as applying for variances from the Prince George's County Board of Zoning Appeals, before obtaining judicial review of the ordinance's constitutionality. The core reasoning was that the Regional District Act and county code establish a specific administrative process for zoning matters, including variances and appeals, and that a constitutional challenge does not automatically excuse exhaustion when administrative remedies could potentially resolve or narrow the dispute.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case Young v. State involved the conviction of Anthony Young for a second-degree sexual offense against a thirteen-year-old boy, with identification as the central issue at trial. The primary question on appeal was whether the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony of a DNA match from anal swabs without accompanying statistical probability evidence. The court held that the evidence was admissible, ruling that when DNA analysis examines a sufficient number of genetic markers to produce an infinitesimal random match probability, an expert may testify to both the match and the source of the DNA. The core reasoning was that Maryland evidence rules allow expert opinions supported by a sufficient factual basis from the testing methods, and that probability statistics are not a necessary foundation for source attribution testimony in such circumstances.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a high school teacher convicted of child abuse and related sexual offenses against a 14-year-old student after giving her a ride home from school and engaging in sexual activity at his house. The central issue was whether the teacher qualified as a person with temporary responsibility for supervising a child under Maryland's child abuse statute, Md. Code Ann., Art. 27, § 35C(b). The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the convictions, finding the evidence sufficient based on the teacher's school interactions with the student, such as occasional academic help and providing rides, combined with teachers' general supervisory duties at the school. The court reasoned that these circumstances established the requisite temporary responsibility even though the encounter occurred after school hours and the student's mother had not explicitly delegated supervision.

criminal law

This case involved a petition for reinstatement to the Maryland bar by Wendell H. Grier, who had been indefinitely suspended in 1990 after multiple client complaints about competence, diligence, communication, and escrow account shortages, all tied to his active alcoholism at the time. Following his suspension, Grier achieved sustained sobriety since April 1991, maintained regular AA attendance, held steady employment as a legal assistant with positive performance reviews, and obtained a real estate appraiser license. A five-member inquiry panel recommended reinstatement with conditions including ongoing AA participation and reporting, escrow account co-signing by another attorney if needed, and practice monitoring for five years, though the Review Board voted against reinstatement. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, finding that Grier had satisfied the requirements for reinstatement through demonstrated rehabilitation and compliance with sobriety and professional standards, subject to the recommended oversight conditions for a set period.

business & regulatory