Alan M. Wilner

The case involved a 16-year-old charged in adult court with serious offenses including attempted first-degree murder and home invasion arising from an armed robbery in which shots were fired and a victim injured. The defendant moved under Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 4-202 to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court, but the circuit court denied the motion after considering the statutory factors and emphasizing the gravity of the crimes. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had misinterpreted the key factor of amenability to treatment in the juvenile system as merely eligibility for programs rather than a broader inquiry into available services, the defendant's willingness to participate, and whether juvenile programming would better reduce recidivism than adult options. The court clarified that all five statutory factors—age and condition, amenability, nature of the offense, and public safety—are interconnected with amenability serving as the central focus, and that the ultimate legislative goal is public protection through effective rehabilitation. The case was remanded for a fresh transfer hearing applying these standards, with directions to account for the passage of time since the original proceeding.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a class action (the Linton action) brought by individuals who had assigned their structured settlement annuity benefits, alleging that the assignments resulted from fraud by the assignees (Access Funding and affiliates). Prior to that suit, the Maryland Consumer Protection Division (CPD) and the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau had filed separate actions against the same defendants seeking civil penalties, injunctive relief, and disgorgement or restitution. While those government actions were pending, the Linton parties negotiated a settlement that provided plaintiffs only about four percent of the assigned benefits' value, barred them from benefiting from the CPD or CFPB suits, assigned any recoveries from those suits to the defendants, and purported to require dismissal of the government cases. The Circuit Court approved the settlement over CPD's objection due to the defendants' limited assets, but the Court of Special Appeals reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that reversal. The Court held that private parties may not use a settlement to interfere with the government's pursuit of statutory remedies like disgorgement, which serve a distinct public purpose of stripping wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains beyond merely compensating victims, and remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a complaint by Robin Bartlett Frazier against the Taneytown City Council alleging violations of Maryland's Open Meetings Act when the Council held a closed session to consult about threatened litigation. The Circuit Court found violations but characterized them as technical, harmless, and non-willful, entering judgment for the Council and denying sanctions such as civil penalties, voiding of actions, or fee reimbursement. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that violations cannot be excused merely for being technical or harmless, that all sanctions under the Act are discretionary, and that civil penalties or voiding actions require willful violations defined as knowing and intentional conduct (though not necessarily nefarious). It concluded there was no abuse of discretion in declining sanctions and affirmed the judgment.

procedure

This case was a class action lawsuit brought by consumers against LVNV Funding LLC, an unlicensed debt buyer, challenging money judgments that LVNV had obtained against them in Maryland District Court in 2008. The plaintiffs sought to have those judgments declared void and to recover monetary damages under the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act and the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act. The Court of Appeals held that the enrolled District Court judgments were not void and could not be collaterally attacked because the District Court had fundamental jurisdiction, reversing the Court of Special Appeals on that point. However, the Court ruled that the licensing statute permits a private cause of action for damages arising from unlicensed debt collection activities and remanded the case for a new trial limited to damages under the relevant statutory provisions.

business & regulatorycriminal lawprocedure

This case involved commercial real estate brokers who procured a five-year lease with a renewal option, under which the property owner was obligated to pay brokerage commissions for both the initial term and any renewal. After the owner defaulted on its mortgage, the property was foreclosed and ultimately acquired by the respondent subject to the existing lease; when the tenant later exercised its renewal option, the brokers sued the respondent to recover the renewal commissions, claiming third-party beneficiary status and successor liability under the lease covenants. The lower courts granted summary judgment for the respondent, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that even assuming the brokers qualified as third-party beneficiaries, the commission covenant was a personal one that did not run with the land, the respondent had never signed the lease, and neither the respondent nor its predecessors (including the foreclosing lender) had assumed any lease obligations—in fact, the mortgage documents expressly disclaimed such liability.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved commercial real estate brokers who sought renewal commissions from a later property owner after a tenant exercised a lease renewal option. The brokers procured the original five-year lease with a renewal term, under which the owner was required to pay commissions, but the property went through foreclosure and multiple transfers, with the defendant acquiring it subject to the lease. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court and Court of Special Appeals judgments for the defendant, ruling that the commission covenant was a personal obligation that did not run with the land. The court reasoned that the defendant and its assignors were never parties to the lease, the assignments expressly disclaimed liability for lease covenants, and third-party beneficiary status alone did not create liability where none otherwise existed.

property