Alan M. Wilner

The case involved a 16-year-old charged in adult court with serious offenses including attempted first-degree murder and home invasion arising from an armed robbery in which shots were fired and a victim injured. The defendant moved under Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 4-202 to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court, but the circuit court denied the motion after considering the statutory factors and emphasizing the gravity of the crimes. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had misinterpreted the key factor of amenability to treatment in the juvenile system as merely eligibility for programs rather than a broader inquiry into available services, the defendant's willingness to participate, and whether juvenile programming would better reduce recidivism than adult options. The court clarified that all five statutory factors—age and condition, amenability, nature of the offense, and public safety—are interconnected with amenability serving as the central focus, and that the ultimate legislative goal is public protection through effective rehabilitation. The case was remanded for a fresh transfer hearing applying these standards, with directions to account for the passage of time since the original proceeding.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a class action (the Linton action) brought by individuals who had assigned their structured settlement annuity benefits, alleging that the assignments resulted from fraud by the assignees (Access Funding and affiliates). Prior to that suit, the Maryland Consumer Protection Division (CPD) and the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau had filed separate actions against the same defendants seeking civil penalties, injunctive relief, and disgorgement or restitution. While those government actions were pending, the Linton parties negotiated a settlement that provided plaintiffs only about four percent of the assigned benefits' value, barred them from benefiting from the CPD or CFPB suits, assigned any recoveries from those suits to the defendants, and purported to require dismissal of the government cases. The Circuit Court approved the settlement over CPD's objection due to the defendants' limited assets, but the Court of Special Appeals reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that reversal. The Court held that private parties may not use a settlement to interfere with the government's pursuit of statutory remedies like disgorgement, which serve a distinct public purpose of stripping wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains beyond merely compensating victims, and remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a complaint by Robin Bartlett Frazier against the Taneytown City Council alleging violations of Maryland's Open Meetings Act when the Council held a closed session to consult about threatened litigation. The Circuit Court found violations but characterized them as technical, harmless, and non-willful, entering judgment for the Council and denying sanctions such as civil penalties, voiding of actions, or fee reimbursement. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that violations cannot be excused merely for being technical or harmless, that all sanctions under the Act are discretionary, and that civil penalties or voiding actions require willful violations defined as knowing and intentional conduct (though not necessarily nefarious). It concluded there was no abuse of discretion in declining sanctions and affirmed the judgment.

procedure

This case was a class action lawsuit brought by consumers against LVNV Funding LLC, an unlicensed debt buyer, challenging money judgments that LVNV had obtained against them in Maryland District Court in 2008. The plaintiffs sought to have those judgments declared void and to recover monetary damages under the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act and the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act. The Court of Appeals held that the enrolled District Court judgments were not void and could not be collaterally attacked because the District Court had fundamental jurisdiction, reversing the Court of Special Appeals on that point. However, the Court ruled that the licensing statute permits a private cause of action for damages arising from unlicensed debt collection activities and remanded the case for a new trial limited to damages under the relevant statutory provisions.

business & regulatorycriminal lawprocedure

This case involved commercial real estate brokers who procured a five-year lease with a renewal option, under which the property owner was obligated to pay brokerage commissions for both the initial term and any renewal. After the owner defaulted on its mortgage, the property was foreclosed and ultimately acquired by the respondent subject to the existing lease; when the tenant later exercised its renewal option, the brokers sued the respondent to recover the renewal commissions, claiming third-party beneficiary status and successor liability under the lease covenants. The lower courts granted summary judgment for the respondent, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that even assuming the brokers qualified as third-party beneficiaries, the commission covenant was a personal one that did not run with the land, the respondent had never signed the lease, and neither the respondent nor its predecessors (including the foreclosing lender) had assumed any lease obligations—in fact, the mortgage documents expressly disclaimed such liability.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved commercial real estate brokers who sought renewal commissions from a later property owner after a tenant exercised a lease renewal option. The brokers procured the original five-year lease with a renewal term, under which the owner was required to pay commissions, but the property went through foreclosure and multiple transfers, with the defendant acquiring it subject to the lease. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court and Court of Special Appeals judgments for the defendant, ruling that the commission covenant was a personal obligation that did not run with the land. The court reasoned that the defendant and its assignors were never parties to the lease, the assignments expressly disclaimed liability for lease covenants, and third-party beneficiary status alone did not create liability where none otherwise existed.

property

The case concerned the Maryland Governor's reappointment of two department secretaries after withdrawing their nominations during the 2017 legislative session without Senate action, and the legislature's inclusion of budget language (§30) barring payment of their salaries. The Court of Appeals held that the reappointments were valid under Article II, §§11 and 12 of the state constitution because the Senate had not rejected the nominations despite opportunity to do so, and that §30 was unconstitutional and unenforceable under the precedent of Bayne v. Secretary of State. The core reasoning was that the constitution permits such recess reappointments when the Senate fails to act, and the legislature cannot use appropriations to override that authority. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

federal power

The case concerned two individuals appointed by the Maryland Governor to cabinet secretary positions during a recess, whose nominations were submitted to the Senate but withdrawn before any rejection vote, leading to their reappointment after the legislative session ended. The General Assembly had included a budget provision (§30) barring use of any funds to pay their salaries, which the State Treasurer followed by withholding paychecks. The Court of Appeals held that the reappointments were valid under Article II, §§11 and 12 of the state constitution because the Senate had not rejected the nominations, and that §30 was invalid and unenforceable under precedent from Bayne v. Secretary of State. The core reasoning relied on the constitutional text governing recess appointments and the clear prohibition against legislative nullification of such appointments via budget language.

procedure

In this criminal case, defendant Phillips moved in limine to exclude cell-phone location evidence as unreliable under the Reed v. State standard, and the trial judge granted the motion. The State filed an untimely request for in banc review of that interlocutory order; an in banc panel reversed the ruling, but the Court of Special Appeals held the panel lacked jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court held that in banc review under Article IV, § 22 and Rule 2-551 requires a timely notice filed within ten days after final judgment (or resolution of post-judgment motions), proper preservation of the issue, and that the ruling be one from which an appeal would lie; the State's notice failed these requirements and was therefore a nullity. The Court further confirmed that the State had no statutory right under Courts Article § 12-302(c) to appeal the evidentiary ruling even if timely, and that an in banc decision constitutes a final judgment from which any appeal must be taken within ordinary appellate deadlines.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a company's 1993 zoning approvals for a rubble landfill and sand/gravel operation in Anne Arundel County, followed by repeated extensions to obtain required state and county permits through 2011, when the county board of appeals denied a further two-year extension by a 2-2 vote. Lower courts reversed the denial and remanded, but the Court of Appeals of Maryland clarified that an even split constitutes a denial and that the denying members' decision must be reviewed for substantial evidence and legal error. The court held that findings on the applicant's lack of diligence lacked substantial evidence and were arbitrary, while conclusions on whether the extension was the minimum necessary relief and on neighborhood impacts applied incorrect legal standards. It therefore vacated the lower court rulings and remanded to the board of appeals for further proceedings applying the proper criteria.

environmentbusiness & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved a challenge by the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) to Montgomery County's use of public resources to promote voter approval of a 2011 county law that curtailed 'effect bargaining' rights in police collective bargaining agreements, after the measure was petitioned to referendum. The Circuit Court ruled against the county, but the Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the county possessed authority under state and local law, as well as the government speech doctrine, to expend funds and direct employees in support of the ballot measure. The court further determined that the county executive and public information director were authorized to act on the county's behalf and that the FOP was not precluded from suit by standing or laches doctrines. Core reasoning centered on the distinction between prohibited private political activity and permissible government advocacy on matters directly affecting county operations, finding no violations of employee conduct regulations or collective bargaining statutes.

labor & employmentelectionsfree speech

This case concerns a long-running dispute over attorneys' fees in a Maryland wage payment lawsuit brought by Joy Friolo against her former employer under the Wage and Hour Law and Wage Payment and Collection Law. After multiple trials and appeals, the Court of Appeals confirmed that the lodestar method—multiplying reasonable hours by a reasonable hourly rate—must be used to assess fee awards in such cases. The court rejected a mathematical formula tying fees strictly to the gap between settlement offers and the final judgment, held that fees may be reduced if counsel unreasonably prolongs litigation, and ruled that successful appellate work must be compensated. It remanded the case for the circuit court to apply these principles and award reasonable fees for the appeals.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether Safeway, Inc. improperly deducted wages from employee Bonita Marshall in response to garnishment writs by using an incorrect exemption standard. The Court of Appeals clarified the proper wage exemption calculation under Maryland law as the greater of 75% of disposable wages or 30 times the federal minimum wage, held that employees have a private right of action for improper wage deductions under LE § 3-507.2, and addressed class certification procedures. The court determined that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification due to the untimeliness of the motion, predominance of individual issues, and the superiority of individual garnishment proceedings. As a result, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of Safeway.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a dispute between school bus contractors and the Anne Arundel County Board of Education over whether the board's procurement of transportation services was subject to the Maryland General Procurement Law, and thus whether the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals (MSBCA) had jurisdiction to hear the contractors' protest regarding bidding procedures and specifications. The court affirmed the dismissal of the appeal by MSBCA, holding that county boards of education are not subject to the General Procurement Law. The reasoning was that county school boards are not units of the executive branch for purposes of that law, and instead, their procurements are governed by provisions in the Education Article of the Code, with administrative review lying with the State Board of Education.

business & regulatoryprocedure