Ruth Abrams

The case concerned a landowner's application for a special permit to remove 300,000 to 400,000 cubic yards of gravel from a five-acre portion of her 39-acre residentially zoned property in order to create a level site for a Christmas tree farm. The board denied the permit under the local zoning by-law prohibiting commercial earth removal, but lower courts held the activity exempt as incidental to an agricultural or horticultural use under G. L. c. 40A, § 3. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, ruling that the proposed large-scale excavation was a separate commercial quarrying operation not primarily or incidentally related to agriculture within the meaning of G. L. c. 128, § 1A and G. L. c. 61A, § 2, and that allowing it would nullify the zoning by-law.

propertyenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether a 1991 amendment to Massachusetts workers' compensation law (G. L. c. 152, § 8(2)(j)) allowing insurers to terminate benefits for incarcerated employees applied to a worker injured in 1987 who began receiving benefits and was later imprisoned for a felony. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the reviewing board's ruling that the provision applied only to post-enactment injuries. The court held that the amendment was procedural rather than substantive under the 1991 legislation's designation and G. L. c. 152, § 2A, making it applicable to all claims from its effective date onward regardless of the injury date, and that clear legislative intent overrode the common-law presumption against retroactivity for substantive changes.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case arose from a medical malpractice suit filed by Joseph St. Germain against orthopedic surgeon Dr. Bernard Pfeifer, neurosurgeon Dr. Stephen Freidberg, resident Dr. Glen Seidman, and nurse Kristin Bartelson, alleging that premature mobilization after spinal surgery caused implanted hardware to fail. Two medical malpractice tribunals found the plaintiff's offers of proof insufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability against all defendants, triggering a requirement to post a $6,000 bond within thirty days to proceed; the plaintiff posted no bond and his claims were dismissed. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the tribunals erred in finding the offers of proof insufficient as to Nurse Bartelson and Drs. Pfeifer and Seidman, because the evidence, if substantiated, showed deviations from the postoperative plan that could support liability. The court further held that the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim against Dr. Freidberg while the plaintiff's timely motion to reduce the bond on indigency grounds remained pending. The appeals were transferred to the SJC, which reversed the dismissals in part and remanded for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

The case involved an age discrimination claim under Massachusetts law (G.L. c. 151B) brought by plaintiff Ronald Wheatley against his former employer AT&T and supervisor after his position was eliminated. Wheatley had filed a complaint with the MCAD more than six months after receiving initial notice of the elimination but within six months of his final termination date. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on statute of limitations grounds, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed. The court reasoned that the limitations period under §5 did not begin to run upon the July or September 1990 notices because those communications were equivocal, as they offered the possibility of reassignment to another position within the company and thus did not provide unequivocal notice of termination.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Chipman, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder and related charges stemming from the fatal shooting of a 14-year-old girl on a school bus and damage to a passing car, both caused by shots fired from a .30 caliber M-1 carbine in a wooded area near Route 25 in Plymouth. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of his identity as the shooter and of joint venture, lack of proof of deliberate premeditation, improper admission of a videotaped simulation of the sniper's view, and error in denying his motion to suppress statements made to police. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence, including the defendant's possession and use of the stolen rifle, target practice with his companion, proximity to the shooting site, and voluntary statements, was sufficient to support the verdicts and joint venture liability; the videotape was properly admitted as illustrative; and the statements were not the product of custodial interrogation. The court also declined to exercise its extraordinary power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce the verdict or order a new trial.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

The case concerned whether a plaintiff alleging gender discrimination in employment, including discharge due to pregnancy, had a right to a jury trial under the Massachusetts Constitution when suing her former employer under statutes such as the Equal Rights Act, wage discrimination laws, the maternity leave act, and G. L. c. 151B. The Superior Court denied the defendant's motion to strike the jury demand, and after review the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that ruling. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial on most claims under art. 15 of the Declaration of Rights because the action was a suit between persons involving a controversy concerning property that was not traditionally within equity jurisdiction in 1780 and was analogous to common-law tort or contract claims. The opinion noted that claims seeking only injunctive relief would remain equitable and not subject to jury trial.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure