Ruth Abrams

The case concerned a landowner's application for a special permit to remove 300,000 to 400,000 cubic yards of gravel from a five-acre portion of her 39-acre residentially zoned property in order to create a level site for a Christmas tree farm. The board denied the permit under the local zoning by-law prohibiting commercial earth removal, but lower courts held the activity exempt as incidental to an agricultural or horticultural use under G. L. c. 40A, § 3. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, ruling that the proposed large-scale excavation was a separate commercial quarrying operation not primarily or incidentally related to agriculture within the meaning of G. L. c. 128, § 1A and G. L. c. 61A, § 2, and that allowing it would nullify the zoning by-law.

propertyenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether a 1991 amendment to Massachusetts workers' compensation law (G. L. c. 152, § 8(2)(j)) allowing insurers to terminate benefits for incarcerated employees applied to a worker injured in 1987 who began receiving benefits and was later imprisoned for a felony. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the reviewing board's ruling that the provision applied only to post-enactment injuries. The court held that the amendment was procedural rather than substantive under the 1991 legislation's designation and G. L. c. 152, § 2A, making it applicable to all claims from its effective date onward regardless of the injury date, and that clear legislative intent overrode the common-law presumption against retroactivity for substantive changes.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case arose from a medical malpractice suit filed by Joseph St. Germain against orthopedic surgeon Dr. Bernard Pfeifer, neurosurgeon Dr. Stephen Freidberg, resident Dr. Glen Seidman, and nurse Kristin Bartelson, alleging that premature mobilization after spinal surgery caused implanted hardware to fail. Two medical malpractice tribunals found the plaintiff's offers of proof insufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability against all defendants, triggering a requirement to post a $6,000 bond within thirty days to proceed; the plaintiff posted no bond and his claims were dismissed. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the tribunals erred in finding the offers of proof insufficient as to Nurse Bartelson and Drs. Pfeifer and Seidman, because the evidence, if substantiated, showed deviations from the postoperative plan that could support liability. The court further held that the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim against Dr. Freidberg while the plaintiff's timely motion to reduce the bond on indigency grounds remained pending. The appeals were transferred to the SJC, which reversed the dismissals in part and remanded for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

The case involved an age discrimination claim under Massachusetts law (G.L. c. 151B) brought by plaintiff Ronald Wheatley against his former employer AT&T and supervisor after his position was eliminated. Wheatley had filed a complaint with the MCAD more than six months after receiving initial notice of the elimination but within six months of his final termination date. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on statute of limitations grounds, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed. The court reasoned that the limitations period under §5 did not begin to run upon the July or September 1990 notices because those communications were equivocal, as they offered the possibility of reassignment to another position within the company and thus did not provide unequivocal notice of termination.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Chipman, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder and related charges stemming from the fatal shooting of a 14-year-old girl on a school bus and damage to a passing car, both caused by shots fired from a .30 caliber M-1 carbine in a wooded area near Route 25 in Plymouth. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of his identity as the shooter and of joint venture, lack of proof of deliberate premeditation, improper admission of a videotaped simulation of the sniper's view, and error in denying his motion to suppress statements made to police. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence, including the defendant's possession and use of the stolen rifle, target practice with his companion, proximity to the shooting site, and voluntary statements, was sufficient to support the verdicts and joint venture liability; the videotape was properly admitted as illustrative; and the statements were not the product of custodial interrogation. The court also declined to exercise its extraordinary power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce the verdict or order a new trial.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

The case concerned whether a plaintiff alleging gender discrimination in employment, including discharge due to pregnancy, had a right to a jury trial under the Massachusetts Constitution when suing her former employer under statutes such as the Equal Rights Act, wage discrimination laws, the maternity leave act, and G. L. c. 151B. The Superior Court denied the defendant's motion to strike the jury demand, and after review the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that ruling. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial on most claims under art. 15 of the Declaration of Rights because the action was a suit between persons involving a controversy concerning property that was not traditionally within equity jurisdiction in 1780 and was analogous to common-law tort or contract claims. The opinion noted that claims seeking only injunctive relief would remain equitable and not subject to jury trial.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved the convictions of David L. Clarke and Steven A. James for first-degree murder, armed assault with intent to murder, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, arising from a September 1989 shooting in Brockton that killed Rolando Barros and injured Jose DeAndrade. The defendants appealed separately, challenging the exclusion of prior inconsistent witness statements, the sufficiency of evidence for joint venture liability, jury instructions on joint venture, denial of severance, and refusal of funds for a psychiatric evaluation. The court affirmed the convictions after reviewing the record, concluding that the evidence supported the jury's findings on joint venture, there were no prejudicial errors in the trial proceedings, and no basis existed to order a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt under G.L. c. 278, § 33E.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of Wayne Grant for first-degree murder, assault and battery by dangerous weapon, armed assault with intent to murder, and unlicensed handgun possession, arising from a 1988 shooting in Boston tied to a drug dispute. On appeal, the defendant challenged the denial of his motion to dismiss for speedy trial violations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36(d)(3), the admission of a witness statement as an excited utterance, the prosecutor's closing argument, and the jury instructions on the burden of proof. The court affirmed all convictions, holding there was no reversible error in any of the trial court's rulings. It further declined to exercise its power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce the verdict or order a new trial, finding the instructions as a whole adequately conveyed the Commonwealth's burden despite one minor misstatement.

criminal lawprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Warren, the Commonwealth appealed a Superior Court order suppressing evidence seized from the defendant's apartment pursuant to a search warrant. The warrant was issued based on an anonymous informant's tip about drugs and firearms inside the apartment, combined with a police-supervised controlled buy of cocaine that the informant conducted at the building. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the suppression order, holding that the affidavit established probable cause under the two-pronged Upton standard. Although the informant's past credibility was not shown, the basis-of-knowledge prong was met by the informant's personal observations, and the veracity prong was satisfied by police corroboration through the controlled buy and the detailed tip, allowing reasonable inferences that the informant had entered the correct second-floor apartment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a sexual assault committed by a school bus driver on a special needs student passenger arose out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the insured vehicle under Town Taxi's business motor vehicle policy with Aetna, triggering the insurer's duty to defend and indemnify the company in a suit brought by the plaintiff for breach of the common carrier's nondelegable duty of passenger safety. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to Aetna, but the Appeals Court reversed, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that result. The court held that the assault did arise out of the use of the bus, relying on the general rule that assaults by employees on passengers of bus or taxicab companies are deemed to arise from the vehicle's use due to the carrier-passenger relationship and the implied promise of safe passage. It distinguished prior precedents like Sabatinelli v. Travelers Ins. Co. because those did not involve common carriers transporting passengers. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatorycriminal law

The case concerned whether interest-free loans from wholly owned subsidiaries to their out-of-state parent corporation qualified as 'services performed' under G. L. c. 63, §§ 33 and 39A, allowing the Commissioner of Revenue to impute interest income and assess additional corporate excise taxes. The Appellate Tax Board had granted abatements to the subsidiaries after the commissioner assessed deficiencies based on the loans, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed those decisions. The court held that the statutory term 'services' encompasses the making of such loans because its ordinary meaning covers acts that benefit another, as confirmed by dictionary definitions, prior Massachusetts cases, and decisions from other jurisdictions. It further reasoned that this interpretation aligns with the statute's remedial purpose of preventing tax avoidance through below-market intercorporate transactions by requiring fair compensation to the Massachusetts taxpayer entities.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved the Town of Ayer and its insurer American Employers seeking coverage from Imperial Casualty under a law enforcement professional liability policy after Imperial refused to defend or indemnify Ayer in two tort suits arising from injuries in a 1985 high-speed police pursuit that caused a collision. The underlying claims alleged Ayer's negligence in failing to develop pursuit policies and train officers. The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment ordering Imperial to defend Ayer and later required reimbursement of defense and settlement costs, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed both orders. The court held that the policy's exclusion for acts arising from the ownership, operation, or use of any land motor vehicle applied because Ayer owned the police cruiser involved, relieving Imperial of any duty to defend or indemnify. This conclusion followed from comparing the exclusion's purpose to similar provisions in homeowner policies, where coverage is barred when the insured owns or operates the vehicle at issue.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Glen Burnett's appeal from his conviction for motor vehicle homicide after his vehicle crossed the center line and collided with another car, killing a passenger. Burnett challenged the trial judge's exclusion of evidence that the other driver had a prior conviction for operating to endanger (punishable only by a fine) to impeach that driver's credibility, as well as the exclusion of an out-of-court statement by the other driver as an excited utterance. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute plainly bars use of traffic violation convictions resulting in a fine only for impeachment purposes, regardless of the offense's potential penalties, and that the statement lacked sufficient spontaneity and reliability to qualify as an excited utterance given the time elapsed and the witness's calm demeanor. The judge properly exercised discretion in these evidentiary rulings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs injured in a car accident caused by an Avon Tape employee who had consumed beer at work and drove home while intoxicated. The plaintiffs sued the employer claiming liability under host liability for failing to prevent the employee from driving and under respondeat superior. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed summary judgment for the defendant employer, holding that no duty existed under host liability because the employer did not furnish the alcohol and that general releases signed by the plaintiffs in favor of the employee barred the respondeat superior claim. The court reasoned that such liability requires control over the liquor supply and that releases to the agent preclude derivative claims against the principal. A partial dissent argued the employer owed a duty based on workplace control over the employee.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

The case involved Robert Ferreira's appeal from his conviction for first-degree murder based on deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, arising from the 1987 drowning of a victim whose body was found bound in the Cape Cod Canal, with evidence linking the defendant to the victim's car, ATM withdrawals, and admissions of involvement in a joint scheme with Kevin Galford. The defendant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions, particularly regarding joint venture liability, the impact of voluntary intoxication on shared intent, and the definition of malice, while also seeking relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce the verdict or grant a new trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the instructions as a whole did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because they correctly stated the elements of joint venture and malice without precluding consideration of intoxication evidence, and there was no basis for a lesser verdict or new trial. The court noted that the defendant was not entitled to a manslaughter instruction given the absence of supporting evidence at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a Massachusetts state court enforcing a federal judgment for copyright infringement damages should apply the federal postjudgment interest rate of 3.45% or the Massachusetts statutory rate of 12%. The Superior Court applied the federal rate, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that postjudgment interest is determined by the law of the forum state. The court reasoned that interest on judgments is a remedial matter governed by Massachusetts law, and federal statute 28 U.S.C. § 1961 does not apply to state courts or preempt state rules on this issue. It also rejected arguments about forum shopping and congressional intent, noting that enforcement is limited to forums where assets are located.

procedurefederal power

The case involved Paul S. Reed's appeal from his second conviction for first-degree murder, based solely on his claim that he was improperly denied access to the psychiatric treatment records of the Commonwealth's main witness, an inmate who testified that Reed had confessed to the crime. The defendant sought the records either to support expert testimony on the witness's veracity or to uncover any undisclosed promises, inducements, or rewards. The court held that expert testimony on a witness's credibility is inadmissible and that the records contained no such exculpatory material, so there was no error in denying access. After reviewing the entire record under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, the court affirmed the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between a private littoral landowner operating a motel in Truro and a licensee who received permits from the town board of selectmen to conduct shellfish propagation and aquaculture on the owner's tidal flats. The Superior Court ruled that the plaintiff owned the tidal flats, that the licenses were invalid for aquaculture activities or structures above the extreme low water mark under G. L. c. 130, §§ 57 and 68A, and that the licensee could plant, grow, and harvest shellfish without structures above that line. On direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the ownership and licensing limitations but held that the lower court's allowance for planting and growing shellfish above the extreme low water mark was erroneous. The core reasoning centered on the Colonial Ordinance's reservation of public fishing rights in the intertidal zone, statutory limits on aquaculture licenses, and the principle that such licenses cannot impair established private property rights in the flats.

property

The case involved Beverly Folmsbee, an employee at Tech Tool Grinding & Supply, Inc., who refused to participate in the company's mandatory drug testing program, left her job, and sued alleging violations of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H & 11I), her right to privacy under G. L. c. 214, § 1B, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the privacy and wrongful termination claims and, after trial, dismissed the civil rights claim; the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments for the employer. The court reasoned that, as a private employer, constitutional search-and-seizure protections did not apply, the drug-testing policy did not constitute an unreasonable, substantial, or serious interference with privacy under the employer-interest-versus-employee-privacy balancing test, and no recognized public policy was violated by the discharge.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned whether the town of Burlington could recover damages under G. L. c. 79, § 12 after the town of Bedford took land by eminent domain for conservation purposes, allegedly eliminating Burlington’s reasonably probable future access to public ways from its own adjacent parcel. Burlington also challenged the validity of Bedford’s taking on grounds including lack of proper purpose and procedural defects. The court held that Burlington lacked standing to contest the taking’s validity because G. L. c. 40, § 8C provides no statutory basis for such a suit and no duty was owed to Burlington. On the damages claim, the court ruled that the loss of a potential future access route is not a compensable “special and peculiar” injury, as the statute and precedent limit recovery to existing access rights and do not extend to uncertain future interests.

propertyprocedure