John M. Greaney

This case involved a certified question from federal court to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concerning whether a 1971 Attorney General regulation under G.L. c. 93A (940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.08(2)), addressing repairs, services, and warranties, applied to a business-to-business breach of warranty claim. The underlying dispute arose from a requirements contract where Sylvania manufactured shoes for Knapp; a small percentage of shoes had adhesion defects, leading Knapp to sue for breach of implied warranties and unfair practices, though the federal judge found Sylvania acted in good faith without unfair conduct. The SJC held that the regulation does not apply to a simple breach of warranty during performance of a commercial contract between parties of equal bargaining power and sophistication. The court reasoned that the regulation targets consumer transactions, was issued before the 1971 addition of G.L. c. 93A § 11 for business plaintiffs, and a mere warranty breach in this context does not constitute an unfair or deceptive act under the statute.

business & regulatory

This case involves nine plaintiffs seeking a declaration that they have an easement over a private way on the registered beachfront lots owned by defendants Knott and Bemis in Gloucester. The Land Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, but on appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that summary judgment should instead be entered for the defendants. The court reasoned that under the Land Registration Act, G.L. c. 185, §46, purchasers of registered land hold it free from encumbrances not noted on their certificates of title, and the plaintiffs failed to show an easement was noted or that exceptions like actual notice applied, as the referenced deeds did not grant rights to the plaintiffs who were not parties to them.

property

The case involved Jesus Madera, who was denied public housing by the Springfield Housing Authority due to concerns about property destruction and arson risk stemming from a prior arrest (despite his acquittal), and who appealed that denial to the state Executive Office of Communities and Development (EOCD). Madera sued after the EOCD upheld aspects of the denial following an informal process that included ex parte contacts with the local authority, arguing he was entitled to a formal adjudicatory hearing under the state Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme Judicial Court held that G.L.c. 30A, §1(1) required the EOCD to conduct such a hearing because its regulations assigned it the role of reviewing local housing authority rejections. The court affirmed the order for an adjudicatory hearing but vacated the lower court's broader ruling on communications between the EOCD and local authorities as exceeding the proper scope.

procedurecivil rights

The case concerned constitutional challenges by a corporate plaintiff and individual physicians, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated parties, to two Massachusetts statutes enabling the Massachusetts Medical Professional Insurance Association (MMPIA) to recover deficits from prior years of medical malpractice insurance coverage through assessments or prospective rate increases on policyholders. The plaintiffs claimed violations of the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal and state procedural due process protections, and separation of powers under Article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Superior Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' motions, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed after granting direct appellate review. The court concluded that the statutes did not retroactively impair contracts, provided sufficient process for rate determinations, and respected the separation of governmental powers.

business & regulatoryhealthcaretorts & liability

This case concerns Sarnafil, Inc.'s claims against its insurer, Peerless Insurance Company, for reimbursement of defense costs incurred in arbitration and a related court action over property damage from a roofing membrane installation at Kansas City International Airport, as well as claims alleging misrepresentation about coverage for loss prevention measures. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to Peerless on the relevant counts, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed on the defense cost claims while affirming on the misrepresentation claims. The court determined that undisputed communications between the parties created triable issues of fact regarding notice to the insurer and potential breaches of the policies' voluntary payment and notice provisions, which could affect Peerless's duty to defend under the liability policies. On the misrepresentation counts, the court found the record supported summary judgment for Peerless. Both policies provided coverage for certain third-party property damage but excluded damage to the insured's own products.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In this case, David Lloyd Smith was tried jointly with a codefendant on charges of trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, based on a police surveillance operation that led to their arrests after an attempted undercover drug purchase. The jury convicted both on the cocaine trafficking counts but acquitted on the marijuana charges. Smith, who fled mid-trial and was later sentenced, appealed arguing that the trial judge erred by denying his motion to sever the trials, which he claimed limited his ability to cross-examine witnesses about the codefendant's prior surveillance and thereby prevented him from fully presenting his defense that police had planted drugs on the codefendant. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defense was not so antagonistic as to require severance and that the excluded evidence was relevant but not essential to making Smith's testimony comprehensible to the jury.

criminal lawprocedure