John M. Greaney

This case involved a certified question from federal court to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concerning whether a 1971 Attorney General regulation under G.L. c. 93A (940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.08(2)), addressing repairs, services, and warranties, applied to a business-to-business breach of warranty claim. The underlying dispute arose from a requirements contract where Sylvania manufactured shoes for Knapp; a small percentage of shoes had adhesion defects, leading Knapp to sue for breach of implied warranties and unfair practices, though the federal judge found Sylvania acted in good faith without unfair conduct. The SJC held that the regulation does not apply to a simple breach of warranty during performance of a commercial contract between parties of equal bargaining power and sophistication. The court reasoned that the regulation targets consumer transactions, was issued before the 1971 addition of G.L. c. 93A § 11 for business plaintiffs, and a mere warranty breach in this context does not constitute an unfair or deceptive act under the statute.

business & regulatory

This case involves nine plaintiffs seeking a declaration that they have an easement over a private way on the registered beachfront lots owned by defendants Knott and Bemis in Gloucester. The Land Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, but on appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that summary judgment should instead be entered for the defendants. The court reasoned that under the Land Registration Act, G.L. c. 185, §46, purchasers of registered land hold it free from encumbrances not noted on their certificates of title, and the plaintiffs failed to show an easement was noted or that exceptions like actual notice applied, as the referenced deeds did not grant rights to the plaintiffs who were not parties to them.

property

The case involved Jesus Madera, who was denied public housing by the Springfield Housing Authority due to concerns about property destruction and arson risk stemming from a prior arrest (despite his acquittal), and who appealed that denial to the state Executive Office of Communities and Development (EOCD). Madera sued after the EOCD upheld aspects of the denial following an informal process that included ex parte contacts with the local authority, arguing he was entitled to a formal adjudicatory hearing under the state Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme Judicial Court held that G.L.c. 30A, §1(1) required the EOCD to conduct such a hearing because its regulations assigned it the role of reviewing local housing authority rejections. The court affirmed the order for an adjudicatory hearing but vacated the lower court's broader ruling on communications between the EOCD and local authorities as exceeding the proper scope.

procedurecivil rights

The case concerned constitutional challenges by a corporate plaintiff and individual physicians, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated parties, to two Massachusetts statutes enabling the Massachusetts Medical Professional Insurance Association (MMPIA) to recover deficits from prior years of medical malpractice insurance coverage through assessments or prospective rate increases on policyholders. The plaintiffs claimed violations of the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal and state procedural due process protections, and separation of powers under Article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Superior Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' motions, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed after granting direct appellate review. The court concluded that the statutes did not retroactively impair contracts, provided sufficient process for rate determinations, and respected the separation of governmental powers.

business & regulatoryhealthcaretorts & liability

This case concerns Sarnafil, Inc.'s claims against its insurer, Peerless Insurance Company, for reimbursement of defense costs incurred in arbitration and a related court action over property damage from a roofing membrane installation at Kansas City International Airport, as well as claims alleging misrepresentation about coverage for loss prevention measures. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to Peerless on the relevant counts, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed on the defense cost claims while affirming on the misrepresentation claims. The court determined that undisputed communications between the parties created triable issues of fact regarding notice to the insurer and potential breaches of the policies' voluntary payment and notice provisions, which could affect Peerless's duty to defend under the liability policies. On the misrepresentation counts, the court found the record supported summary judgment for Peerless. Both policies provided coverage for certain third-party property damage but excluded damage to the insured's own products.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In this case, David Lloyd Smith was tried jointly with a codefendant on charges of trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, based on a police surveillance operation that led to their arrests after an attempted undercover drug purchase. The jury convicted both on the cocaine trafficking counts but acquitted on the marijuana charges. Smith, who fled mid-trial and was later sentenced, appealed arguing that the trial judge erred by denying his motion to sever the trials, which he claimed limited his ability to cross-examine witnesses about the codefendant's prior surveillance and thereby prevented him from fully presenting his defense that police had planted drugs on the codefendant. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defense was not so antagonistic as to require severance and that the excluded evidence was relevant but not essential to making Smith's testimony comprehensible to the jury.

criminal lawprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Claudio, the defendant was convicted by a jury of breaking and entering a dwelling at night with intent to commit a felony and assaulting an occupant, as well as first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule based on that underlying felony. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the breaking-and-entering felony merged with the homicide and could not serve as a predicate for felony-murder. However, the court found that the trial judge's jury instructions omitted necessary guidance on joint venture liability and the elements of the underlying felony, requiring reversal of both convictions and a new trial limited to the felony-murder theory.

criminal law

The case involved the conviction of Lenny Fruchtman on charges of unnatural sexual intercourse with a child by force and indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, based on acts against his stepdaughter beginning in 1980; he was acquitted on a related charge of natural intercourse by force. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial judge erred by limiting his peremptory challenges to prospective women jurors, requiring gender-neutral justifications due to a perceived pattern of discrimination, and by restricting cross-examination of the victim while allowing certain prosecutor arguments and jury instructions. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions, holding that peremptory challenges cannot be exercised solely on the basis of gender under the Massachusetts Constitution, that the judge properly enforced this rule without unduly impairing the defendant's rights, and that the other claimed errors did not warrant reversal under the applicable standards.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned whether G. L. c. 127, § 129D requires the award of good conduct credits, which reduce sentences for participation in approved programs, to prisoners for time spent in pretrial detention before sentencing. The Superior Court judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff, interpreting the statute to include pretrial detainees and ordering the Commissioner of Correction to award such credits. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the statute applies only to sentenced prisoners, based on the ordinary meaning of its language, its context with related statutes distinguishing pretrial and post-conviction custody, and legislative purpose focused on rehabilitation during service of a sentence. The court further concluded that limiting credits to sentenced prisoners satisfies federal and state equal protection guarantees under rational basis review, as the distinction rationally advances the goal of encouraging program participation by those already convicted.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved a landlord's summary process eviction action against a tenant in a HUD section 8 subsidized apartment, where the tenant counterclaimed for breach of the implied warranty of habitability (along with related claims) based on ongoing issues like rodent and cockroach infestations and inadequate heat. The Boston Housing Court ruled for the tenant, finding a 50% reduction in the apartment's value and awarding damages calculated on the full contract rent (including subsidies paid by MHFA), doubled under G.L. c. 93A, plus attorney's fees. MHFA intervened on appeal to argue that damages should be limited to the tenant's personal rent share, but the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment. The court reasoned that habitability damages are measured by the difference between the premises' warranted value and defective condition to compensate for the tenant's contractual loss, and this approach does not conflict with federal section 8 regulations.

propertyfederal power

This case concerns the authority of the Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance, acting as receiver for the insolvent American Mutual insurance companies, to settle potential claims against their former auditor Coopers & Lybrand for $3.75 million plus other services, and whether state insurance guaranty funds could intervene or pursue separate claims. The court held that the receiver has sole statutory authority under G.L. c. 175, § 180C to bring and compromise claims both on behalf of the insurer and on behalf of its policyholders, claimants, and creditors, as the receiver represents their common interests in the liquidation. It further ruled that the guaranty funds lack standing to object to or intervene in the settlement or to file independent suits, and that judicial approval of the compromise is reviewed under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard focused on the face of the agreement rather than a de novo best-interests inquiry. The decision emphasized the receiver's broad powers to manage the estate efficiently and bind parties with aligned interests.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether James P. Gilmore's presentment letter under G.L. c. 258, §4 adequately notified the Commonwealth and Middlesex County of his claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from the 1979 murder of his sister by a prisoner on furlough from the house of correction. The plaintiff joined an existing lawsuit by family members alleging negligence by public officials and psychiatrists in failing to commit or properly supervise the perpetrator despite prior complaints and incidents. The Superior Court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the ground that the letter, which attached and referenced specific paragraphs from a related federal complaint, was sufficient. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that the letter met the statute's requirements by enabling officials to ascertain the claim's nature, investigate, and take appropriate action.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over the amount of uninsured motorist coverage available under a Massachusetts automobile insurance policy for injuries sustained by a passenger in a stolen vehicle. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that $100,000 in benefits were available, while the insurer argued that a policy limitation reduced coverage to $25,000 because the vehicle was being used without the owner's consent. The court decided in favor of the insurer, holding that the passenger was "using" the automobile without consent within the meaning of the policy limitation. The reasoning centered on the plain language of the policy, where "use" is broader than "occupancy," and the passenger's request for a ride constituted use of the vehicle for his purposes, with no ambiguity in the consent provision.

business & regulatory

This case involved a dispute between two insurers, USF&G and Hanover, over which policy covered $100,000 in damages from a 1988 car accident caused by a driver test-driving a dealership vehicle. USF&G had issued a policy to the driver's wife containing an excess clause requiring the owner's insurance to pay first, while Hanover's garage policy for the dealership contained a super-escape clause denying coverage if other valid and collectible insurance existed. After USF&G paid the claim and sued for contribution or full reimbursement, the Superior Court ruled the clauses mutually repugnant and ordered proration. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Hanover's super-escape clause took precedence over USF&G's excess clause under the policy language and precedents such as Mission Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., making USF&G solely responsible for the loss.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether a workers' compensation insurer could assert a lien under G. L. c. 152, § 15 on a legal malpractice settlement recovered by an injured employee and his wife. The plaintiffs had received workers' compensation benefits from Liberty Mutual after the husband's workplace injury, then sued their attorneys for negligence in dismissing a third-party tort claim against the owner of the equipment involved; the parties settled the malpractice suit for $475,000, prompting Liberty Mutual to intervene and claim a lien on the proceeds. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding that § 15 did not apply to malpractice recoveries, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, concluding that the statute reaches such recoveries because they arise from the original work-related injury and serve to prevent double compensation. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine the precise amount of the lien, as the record did not allow exact calculation.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved towns and voters challenging the constitutionality of the 1993 Massachusetts House redistricting plan under Article 101 of the state constitution and related provisions, seeking to invalidate St. 1993, c. 273 for allegedly failing to respect political subdivisions like towns. The court first held that the action was properly before it despite a filing error and proceeded to the merits. On the merits, it ruled that the plaintiffs did not prove the Legislature unduly departed from constitutional requirements to respect political subdivisions during redistricting, as the plan balanced factors including population equality, the federal Voting Rights Act, and subdivision boundaries while maintaining contiguity. Accordingly, the court entered judgment for the Secretary, upholding the plan without requiring a new one.

elections

This case involved homeowners who sued their second mortgage holder for violating Massachusetts consumer protection law (G.L.c. 93A) by failing to act in good faith during foreclosure proceedings after a fire destroyed their uninsured property and left them unable to make payments. The Superior Court found a violation and awarded damages, a decision affirmed by the Appeals Court, but the Supreme Judicial Court granted further review. The SJC reversed, concluding that no 93A violation occurred because the defendant's actions, including incomplete notices and refusal to accept a proposed payoff from third-party buyers, did not amount to unfair or deceptive practices under the statute. The court emphasized that statutory publication requirements were met, the debt misstatement was not an attempt to collect an improper amount, and other issues like delayed accounting did not meet the legal threshold for liability.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Michael L. Crawford, who was tried and convicted by a jury of involuntary manslaughter in the shooting deaths of his girlfriend and their unborn child. On appeal, Crawford argued that the trial judge erred by admitting the couple's four-year-old daughter's hearsay statements (made to her grandmother, a neighbor, and a police detective) identifying him as the shooter under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule, claiming this violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment and Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; he also challenged the refusal to give a missing witness instruction and alleged errors in the reasonable doubt jury instruction. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions, concluding that the statements met the spontaneity requirement for the exception, their admission did not violate confrontation rights because the child was available to testify, and the jury instructions as a whole (including a later reinstruction limited to the Webster charge) properly conveyed the required standard without misleading the jury.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned a defendant convicted of carrying a firearm without a license after police officers testified to observing him throw a handgun from a vehicle during a pursuit. The central issue on appeal was whether the prosecutor's closing argument improperly bolstered the credibility of the police witnesses by suggesting they would not risk their pensions in a conspiracy and by implying the absence of any disciplinary record. The court concluded that these remarks were improper and could have influenced the jury's verdict. It therefore reversed the conviction, set aside the verdict, and ordered a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved subcontractors challenging the Fall River Housing Authority's plan to award a contract for renovating a low-income housing project without following Massachusetts competitive bidding statutes under G. L. c. 149, §§ 44A-44H. The project was funded entirely by federal HUD grants through the Comprehensive Grant Program. The Superior Court ruled that the state bidding laws did not apply to federally funded projects, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the authority must comply with the statutes. The court reasoned that the laws govern public building construction by local housing authorities regardless of the funding source, as the project was not a wholly federal undertaking exempt from state requirements, and jurisdiction was proper due to the futility of administrative remedies and public interest.

business & regulatoryfederal power