The case concerned whether early retirement incentive payments promised to Boston school administrators under agreements with the school committee qualified as "regular compensation" under Massachusetts retirement statutes, thereby increasing the base for calculating retirement benefits. The Boston Retirement Board had determined they did not, leading the Boston Association of School Administrators and Supervisors and the school committee to seek a declaratory judgment. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that such payments—explicitly conditioned on notice of retirement and not representing ongoing salary—fell outside the statutory definition of regular compensation. The court noted that a 1979 clarifying amendment reinforced this interpretation by expressly excluding early retirement incentives, and it rejected arguments that applying the statute would unconstitutionally impair vested rights of existing employees.
In Commonwealth v. Taylor, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of knowingly buying, receiving, and aiding in the concealment of stolen antique jewelry valued over $100. The Superior Court had denied his pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, but the Appeals Court reversed on the ground that the warrant was fatally defective, and the Supreme Judicial Court agreed after further review. The core issue was that the warrant directed seizure of items described on an attached six-page list that was not actually provided with the warrant, leaving only a broad reference to "antique jewelry" that failed to meet the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment, Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and G. L. c. 276, § 2. Without the improperly seized evidence linking the defendant to the stolen items, the remaining proof was insufficient to support the conviction, leading to reversal and entry of a judgment of not guilty.
After a divorce, custody of two minor children was awarded to the mother, with visitation rights to the father; the mother later sought to restrict visitation because the father, a Jehovah’s Witness, was instructing the children in his faith, which she claimed confused them and alienated them from her. A Probate Court judge modified the visitation order to prohibit the father from teaching the children about his religion. On appeal, the court reversed the modification, holding that the evidence was insufficient to justify restricting the father’s religious instruction during visitation. The decision emphasized that limitations on a parent’s religious activities with a child require a detailed showing of harm to the child’s physical or emotional well-being rather than mere assumption, while recognizing the value of the child’s contact with both parents’ faiths.
The case concerned a special legislative commission investigating contracts for public buildings that issued a summons to an officer of an architectural firm; after the officer refused to testify or produce documents citing self-incrimination, the commission obtained a court order granting him immunity, but he still declined to appear. The commission then sued in Superior Court to compel compliance, leading to an order for the witness to testify and a subsequent civil contempt judgment with incarceration when he disobeyed. The court affirmed the contempt order, rejecting the argument that the commission had ceased to exist. It reasoned that the statute extending the commission's termination date and providing funding was a valid appropriation measure that did not violate the state constitution's budget amendment restrictions on special appropriations or requirements for emergency measures.
The case involved a defendant convicted by jury of unlawful distribution of heroin and possession of heroin with intent to distribute, based on police surveillance of a street transaction and recovery of drugs from a trash can. The defendant challenged the trial judge's denial of a motion to exclude his prior heroin convictions, which the prosecutor intended to use for impeachment if he testified, arguing this burdened his right to testify and risked unfair prejudice. He also contested the consecutive sentences as violating double jeopardy by imposing multiple punishments for the same conduct. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the state statute expressly permitted impeachment by prior convictions without constitutional violation and that the offenses were distinct under legislative intent, allowing separate punishments.
The case involved Jesus Caldron's convictions for robbery and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon arising from an incident in which he and another man approached a victim on a Boston street, leading to the victim's wallet, watch, and knife being taken and the victim being stabbed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the convictions and remanded for retrial after holding that the trial judge erred in excluding the defendant's testimony on direct examination about whether he intended to rob the victim or about statements he made to his companion immediately after the events. The court reasoned that wrongful intent is an element of both charged crimes, that a defendant may testify directly to his own intent, and that the excluded evidence was not harmless given the conflicting accounts of the defendant's participation and the victim's varying descriptions of events before the grand jury and at trial.