Benjamin Kaplan

The case concerned whether early retirement incentive payments promised to Boston school administrators under agreements with the school committee qualified as "regular compensation" under Massachusetts retirement statutes, thereby increasing the base for calculating retirement benefits. The Boston Retirement Board had determined they did not, leading the Boston Association of School Administrators and Supervisors and the school committee to seek a declaratory judgment. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that such payments—explicitly conditioned on notice of retirement and not representing ongoing salary—fell outside the statutory definition of regular compensation. The court noted that a 1979 clarifying amendment reinforced this interpretation by expressly excluding early retirement incentives, and it rejected arguments that applying the statute would unconstitutionally impair vested rights of existing employees.

labor & employment

In Commonwealth v. Taylor, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of knowingly buying, receiving, and aiding in the concealment of stolen antique jewelry valued over $100. The Superior Court had denied his pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, but the Appeals Court reversed on the ground that the warrant was fatally defective, and the Supreme Judicial Court agreed after further review. The core issue was that the warrant directed seizure of items described on an attached six-page list that was not actually provided with the warrant, leaving only a broad reference to "antique jewelry" that failed to meet the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment, Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and G. L. c. 276, § 2. Without the improperly seized evidence linking the defendant to the stolen items, the remaining proof was insufficient to support the conviction, leading to reversal and entry of a judgment of not guilty.

criminal lawprocedure

After a divorce, custody of two minor children was awarded to the mother, with visitation rights to the father; the mother later sought to restrict visitation because the father, a Jehovah’s Witness, was instructing the children in his faith, which she claimed confused them and alienated them from her. A Probate Court judge modified the visitation order to prohibit the father from teaching the children about his religion. On appeal, the court reversed the modification, holding that the evidence was insufficient to justify restricting the father’s religious instruction during visitation. The decision emphasized that limitations on a parent’s religious activities with a child require a detailed showing of harm to the child’s physical or emotional well-being rather than mere assumption, while recognizing the value of the child’s contact with both parents’ faiths.

family lawreligious liberty

The case concerned a special legislative commission investigating contracts for public buildings that issued a summons to an officer of an architectural firm; after the officer refused to testify or produce documents citing self-incrimination, the commission obtained a court order granting him immunity, but he still declined to appear. The commission then sued in Superior Court to compel compliance, leading to an order for the witness to testify and a subsequent civil contempt judgment with incarceration when he disobeyed. The court affirmed the contempt order, rejecting the argument that the commission had ceased to exist. It reasoned that the statute extending the commission's termination date and providing funding was a valid appropriation measure that did not violate the state constitution's budget amendment restrictions on special appropriations or requirements for emergency measures.

procedurecriminal law

The case involved a defendant convicted by jury of unlawful distribution of heroin and possession of heroin with intent to distribute, based on police surveillance of a street transaction and recovery of drugs from a trash can. The defendant challenged the trial judge's denial of a motion to exclude his prior heroin convictions, which the prosecutor intended to use for impeachment if he testified, arguing this burdened his right to testify and risked unfair prejudice. He also contested the consecutive sentences as violating double jeopardy by imposing multiple punishments for the same conduct. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the state statute expressly permitted impeachment by prior convictions without constitutional violation and that the offenses were distinct under legislative intent, allowing separate punishments.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Jesus Caldron's convictions for robbery and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon arising from an incident in which he and another man approached a victim on a Boston street, leading to the victim's wallet, watch, and knife being taken and the victim being stabbed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the convictions and remanded for retrial after holding that the trial judge erred in excluding the defendant's testimony on direct examination about whether he intended to rob the victim or about statements he made to his companion immediately after the events. The court reasoned that wrongful intent is an element of both charged crimes, that a defendant may testify directly to his own intent, and that the excluded evidence was not harmless given the conflicting accounts of the defendant's participation and the victim's varying descriptions of events before the grand jury and at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the defendant David Young, Jr., who was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder in the deaths of brothers D.J. Walker and Lenwood Walker in 1975. The defendant challenged the convictions on multiple grounds, including the admission of evidence from a warrantless search of the crime scene, his placement in a prisoner's dock during trial, the introduction of evidence about his drug dealing, a ballistician's testimony regarding a gun photograph, and the denial of directed verdicts. The court affirmed the convictions after reviewing the prosecution's evidence, which included witness testimony linking the defendant to the victims through drug dealings and a robbery, physical evidence connecting the crimes to the defendant's apartment, and ballistic matches from the same gun. The court found no error in the admission of the challenged evidence or procedures and concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge by George Bachrach, a candidate for State senator, to a 1979 Massachusetts statute that amended election laws to prohibit the use of the term "Independent" as a political designation on nominating papers and ballots, instead requiring "Unenrolled" for candidates without an approved party affiliation. Bachrach, who had changed his enrollment to Unenrolled and sought to campaign as an Independent, argued that the restrictions violated the State and Federal Constitutions. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, after reserving and reporting the case, entered an order enjoining the Secretary of the Commonwealth from enforcing the ban and requiring "Unenrolled" on the ballot. The court's core reasoning centered on the legislation's impact as a content-based restriction on political speech and expression in the electoral process, which triggered heightened constitutional scrutiny and could not be justified even under a rational basis standard due to its burdens on candidates' ability to communicate their political identity to voters.

electionsfree speech

In Commonwealth v. Robinson, the defendant was convicted by a Suffolk County jury in 1976 of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and two counts of assault by dangerous weapon arising from a robbery of a Boston restaurant in which one employee was fatally shot. After his initial appeal was dismissed, he filed a pro se motion for a new trial (later amended by counsel) alleging that the prosecutor had used peremptory challenges in a racially biased manner and that the trial judge's instructions to the jury were erroneous regarding the degree of murder, premeditation, reasonable doubt, burden of proof, and duress. The trial judge denied the motion, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence did not establish bias in jury selection and that the jury instructions properly allocated burdens and defined the elements consistent with governing precedents such as Mullaney and Patterson.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned the timeliness of posting a bond in a medical malpractice action after a medical tribunal issued a negative finding under G.L. c. 231, § 60B. The court decided that the thirty-day period for filing the bond begins upon entry of the tribunal's finding by the clerk, without adding extra days for mailing under Mass. R. Civ. P. 6(d), making the plaintiff's filing untimely. The core reasoning was that the statute measures time from the 'finding' (interpreted as entry), and rule 6(d) applies only when the measuring period itself starts from service of notice. The opinion also noted that relief for late filing could potentially be sought under the excusable neglect provision of rule 6(b)(2) applied by analogy.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involved Kathy Fitzgerald, a welder terminated after her employer refused to grant maternity leave based on her physicians' advice that she could no longer safely perform welding work due to pregnancy, though she remained able to do lighter duties and sought alternative clerical positions. After the union grievance process retroactively placed her on maternity leave, she applied for unemployment benefits while searching for other work without success. The board of review approved benefits, but a municipal court judge reversed in favor of the Director; the Supreme Judicial Court held that the board was correct. The court reasoned that Fitzgerald's departure was not a voluntary quit without good cause under G.L. c. 151A § 25(e)(1) because her decision was based on medical advice and she had sought leave and other employment, and that she qualified as totally unemployed under § 1(r)(2) since she performed no services, earned no pay, and was available for suitable work she could not obtain, with the maternity leave not barring eligibility.

labor & employment

The case involved the conviction of Michael Woods for two counts of rape based on the victim's testimony about an incident in September 1975 at a Boston subway station and plaza. The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed evidence including the victim's delayed reporting, inconsistent recollections of the exact date, photo and in-court identifications, and the defendant's alibi supported by employment records from Deer Island placing him at work on the alleged date. Although the Appeals Court had affirmed the convictions, the court ordered a new trial, reasoning that the combination of evidentiary weaknesses created a serious risk that justice had miscarried and that basic fairness required retrial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the convictions of Mamie Ann Best and her son John R. McCown for the first-degree murder of Fayne Adams, Best's husband and McCown's stepfather, on October 25, 1974. Following a fourteen-day trial in Middlesex County Superior Court, a jury found both defendants guilty, and they appealed directly to the Supreme Judicial Court, claiming various trial errors as well as additional issues under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. The court recounted the facts as the jury could have found them, including details of the crime scene, the defendants' statements to police, and investigative leads, then addressed Best's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, challenges to the admissibility of evidence and statements, and other legal points raised by the defendants. The court concluded that the judgments of conviction should be affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendants indicted for murder in two consolidated matters where the victims died more than a year and a day after the alleged assaults, raising the question of whether the common-law "year and a day" rule barred the prosecutions. The court reviewed the rule's origins in a 13th-century English statute on private appeals for murder and its later application to public prosecutions, noting its basis in outdated concerns about proving causation amid limited medical knowledge. It determined that advances in medical science had rendered the arbitrary time limit obsolete, as the prosecution must still prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore held that the rule no longer applies in Massachusetts. The indictments were allowed to stand.

criminal law

This case concerned whether a police officer's affidavit established probable cause to issue a search warrant for premises suspected of drug activity. The lower court suppressed evidence obtained under the warrant, and the appellate court affirmed that decision. The affidavit relied on tips from two unnamed informants, but one lacked demonstrated reliability, and neither provided sufficient detailed information about the alleged criminal activity. Police surveillance and additional observations, such as associations with known drug traffickers and the carrying of plastic bags, were deemed insufficient to corroborate the tips or establish probable cause for the specific location. The court concluded that the warrant was issued without a proper basis under constitutional requirements.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a landlord who, after losing a small claims action brought by a tenant for treble damages under the security deposit statute (G. L. c. 186, § 15B), sought to appeal to the Superior Court but refused to post the required bond equal to three times the deposit plus interest, costs, and fees. The landlord instead filed a declaratory judgment action claiming the heightened bond requirement violated equal protection and due process. The Superior Court ruled in the landlord's favor, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the bond provision was constitutional. The court reasoned that the Legislature has broad discretion to impose multiple damages and corresponding appeal bonds in specific economic contexts to deter violations and encourage enforcement, and that singling out security deposit disputes for such treatment was rationally related to addressing known problems in that area. The opinion noted that similar multiple-recovery statutes exist elsewhere without raising equal protection concerns.

propertyprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a dispute between taxpayer Freda Joffe and certified public accountant Saul Wilson over a contingent fee agreement for Wilson's services in contesting a 1965 federal income tax deficiency assessment against the Joffes and their oil company. Joffe sought to rescind the agreement and recover the $38,022 paid, claiming Wilson had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by directing tax litigation strategy and working with attorneys. The court held that the fee arrangement did not violate the criminal statute on unauthorized practice of law. The core reasoning was that Wilson's activities fell within permissible accounting services in federal tax matters, he collaborated with licensed counsel without directing their judgment, and no criminal sanction applied under precedents distinguishing such roles from prohibited legal practice.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved James and Patricia Nassar, who were found not guilty by reason of mental illness after a bench trial on charges of child abandonment and manslaughter related to the death of their 16-month-old son Joshua, whom they abandoned due to religious delusions stemming from chronic paranoid schizophrenia. Following their acquittal, the district attorney petitioned for their involuntary commitment to a mental health facility under G.L. c. 123, §16(b) after an initial observation period, leading the trial judge to hold a hearing with conflicting psychiatric testimony on their prognosis, risks to children, and potential for violence if released. The judge determined they should be released but stayed the judgment and reported the statutory interpretation issues to the Appeals Court (transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court) for resolution on the standards and procedures for post-acquittal commitment. The court analyzed the evidence of their shared delusional system, the statutory requirements distinguishing violent crimes like manslaughter, and due process considerations for the burden of proof in such proceedings.

criminal lawhealthcareprocedure

The case involved a former probationary employee who sued his employer and a personnel manager for intentional infliction of emotional distress after his termination, which followed absences without notice and a period of hospitalization for a blood condition and anxiety. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The court held that the supervisors' decision to end employment—based on attendance lapses and concerns about the plaintiff's ability to handle job stress—did not constitute conduct so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all bounds of decency, even assuming awareness of his emotional state. It compared the facts unfavorably to prior cases involving public humiliation or extreme dunning and noted that the employment was at-will during probation. The ruling emphasized the narrow scope of the tort as established in Agis v. Howard Johnson Co.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

The case concerned a special legislative commission's efforts to enforce a summons against former Governor Endicott Peabody for production of documents related to its investigation of corrupt practices and maladministration in state and county construction contracts since 1968, with a specific focus on a 1969 management contract with McKee-Berger-Mansueto, Inc. The Superior Court judge refused enforcement of the summons, but on appeal the Supreme Judicial Court ordered that it be enforced according to its terms except for certain items as to which further Superior Court proceedings could be held. The core reasoning was that the commission possessed statutory authority under the creating resolves to issue compulsory process in aid of its investigative duties, that no applicable privilege barred production, and that the inquiry remained within the bounds of legitimate state legislative investigation without infringing federal supremacy or other limits.

criminal lawprocedure