Paul J. Liacos

This case concerned indictments against Charles Barrett, Sr., for twelve counts each of rape of a child without force and indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, stemming from alleged incidents between 1979 and 1980. Following convictions at a jury-waived trial, the Appeals Court vacated the indecent assault convictions due to the expired statute of limitations and reversed the rape convictions because the admission of evidence of the time-barred indecent assaults prejudiced the defense. On further review, the court determined that the statute of limitations had expired for the indecent assault charges but not for the rape charges, which remained timely under amendments extending the period, and that sufficient evidence supported the rape convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a clerk-magistrate of the Plymouth District Court who was charged with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and assault and battery on a court officer after an altercation in which he knocked down, struck, and kicked a court officer attempting to escort him to another courtroom as directed by a visiting judge. The trial judge denied a motion to dismiss, allowed a required finding on the charge involving a court officer, and after a jury convicted the defendant of simple assault and battery, imposed probation and a fine. On appeal, the defendant claimed errors in the denial of self-defense instructions, judicial immunity instructions, and the motion to dismiss, but the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the officers acted with authority, the defendant's use of force was not justified, and judicial immunity does not shield criminal conduct.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the conviction of the defendant for first-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm based on eyewitness identifications from two young women who observed the shooting of Dana Cox. On appeal, the defendant argued that testimony about the witnesses' fear of testifying and speaking to police denied him a fair trial, and sought relief under G.L. c. 278, § 33E. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence of the witnesses' fear was properly admitted because it explained their conduct and the judge gave limiting instructions, and that the identification evidence was not weak. The court found no basis to order a new trial or reduce the verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned disciplinary proceedings against Massachusetts attorney Edmund M. Hurley following his federal conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United States by impeding the IRS in the collection of taxes owed by a client, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. A single justice had ordered indefinite suspension from the practice of law, retroactive to a 1992 temporary suspension, after the Board of Bar Overseers recommended that sanction based on the conviction and related conduct. Hurley appealed, arguing for a definite suspension tied to his probation term and challenging the characterization of his offense. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the indefinite suspension, holding that it was not markedly disparate from sanctions in comparable cases involving attorneys convicted of serious crimes.

criminal lawtaxes

This case concerned a certified question from the First Circuit regarding whether a police officer's discretionary decisions to initiate and continue a high-speed pursuit of a vehicle violating the law qualify as policymaking or planning under the discretionary function immunity provision of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L. c. 258, § 10(b). The facts involved a pursuit that ended when the pursued motorcycle collided with a second police cruiser positioned to block the road, resulting in the death of the driver and serious injuries to the passenger. The court answered the question in the negative, concluding that such pursuit decisions do not involve the kind of policy or planning judgments that trigger immunity. Its reasoning distinguished these operational choices from protected discretionary functions like decisions on investigations, arrests, or resource allocation, which implicate broader public policy considerations.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether an at-will employee could bring a wrongful termination claim after being fired in alleged retaliation for joining a shareholder derivative suit challenging the company's stock buy-back agreements. The trial judge, sitting without a jury, found that the company's president and directors had undermined the plaintiff's division and terminated him because of his participation in the suit, violating the public policy exception to at-will employment. On appeal, the court addressed whether that exception extends to participation in derivative actions and concluded that such terminations are actionable because they implicate important public interests in corporate accountability and shareholder remedies. The court also noted that other claims, including breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, remained separate and were not affected by its public-policy ruling.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability