Paul J. Liacos

This case concerned indictments against Charles Barrett, Sr., for twelve counts each of rape of a child without force and indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, stemming from alleged incidents between 1979 and 1980. Following convictions at a jury-waived trial, the Appeals Court vacated the indecent assault convictions due to the expired statute of limitations and reversed the rape convictions because the admission of evidence of the time-barred indecent assaults prejudiced the defense. On further review, the court determined that the statute of limitations had expired for the indecent assault charges but not for the rape charges, which remained timely under amendments extending the period, and that sufficient evidence supported the rape convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a clerk-magistrate of the Plymouth District Court who was charged with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and assault and battery on a court officer after an altercation in which he knocked down, struck, and kicked a court officer attempting to escort him to another courtroom as directed by a visiting judge. The trial judge denied a motion to dismiss, allowed a required finding on the charge involving a court officer, and after a jury convicted the defendant of simple assault and battery, imposed probation and a fine. On appeal, the defendant claimed errors in the denial of self-defense instructions, judicial immunity instructions, and the motion to dismiss, but the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the officers acted with authority, the defendant's use of force was not justified, and judicial immunity does not shield criminal conduct.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the conviction of the defendant for first-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm based on eyewitness identifications from two young women who observed the shooting of Dana Cox. On appeal, the defendant argued that testimony about the witnesses' fear of testifying and speaking to police denied him a fair trial, and sought relief under G.L. c. 278, § 33E. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence of the witnesses' fear was properly admitted because it explained their conduct and the judge gave limiting instructions, and that the identification evidence was not weak. The court found no basis to order a new trial or reduce the verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned disciplinary proceedings against Massachusetts attorney Edmund M. Hurley following his federal conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United States by impeding the IRS in the collection of taxes owed by a client, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. A single justice had ordered indefinite suspension from the practice of law, retroactive to a 1992 temporary suspension, after the Board of Bar Overseers recommended that sanction based on the conviction and related conduct. Hurley appealed, arguing for a definite suspension tied to his probation term and challenging the characterization of his offense. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the indefinite suspension, holding that it was not markedly disparate from sanctions in comparable cases involving attorneys convicted of serious crimes.

criminal lawtaxes

This case concerned a certified question from the First Circuit regarding whether a police officer's discretionary decisions to initiate and continue a high-speed pursuit of a vehicle violating the law qualify as policymaking or planning under the discretionary function immunity provision of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L. c. 258, § 10(b). The facts involved a pursuit that ended when the pursued motorcycle collided with a second police cruiser positioned to block the road, resulting in the death of the driver and serious injuries to the passenger. The court answered the question in the negative, concluding that such pursuit decisions do not involve the kind of policy or planning judgments that trigger immunity. Its reasoning distinguished these operational choices from protected discretionary functions like decisions on investigations, arrests, or resource allocation, which implicate broader public policy considerations.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether an at-will employee could bring a wrongful termination claim after being fired in alleged retaliation for joining a shareholder derivative suit challenging the company's stock buy-back agreements. The trial judge, sitting without a jury, found that the company's president and directors had undermined the plaintiff's division and terminated him because of his participation in the suit, violating the public policy exception to at-will employment. On appeal, the court addressed whether that exception extends to participation in derivative actions and concluded that such terminations are actionable because they implicate important public interests in corporate accountability and shareholder remedies. The court also noted that other claims, including breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, remained separate and were not affected by its public-policy ruling.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involves a defendant convicted of second-degree murder who appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial, raising claims about jury instructions on intoxication and malice, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the definition of reasonable doubt. The trial judge denied the motion without a hearing on waiver grounds because the issues could have been raised on direct appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, concluding that the defendant did not demonstrate an extraordinary case warranting review of waived claims and that the reasonable doubt instruction was proper and consistent with established precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a fourteen-year-old boy who was seriously injured while crossing a state highway near a large crowd that had gathered to watch efforts to free heavy machinery stuck in a cranberry bog in the town of Carver. The plaintiffs sued the town for negligence, claiming it failed to address resulting safety and traffic problems. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the town, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the public duty rule under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act barred recovery because the duty to provide police protection or manage traffic congestion was a general obligation owed to the public at large rather than to any particular individual.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the defendant William Barnoski's convictions for first-degree murder, assault by dangerous weapon, and armed assault with intent to murder after he shot John McDermott (who died) and Peter's son Peter McDermott (who survived) during a tense gathering at the McDermott home in 1988. On appeal from the convictions and denial of a new trial motion, the defendant argued for reversal based on claims including improper admission of evidence, violations of self-incrimination rights, and issues with joint venture instructions, while also seeking relief under G.L. c. 278, § 33E. The court affirmed the convictions and the denial of the new trial motion, concluding that the evidentiary challenges lacked merit, any errors were not prejudicial, and no reduction of the verdict or new trial was warranted under the statute.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a defendant's appeal from a District Court order revoking his probation on several prior convictions and ordering him to serve suspended sentences. The defendant contended that the revocation hearing violated his right to counsel because his attorney received no opportunity to prepare and that one of the underlying sentences raised double jeopardy concerns. The court reversed the revocation, concluding that the defendant was denied assistance of counsel when the judge denied a continuance despite the attorney's lack of notice and preparation time, and that any waiver of counsel was invalid. The decision emphasized that probation revocation hearings require a reliable process to assess violations and that proceeding without proper representation prevented an informed determination by the judge.

criminal lawprocedure

In Ash v. Attorney General, plaintiffs including the city of Cambridge challenged the Attorney General's certification of an initiative petition proposing the Massachusetts Rent Control Prohibition Act, which would ban most rent control programs except for limited voluntary municipal schemes after six months, on grounds that it violated Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution by addressing matters restricted to particular localities. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the initiative petition was properly certified and did not fall under the local matters exclusion. The court reasoned that the act's provisions apply uniformly to every municipality in the Commonwealth, rent control regulation of landlord-tenant relationships is reserved to the Legislature under the home rule amendment and constitutes a matter of statewide concern rather than a purely local issue, and the Attorney General's summary was not challenged in the reported decision.

propertybusiness & regulatoryelections

The case involved a defendant charged with manslaughter after a woman died from a drug overdose at an apartment where he and others had been using cocaine and heroin. The defendant sought to suppress three written statements he gave to police, arguing violations of his Miranda rights. The court suppressed the third statement, finding it tainted by the second statement, which was obtained while the defendant was in custody without proper Miranda warnings. The first statement was upheld as non-custodial and voluntary. The core reasoning was that the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of taint from the Miranda violation, making the third statement inadmissible as a product of the illegal second statement.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council's exclusion of the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB) from participating in the annual St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade. GLIB sued under Massachusetts public accommodation law (G.L.c. 272, §§ 92A, 98), alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and the trial court granted a permanent injunction requiring the council to allow GLIB to march under the same terms as other participants. The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the council's claims that the parade was protected speech under the First Amendment and state constitution, that the public accommodation law did not apply or was unconstitutionally overbroad, and that the exclusion was based on nondiscriminatory reasons such as safety or lack of information. The court analyzed whether a parade constitutes a place of public accommodation and whether the anti-discrimination statute could be applied without violating constitutional rights, while noting that not all conduct labeled as expressive receives First Amendment protection.

civil rightsfree speech

This case, a follow-up to Murphy I, addressed the appropriate remedy after a portion of G.L. c. 152, § 11A was held to violate equal protection by requiring only claimants represented by counsel to pay a fee for an impartial medical examiner in workers' compensation appeals. The Superior Court had struck the phrases 'represented by counsel' and 'equal to the average weekly wage in the commonwealth at the time of the appeal' from the fee provision, leaving a general requirement that any claimant filing an appeal submit a fee to defray costs, while preserving the rest of the impartial physician section. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed this approach on appeal, reasoning that the Legislature's strong commitment to the impartial physician process indicated it would have wanted the core provisions to remain in effect without the unconstitutional language, consistent with principles of severability under both common law and G.L. c. 4, § 6. The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the entire fee sentence or section should be invalidated, holding that the remaining language was capable of separation and that excising only the offending parts minimized intrusion into legislative intent.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Frank Greco's efforts to obtain a tape recording of an ex parte hearing in his divorce proceedings from the Suffolk Probate and Family Court, where his wife had sought a temporary restraining order; despite court rules requiring electronic recording and availability to parties, and a subsequent order compelling production, the register's office failed to provide the tape over multiple requests spanning years. Greco sought relief under G.L.c. 211, § 3 to compel production via the Supreme Judicial Court's superintendence powers, but a single justice denied the complaint, and the full court affirmed. The court agreed that Greco was entitled to the tape as a party under Rule 201 and related statutes but held that c. 211, § 3 relief was inappropriate because alternative remedies existed, such as referring the matter to the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court or returning to the judge who ordered production. The opinion noted concerns about the trial court's handling of record access but emphasized that superintendence powers need not be exercised where other redress is available.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned a contract dispute in which buyer Robert Schwartz purchased two lots of land from seller Rose Land for $270,000 with the intent to build a house, but the seller failed to disclose a conservation commission letter warning of wetlands restrictions that limited building on the property as represented in the purchase agreement. The Superior Court found a willful violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A and ordered rescission, requiring Rose Land to return the purchase price upon reconveyance of the property by quitclaim deed, along with treble damages on incidental expenses and lost interest totaling $317,187. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment in all respects, holding that the seller's nondisclosure of known wetlands issues supported the 93A violation and that lost interest constituted actual damages subject to multiplication, while the returned purchase price was equitable relief not eligible for trebling.

propertybusiness & regulatoryenvironment

The case involved a defendant convicted of manslaughter after fatally stabbing her boyfriend during an argument in her apartment, where she raised a self-defense claim at trial. The court reversed the conviction on appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by excluding evidence of the victim's prior physical abuse of the defendant, including specific incidents of violence and a restraining order application. This evidence was deemed admissible because it was relevant to the jury's assessment of whether the defendant had a reasonable apprehension of imminent harm and acted justifiably. The opinion focused on the defendant's knowledge of the victim's past violent acts toward her as key to evaluating the self-defense elements, without addressing the other claimed errors in detail.

criminal law

The case involved the appeal of a defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and kidnapping after the body of William McGunagle was found hog-tied in a Boston park; the defendant, who reported discovering the body, challenged the admission of evidence from a similar 1988 incident involving John McHugh (also found nude and bound in the defendant's white car) offered to prove identity, and argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the prior bad act evidence was properly admitted because the incidents shared distinctive features such as the specific binding method, location in the Savin Hill area, and the defendant's automobile. It further concluded that the evidence was sufficient, citing physical links like matching rope and transmission fluid, witness observations of the defendant and his car near the scene, and the defendant's inconsistent statements and consciousness of guilt, with no basis for relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

criminal lawprocedure

In Kusy v. Town of Millbury, retired police officer Chester Kusy and his wife sued the town for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming it violated G. L. c. 32B by failing to provide group indemnity health insurance after their Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan ended due to low enrollment. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the town, ruling that it had essentially complied with the statute despite no longer offering group coverage, as it had arranged for individual BC/BS policies and passed a by-law to subsidize them for retirees outside HMO areas; the court also held that self-insurance under § 3A was discretionary rather than mandatory. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment except for vacating the portion ordering individual policies, agreeing that the town’s inability to secure group coverage after good-faith efforts relieved it of further obligation and that the by-law did not conflict with the statute. The core reasoning was that the statute requires negotiation and purchase of group insurance on terms the town deems best, but does not mandate self-insurance or other alternatives when no carrier will quote coverage.

labor & employmenthealthcare

The case involved a defendant convicted of unlawful distribution of cocaine who appealed on the ground that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial judge's practice of permitting jurors to ask oral questions of witnesses. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the attorney's decision not to object did not constitute ineffective assistance under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights or the U.S. Constitution. The core reasoning was that juror questioning of witnesses is a permissible practice followed in many jurisdictions, that no prejudice to the defendant was shown from the questions asked in this trial, and that the questions largely repeated or clarified prior testimony without introducing new evidence.

criminal lawprocedure