Francis Quirico

The case involved Lynn Hospital appealing the denial of full tax abatements for a parking garage it owned, which served both the hospital and an adjacent medical building used by private physicians. The Appellate Tax Board granted partial exemptions of 50% for fiscal years 1976 and 1977 under the charitable exemption statute, G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third. The court affirmed that the garage was only partially exempt due to its mixed use, but remanded the case because the board's findings on the proportion of exempt versus non-exempt use were inconsistent and not supported by the evidence.

taxesproperty

The case involved an appeal by plaintiff Dorothy Warren from a decision by the Amherst zoning board granting a variance to John Deady to build a single-family home on a vacant lot with 98 feet of frontage, two feet short of the 100-foot minimum required by the local zoning by-law. The Superior Court upheld the variance after a master's report, but the Appeals Court reversed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted further review. The court held that the board exceeded its authority in granting the variance, as the lot did not satisfy the statutory requirements for a variance under G. L. c. 40A, including unique conditions not shared by other lots and hardship not resulting from the owner's actions, and it did not qualify for grandfathered buildability under the subdivision control law provisions. The decision annulled the variance and ordered judgment for the plaintiff.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involves criminal complaints against two Boston entertainment businesses, Union Station, Inc. and Blackgammon’s, Inc., for operating without licenses required by state statutes and city ordinances for activities including juke boxes, dancing, pool tables, recorded music, and soft drink sales on weekdays and Sundays. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds that the licensing requirements under G. L. c. 136, G. L. c. 140, and Boston Ordinances Title 14 §§ 426-430 were unconstitutional, invalid, or inapplicable, after which a Municipal Court judge denied the motions, convicted the defendants, and the matter was reported interlocutorily to the Supreme Judicial Court with questions on the laws' validity. The court examined agreed facts that the venues operated late-night entertainment with admission fees and vending machines, that one defendant’s license application had been denied, and that the ordinances authorized the mayor to grant or deny licenses based on findings related to public safety, health, order, traffic, noise, or nuisance, while requiring written applications describing conditions affecting those interests.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether the Commonwealth could require the Springfield School Committee to place children with special needs in approved private schools under G. L. c. 71B (chapter 766) when no suitable public program existed, or whether such placements violated the Massachusetts anti-aid amendment by using public funds for private institutions. The school committee sought declaratory relief to block the placements, claiming they were unconstitutional except for schools serving the deaf, dumb, and blind. The court ruled that chapter 766 does not violate the anti-aid amendment, reasoning that the statute serves a secular educational purpose, mandates public placements as the least restrictive option whenever possible, requires extensive state monitoring and individualized plans, and permits private contracts only as a necessary alternative with ongoing oversight. The decision emphasized that the funding is directed at meeting children's special education needs rather than supporting private institutions.

religious libertycivil rights

This case was a class action brought by plaintiffs challenging Massachusetts statutes, known as the Doyle-Flynn Amendments, that restricted state Medicaid funding for abortions to only those necessary to avert the death of the mother. The plaintiffs claimed these limits violated equal protection under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (art. 1, as amended by art. 106) and due process under art. 10. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled for the plaintiffs and declared the restrictions invalid and unenforceable. The core reasoning was that the funding limits discriminated against indigent women by denying medically necessary care available to others, exceeding federal requirements while violating state constitutional guarantees, without a sufficient justification tied to legitimate state interests.

abortionhealthcarecivil rights

This case concerned a dispute between the Boston Teachers Union and the City of Boston over the mayor's refusal to submit a supplemental appropriation request to the city council to fund executed and anticipated collective bargaining agreements with school unions. The court held that the mayor was required to submit appropriation requests for executed collective bargaining agreements under G. L. c. 150E, § 7(b), that the mayor lacked authority to veto city council appropriations for such executed contracts, and that the school committee determines the necessary funding amount subject to council approval. It further ruled that the mayor need not submit requests for unexecuted or anticipated contracts before the statutory thirty-day period expires, while upholding related injunctive relief on setting the city's tax rate pending compliance. The decision rested on statutory interpretation of municipal and collective bargaining laws, the distinct roles of the school committee versus the mayor, and limits on mayoral veto power over appropriations.

labor & employment