Francis Quirico

The case involved Lynn Hospital appealing the denial of full tax abatements for a parking garage it owned, which served both the hospital and an adjacent medical building used by private physicians. The Appellate Tax Board granted partial exemptions of 50% for fiscal years 1976 and 1977 under the charitable exemption statute, G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third. The court affirmed that the garage was only partially exempt due to its mixed use, but remanded the case because the board's findings on the proportion of exempt versus non-exempt use were inconsistent and not supported by the evidence.

taxesproperty

The case involved an appeal by plaintiff Dorothy Warren from a decision by the Amherst zoning board granting a variance to John Deady to build a single-family home on a vacant lot with 98 feet of frontage, two feet short of the 100-foot minimum required by the local zoning by-law. The Superior Court upheld the variance after a master's report, but the Appeals Court reversed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted further review. The court held that the board exceeded its authority in granting the variance, as the lot did not satisfy the statutory requirements for a variance under G. L. c. 40A, including unique conditions not shared by other lots and hardship not resulting from the owner's actions, and it did not qualify for grandfathered buildability under the subdivision control law provisions. The decision annulled the variance and ordered judgment for the plaintiff.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involves criminal complaints against two Boston entertainment businesses, Union Station, Inc. and Blackgammon’s, Inc., for operating without licenses required by state statutes and city ordinances for activities including juke boxes, dancing, pool tables, recorded music, and soft drink sales on weekdays and Sundays. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds that the licensing requirements under G. L. c. 136, G. L. c. 140, and Boston Ordinances Title 14 §§ 426-430 were unconstitutional, invalid, or inapplicable, after which a Municipal Court judge denied the motions, convicted the defendants, and the matter was reported interlocutorily to the Supreme Judicial Court with questions on the laws' validity. The court examined agreed facts that the venues operated late-night entertainment with admission fees and vending machines, that one defendant’s license application had been denied, and that the ordinances authorized the mayor to grant or deny licenses based on findings related to public safety, health, order, traffic, noise, or nuisance, while requiring written applications describing conditions affecting those interests.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether the Commonwealth could require the Springfield School Committee to place children with special needs in approved private schools under G. L. c. 71B (chapter 766) when no suitable public program existed, or whether such placements violated the Massachusetts anti-aid amendment by using public funds for private institutions. The school committee sought declaratory relief to block the placements, claiming they were unconstitutional except for schools serving the deaf, dumb, and blind. The court ruled that chapter 766 does not violate the anti-aid amendment, reasoning that the statute serves a secular educational purpose, mandates public placements as the least restrictive option whenever possible, requires extensive state monitoring and individualized plans, and permits private contracts only as a necessary alternative with ongoing oversight. The decision emphasized that the funding is directed at meeting children's special education needs rather than supporting private institutions.

religious libertycivil rights

This case was a class action brought by plaintiffs challenging Massachusetts statutes, known as the Doyle-Flynn Amendments, that restricted state Medicaid funding for abortions to only those necessary to avert the death of the mother. The plaintiffs claimed these limits violated equal protection under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (art. 1, as amended by art. 106) and due process under art. 10. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled for the plaintiffs and declared the restrictions invalid and unenforceable. The core reasoning was that the funding limits discriminated against indigent women by denying medically necessary care available to others, exceeding federal requirements while violating state constitutional guarantees, without a sufficient justification tied to legitimate state interests.

abortionhealthcarecivil rights

This case concerned a dispute between the Boston Teachers Union and the City of Boston over the mayor's refusal to submit a supplemental appropriation request to the city council to fund executed and anticipated collective bargaining agreements with school unions. The court held that the mayor was required to submit appropriation requests for executed collective bargaining agreements under G. L. c. 150E, § 7(b), that the mayor lacked authority to veto city council appropriations for such executed contracts, and that the school committee determines the necessary funding amount subject to council approval. It further ruled that the mayor need not submit requests for unexecuted or anticipated contracts before the statutory thirty-day period expires, while upholding related injunctive relief on setting the city's tax rate pending compliance. The decision rested on statutory interpretation of municipal and collective bargaining laws, the distinct roles of the school committee versus the mayor, and limits on mayoral veto power over appropriations.

labor & employment

The case involved a challenge by Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Company to the Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance's 1980 decision to set private passenger automobile insurance rates for 1981 using the traditional Commissioner-fixed method under G.L. c. 175, § 113B, instead of allowing competitive ratemaking under G.L. c. 175E. The company argued that the decision lacked proper findings, exceeded authority, and was untimely, seeking to have its own competitive rate filing take effect. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Commissioner's decision, holding that the statute permitted suspension of competitive rates upon a determination after hearing that competition was insufficient to prevent excessive rates, and that the Commissioner's findings supported this action.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Schuler v. Schuler, the former husband sought modification of a 1976 divorce judgment that required him to pay $700 monthly in alimony and $700 in child support, arguing that his termination from his company, sale of his stock, and reduced income constituted a material change in circumstances under G. L. c. 208, § 37. The probate judge denied the request after hearing evidence that the husband had received substantial proceeds from the sale, had investment income, had chosen not to pursue available employment, and retained sufficient assets to meet the payments, while the former wife's earnings remained comparable. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the judge did not abuse discretion or err in finding no material change of circumstances warranting modification, as the evidence supported the conclusion that the husband retained the ability to pay.

family law

The case concerned whether The Framingham Clinic could obtain a building permit to operate a facility providing gynecological services, including first-trimester abortions, in a Framingham business district without a special permit from the zoning board of appeals. The building commissioner initially classified the use as a permitted "business or professional office" but later reversed course and required board approval after public opposition arose. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the clinic and its landlord, annulling the board's decision and ordering issuance of the permit. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the proposed facility fit within the bylaw's allowance for business or professional offices and that no genuine issue of material fact existed under the zoning bylaw.

business & regulatoryhealthcareproperty

In Commonwealth v. Repoza, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing John Grogan during a fight after a graduation party. On appeal, Repoza challenged several trial judge rulings, including jury instructions on malice, and sought extraordinary review. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that no errors warranted reversal after reviewing the assignments and the record independently. The court noted an incorrect instruction using "presumption" of malice from use of a deadly weapon but determined it did not affect the outcome sufficiently to require a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Ann J. Pfluger, an archivist discharged by Deerfield Academy after performance issues with her supervisor, who then applied for unemployment benefits under Massachusetts law. The Director of the Division of Employment Security approved her claim, finding no deliberate misconduct in willful disregard of the employer's interest, and this was upheld through administrative review and by the District Court. On appeal by the employer, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the record supported the finding that Pfluger was discharged as an unsatisfactory employee under unreasonable probationary standards rather than for qualifying misconduct under G. L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2). The decision emphasized that disqualification requires proof of deliberate acts, which was absent here despite disputed testimony about work conditions.

labor & employment

The case involved a defendant convicted in Superior Court of carrying a firearm in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10(a) after police found a gun in the console of a borrowed car he was sitting in; he had been acquitted on a related charge of possessing a firearm with a defaced serial number. The Appeals Court reversed the conviction on grounds that the complaint charged possession on his person but the evidence involved a vehicle, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted further review. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction either for carrying the gun on his person or for having it under his control in a vehicle, as there was no proof the defendant knew the gun was present. It therefore affirmed the reversal, set aside the verdict, and ordered judgment for the defendant.

criminal lawguns

The case involved a plaintiff who sued members of the Fitchburg city council after they revoked his permit to store gasoline on his property, alleging arbitrary action and procedural violations, and seeking to overturn the revocation plus damages for lost business profits. Procedural errors arose because the plaintiff named the wrong defendants (the council board rather than the city itself), leading to improper defaults, a master's damages assessment of $48,000, and lower court rulings on municipal immunity and a potential federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, all defaults, the master's report confirmation, and related orders, remanding the case to the Superior Court to permit addition of proper parties, amendment of pleadings, and full litigation of the issues.

civil rightsprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved plaintiffs who obtained judgments against a negligent driver whose insurance company had become insolvent, seeking recovery from the Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund after already receiving payment under their own uninsured motorist policy. The Superior Court dismissed the action, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The court reasoned that under G.L. c. 175D, the Fund’s obligations are limited to the insolvent insurer’s policy limits, and any amounts recovered from the claimants’ own insurance must be offset against those limits pursuant to section 9, meaning the plaintiffs had already exhausted the available coverage through their $10,000 recovery.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case was an appeal from a first-degree murder conviction and life sentence in which the defendant challenged the legality of a hotel room search and seizure, limitations on recross-examination of a witness, denial of a new trial motion based on post-trial blood tests, and multiple other issues including prosecutorial statements, jury instructions on prior convictions, and references to a probable cause hearing, all raised either at trial or for the first time on appeal. The court summarized the trial evidence, which centered on eyewitness testimony from the victim's roommate describing the defendant approaching and shooting the victim in a car, along with supporting testimony about the defendant's movements and a borrowed vehicle. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded there was no error in any of the challenged rulings or procedures and affirmed both the conviction and the denial of the new trial.

criminal law

In Commonwealth v. Lockley, the defendant was convicted of robbing Iwilla D. Thorn in 1977 and appealed on grounds including the denial of a publicly funded polygraph test, the denial of permission to sit at counsel table, and the admission of mugshot photographs used in the victim's identification. The court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The core reasoning focused on the improper admission of police mugshots, which could lead the jury to infer the defendant had a prior criminal record, as they were not sufficiently altered or presented to avoid suggesting their source or implying prior law enforcement contact. The opinion also noted procedural issues with the polygraph motion but grounded the reversal in the evidentiary error regarding the photographs.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Joseph A. Bruno, Jr., Thomas F. Casale, and Vincent J. Federico, who were indicted for first-degree murder and convicted of second-degree murder after a trial; Bruno's renewed motion for a directed verdict was granted, but those of Casale and Federico were denied. Casale and Federico appealed the denial, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, affirmed the judgments. The court held that the evidence of the defendants' prior harassment of the victim and his group, their coordinated movements with others toward the scene, their presence in the playground from which shots were fired, and their flight afterward was sufficient to permit a jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that they participated in the murder. The opinion distinguished the facts from cases involving mere association with perpetrators and noted that the Commonwealth need not exclude every alternative hypothesis of guilt. The court also conducted its required review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E and found no basis for relief.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Joseph Fernandes Correia, who was convicted of first-degree murder for his alleged role in an attempted armed bank robbery during which a security guard was killed. Correia appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting in-court and out-of-court identifications by two witnesses and in its jury instructions on attempted armed robbery and joint venture liability. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction, holding that the identifications were properly admitted because they were based on independent observations and not unduly suggestive, and that the jury instructions accurately stated the law regarding attempt and participation in a felony resulting in homicide.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appeal by Saxon Coffee Shop from a Boston Licensing Board decision revoking its common victualler's license under G.L. c. 140, § 9, based on police reports claiming prostitutes used the premises and nearby apartments, that management failed to cooperate with police, and that the licensee profited from the activity. The Superior Court affirmed the revocation, but the Supreme Judicial Court annulled the board's decision. The court held that the revocation was not supported by substantial evidence, as the police testimony relied on hearsay from unnamed sources, lacked direct proof of improper conduct by the licensee under the statute, and did not establish that the shop itself was being used for prostitution. The opinion reviewed the statutory requirements for revocation and the standards for judicial review of local licensing board actions.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Joseph N. Callahan's appeal from his 1976 first-degree murder conviction for the killing of Marian Reichle, in which he raised multiple claims of trial error including the admission of statements from a court-ordered psychiatric exam, jury instructions on insanity verdicts and burden of proof, prosecutorial comments, and an Allen charge, though no objections were preserved at trial. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the record under G. L. c. 278, § 33E and found no error in the points raised by the defendant, but identified a fatal flaw in the trial judge's instructions on the element of malice. Specifically, the charge stated that the intentional use of a deadly weapon created a mandatory presumption of malice that the defendant had to rebut, which the court held violated due process under Mullaney v. Wilbur and Sandstrom v. Montana by improperly shifting the burden of proof from the Commonwealth. The court therefore reversed the judgment, set aside the verdict, and ordered a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure