The case involved plaintiffs Marion and Paul McCue who applied for Prudential's Coordinated Health Insurance Plan (CHIP) through agent Shaw after a long relationship with the insurer, but the application was rejected because their doctor's statement was not received within Prudential's internal 45-day limit, and they were not informed of the rule, the application's status, or its later rejection; they later sought coverage after Mrs. McCue was diagnosed with leukemia. Prudential's motion for directed verdict was granted on the count alleging the policy was in force but denied on the counts alleging breach of agreement and duty to complete the application with reasonable care, and the court affirmed the jury verdicts for the plaintiffs on those counts while rejecting Prudential's post-trial motions. The core reasoning was that the plaintiffs' 28-year history with Prudential created special circumstances of assertion, representation, and reliance that permitted liability for the agent's inadequate performance in handling the application process. The court also addressed but did not find reversible error in the use of special interrogatories to the jury.
Analogic Corporation sued Data Translation, Inc. and several former employees, alleging that the defendants had misappropriated trade secrets and proprietary information to copy Analogic’s unpatented MP 6912 high-speed data acquisition module. The trial court confirmed a master’s report, awarded the plaintiff damages of $12,714.75 plus interest and costs, and issued a permanent injunction barring the defendants from manufacturing or selling modules that used Analogic’s circuitry. On appeal, the court held that federal patent law does not preempt state trade-secret protection against unauthorized use of confidential information obtained through former employment. The court further ruled that the master’s findings of breach of employment agreements and misuse of proprietary data were supported by the record, though it remanded the case for additional findings on the time required to reverse-engineer the device without the misappropriated information.
The case involved a landlord who purchased an apartment complex in Brookline with the intent to convert units to condominiums and who petitioned the local rent control board for higher maximum rents on the remaining rent-controlled units, claiming the board's allowed 6.8% rate of return on fair market value was confiscatory. The Supreme Judicial Court held that judicial review of such rent control board decisions under St. 1970, c. 842 is limited to assessing whether the board's action was supported by substantial evidence and legally justified, without permitting a trial de novo on claims of confiscation. The court reaffirmed its prior decision in Sherman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline and ruled that the landlord had not overcome the presumptive validity of the board's determination, which did not require rents sufficient to cover the owner's mortgage interest or guarantee any particular return beyond what was shown on the record.
In this case, a defendant indicted for first-degree murder sought to waive his right to a jury trial under G. L. c. 263, § 6, arguing that the absence of capital punishment in Massachusetts meant there were no longer any "capital cases" preventing such a waiver. The trial judge denied the motion and reported the question, finding the waiver would otherwise have been knowing and voluntary. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the denial, holding that the statutory definition of a "capital case" in G. L. c. 278, § 33E—which covers convictions for murder in the first or second degree on an indictment for first-degree murder—continues to apply for purposes of the jury-waiver prohibition, reflecting legislative intent to provide special safeguards in these serious cases regardless of whether the death penalty is available. The court concluded that any change to this rule must come from the Legislature rather than judicial reinterpretation.
The case involved a defendant convicted of second-degree murder and marijuana possession after a stabbing that followed a racial argument between youths on a Boston street in 1974. The defendant appealed, claiming error in the trial judge's refusal to give certain jury instructions on reasonable doubt and lesser offenses, as well as prejudice from the judge's remarks about the victim's right to life. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury charge adequately addressed unanimity, reasonable doubt, and the degrees of homicide without needing the exact requested language. The remarks were deemed appropriate to counter potential bias from the racial overtones and did not prejudice the defendant when viewed in the full context of the instructions. The court also declined to reduce the verdict to manslaughter under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, finding the evidence supported the jury's determination.
The case involved two co-defendants convicted of murder in the second degree and armed robbery whose convictions were reversed on appeal, leading to a scheduled retrial. Prior to retrial, one defendant moved to take a polygraph examination, prompting the trial judge to report multiple questions of law to the appellate court concerning the potential admissibility of the results as evidence, their impact on the co-defendant's confrontation rights under Bruton v. United States, reliability factors such as language barriers and time elapsed, and related procedural issues. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the reported questions were premature, as the trial judge must first exercise discretion under the standards from Commonwealth v. A Juvenile to determine whether to allow the test and admit its results. The court remanded the cases for further proceedings, emphasizing that trial judges should initially resolve such evidentiary matters subject to later appellate review.