Paul Cashman Reardon

The case involved plaintiffs Marion and Paul McCue who applied for Prudential's Coordinated Health Insurance Plan (CHIP) through agent Shaw after a long relationship with the insurer, but the application was rejected because their doctor's statement was not received within Prudential's internal 45-day limit, and they were not informed of the rule, the application's status, or its later rejection; they later sought coverage after Mrs. McCue was diagnosed with leukemia. Prudential's motion for directed verdict was granted on the count alleging the policy was in force but denied on the counts alleging breach of agreement and duty to complete the application with reasonable care, and the court affirmed the jury verdicts for the plaintiffs on those counts while rejecting Prudential's post-trial motions. The core reasoning was that the plaintiffs' 28-year history with Prudential created special circumstances of assertion, representation, and reliance that permitted liability for the agent's inadequate performance in handling the application process. The court also addressed but did not find reversible error in the use of special interrogatories to the jury.

business & regulatoryhealthcaretorts & liability

Analogic Corporation sued Data Translation, Inc. and several former employees, alleging that the defendants had misappropriated trade secrets and proprietary information to copy Analogic’s unpatented MP 6912 high-speed data acquisition module. The trial court confirmed a master’s report, awarded the plaintiff damages of $12,714.75 plus interest and costs, and issued a permanent injunction barring the defendants from manufacturing or selling modules that used Analogic’s circuitry. On appeal, the court held that federal patent law does not preempt state trade-secret protection against unauthorized use of confidential information obtained through former employment. The court further ruled that the master’s findings of breach of employment agreements and misuse of proprietary data were supported by the record, though it remanded the case for additional findings on the time required to reverse-engineer the device without the misappropriated information.

business & regulatorypropertyfederal power

The case involved a landlord who purchased an apartment complex in Brookline with the intent to convert units to condominiums and who petitioned the local rent control board for higher maximum rents on the remaining rent-controlled units, claiming the board's allowed 6.8% rate of return on fair market value was confiscatory. The Supreme Judicial Court held that judicial review of such rent control board decisions under St. 1970, c. 842 is limited to assessing whether the board's action was supported by substantial evidence and legally justified, without permitting a trial de novo on claims of confiscation. The court reaffirmed its prior decision in Sherman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline and ruled that the landlord had not overcome the presumptive validity of the board's determination, which did not require rents sufficient to cover the owner's mortgage interest or guarantee any particular return beyond what was shown on the record.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, a defendant indicted for first-degree murder sought to waive his right to a jury trial under G. L. c. 263, § 6, arguing that the absence of capital punishment in Massachusetts meant there were no longer any "capital cases" preventing such a waiver. The trial judge denied the motion and reported the question, finding the waiver would otherwise have been knowing and voluntary. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the denial, holding that the statutory definition of a "capital case" in G. L. c. 278, § 33E—which covers convictions for murder in the first or second degree on an indictment for first-degree murder—continues to apply for purposes of the jury-waiver prohibition, reflecting legislative intent to provide special safeguards in these serious cases regardless of whether the death penalty is available. The court concluded that any change to this rule must come from the Legislature rather than judicial reinterpretation.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of second-degree murder and marijuana possession after a stabbing that followed a racial argument between youths on a Boston street in 1974. The defendant appealed, claiming error in the trial judge's refusal to give certain jury instructions on reasonable doubt and lesser offenses, as well as prejudice from the judge's remarks about the victim's right to life. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury charge adequately addressed unanimity, reasonable doubt, and the degrees of homicide without needing the exact requested language. The remarks were deemed appropriate to counter potential bias from the racial overtones and did not prejudice the defendant when viewed in the full context of the instructions. The court also declined to reduce the verdict to manslaughter under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, finding the evidence supported the jury's determination.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved two co-defendants convicted of murder in the second degree and armed robbery whose convictions were reversed on appeal, leading to a scheduled retrial. Prior to retrial, one defendant moved to take a polygraph examination, prompting the trial judge to report multiple questions of law to the appellate court concerning the potential admissibility of the results as evidence, their impact on the co-defendant's confrontation rights under Bruton v. United States, reliability factors such as language barriers and time elapsed, and related procedural issues. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the reported questions were premature, as the trial judge must first exercise discretion under the standards from Commonwealth v. A Juvenile to determine whether to allow the test and admit its results. The court remanded the cases for further proceedings, emphasizing that trial judges should initially resolve such evidentiary matters subject to later appellate review.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of first-degree murder and rape after leaving the victim's body in a snowbank, where it was later mutilated by dogs. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of photographs showing the post-mortem injuries to the head and face. The court reversed the convictions, holding that the photos' prejudicial impact outweighed their evidentiary value, even though the trial judge had attempted to exclude the most inflammatory images and instructed the jury on their limited use. The Commonwealth's case was strong, and pathologist testimony regarding ante-mortem injuries would have sufficed without the post-mortem photographs.

criminal lawprocedure

In Bianco v. Bianco, the wife appealed a probate court divorce decree that granted the husband a divorce, ordered him to pay her $2,500 in lieu of alimony, and required her to convey her interest in the marital home to him. The case centered on interpreting the newly amended G.L. c. 208, § 34, which expanded court authority beyond alimony to allow assignment of property between spouses upon divorce. The court affirmed the decree, holding that the statute permits equitable property division and that the judge's findings on the parties' ages, incomes, contributions to the home, and financial assets were sufficient to support ordering the transfer. The decision emphasized that future rulings under the statute should explicitly address all statutory factors to demonstrate proper exercise of discretion.

family lawproperty

The case involved the defendant's appeal from his conviction of first-degree murder and life sentence for the fatal beating of an elderly woman in her Boston apartment after he gained entry by posing as a surveyor. The defendant challenged the admission of evidence suggesting other crimes, including testimony about his similar attempts to enter other apartments and jail identification cards, as well as the trial judge's jury instructions on the definitions of malice and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was admissible and relevant to prove identity with appropriate limiting instructions, and that the jury instructions accurately reflected established precedent on malice without error. The court also found no issues with the voir dire questions or other assignments of error after reviewing the full record under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a Massachusetts wife suing her husband for personal injuries sustained as a passenger in a car accident that occurred in New York State; the couple's vehicle was registered and insured in Massachusetts. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the husband on the ground of interspousal tort immunity. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, ruling that Massachusetts law, rather than New York law, governs the immunity question because the Commonwealth has the predominant interest in regulating the marital relationships of its domiciliaries. Applying its recent decision in Lewis v. Lewis, which abolished interspousal immunity for motor-vehicle torts, the court held that the action could proceed.

family lawproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a defendant convicted of second-degree murder for the killing of a variety store proprietor in Salisbury, Massachusetts, and sentenced to life imprisonment consecutive to another sentence. The defendant appealed on three grounds: that the trial judge's preliminary instructions to the jury pool improperly emphasized the indictment and undermined the presumption of innocence; that the prosecutor improperly questioned a witness about a prior inconsistent statement regarding a gun; and that cross-examination about the defendant's escape from a forestry camp was irrelevant. The court held that the full set of instructions, including the final charge, correctly explained the indictment as non-evidence and preserved the presumption of innocence. It further ruled the witness questioning permissible for impeachment and the escape details relevant to identity and financial circumstances. After full review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, the court affirmed the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether an insurance policy covered injuries from a fall down stairs that aggravated the plaintiff's pre-existing spinal curvature condition (kyphoscoliosis). The policy excluded coverage for losses caused by any disorder of the spine or lumbar muscles, leading the insurer to argue that the plaintiff was barred from recovery as a matter of law. The court found the exclusion language ambiguous because it could reasonably be read to apply only to the pre-existing condition rather than to new injuries superimposed on it, and therefore applied the rule that ambiguities in insurance contracts are resolved against the insurer. It upheld the denial of a directed verdict for the defendant and affirmed the jury instructions that allowed recovery if the disability resulted from the accident rather than a natural extension of the prior condition.

business & regulatory

The case involved plaintiffs, the first ten signers of an initiative petition to ban private possession and sale of handguns, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Secretary of the Commonwealth from placing a legislative substitute measure on the November 1976 ballot. The substitute bill imposed mandatory minimum sentences for use of a firearm in certain crimes without suspension, probation, parole, or good conduct deductions. The court ruled that the legislative proposal did not meet the requirements of Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution for a substitute because it pursued different objectives than the initiative petition and would interfere with voters' ability to decide the core question proposed by the petition. The reasoning relied on the text of Article 48, the legislative history from the constitutional convention debates, and the principle that a valid substitute must not emasculate or vary from the initiative's fundamental purpose.

gunselectionscriminal law

This case involved plaintiffs seeking a court order under Massachusetts public records law to compel the Lexington police chief to allow inspection or copying of reports and other documents related to a 1975 police incident at a private home, where officers dispersed a crowd, a police dog caused injuries, and misdemeanor charges were pending against some plaintiffs. The Superior Court judge ruled that the documents qualified for an exemption from disclosure as investigatory materials. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of access to police reports and letters from private citizens, holding that the police chief had met the burden of proving with specificity that disclosure would probably prejudice effective law enforcement, as these materials included officer observations, witness statements, confidential sources, and leads. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to assess whether other documents in the police file also fell within a statutory exemption. The decision interpreted the public records statute's presumption of disclosure and the scope of the investigatory materials exemption.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved two Braintree police officers convicted by a jury of breaking and entering a restaurant at night with intent to commit larceny and possession of burglarious implements after they were caught during the act following a tip from another officer. On appeal, the defendants raised multiple claims of error, primarily concerning the admission of testimony about other crimes to show intent or a common scheme, the related jury instructions, and alleged bias by the trial judge through his questioning of witnesses and handling of procedural requests. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the evidence of prior similar acts was relevant and admissible to rebut the defendants' claim of innocent investigative intent and to establish the required criminal intent, that the judge's instructions limited the evidence appropriately, and that no judicial bias or other reversible errors were shown in the record.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the appeal of a defendant convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery arising from the shooting death of a store owner during an alleged robbery. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that although the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on sentencing and parole eligibility, there was no grave prejudice warranting reversal under the standards of G. L. c. 278, § 33E. The evidence was sufficient to support a conviction either under the felony-murder rule or based on premeditation, and any improper remarks by the prosecutor did not constitute reversible error in the absence of objections or requests for curative instructions.

criminal law

This case involved a dispute over enforcement of a real estate purchase and sale agreement for a synagogue building in Boston, where the plaintiff Church of God in Christ sought specific performance against the defendant Congregation Kehillath Jacob after the congregation attempted to cancel the deal and sell to a third party, the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church. The Superior Court had ordered conveyance to the plaintiff, but the Appeals Court reversed; on further review, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court decree. The court reasoned that the congregation had waived the "time is of the essence" clause through multiple extensions, acceptance of late payments, and ongoing conduct that led the plaintiff to believe performance could occur within a reasonable time. It further held that the congregation failed to provide clear and definite notice required to reinstate a strict deadline or cancel the contract, and that the plaintiff's tender of performance in August 1973 was timely under the circumstances of the oral extension and reliance by the plaintiff on the agreement.

property

The plaintiff sued Hertz Corporation and others for personal injuries from a 1972 car accident involving a leased vehicle, alleging defects in the car. After Hertz served interrogatories seeking itemized monetary losses, the plaintiff provided incomplete and evasive answers despite two court orders to supplement them within set deadlines. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint against Hertz under Mass. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) for willful noncompliance with discovery, and the Appeals Court affirmed, finding the plaintiff had ample opportunity to obtain readily available information from hospitals and had shown a pattern of disregard for judicial orders without any demonstrated inability to comply.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved consolidated actions by the town of Arlington seeking to invalidate 'last and best offer' arbitration awards that set wages, benefits, and working conditions for police officers and firefighters under a 1973 state statute. The town argued that the binding arbitration law violated the Home Rule Amendment by stripping local control, unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to private arbitrators, contravened one-person-one-vote principles under the Fourteenth Amendment, and conflicted with municipal finance statutes. The court examined whether the statute qualified as a general law applicable statewide under the Home Rule Amendment's section 8, noted the Legislature's retained authority to regulate municipal matters, and reviewed the arbitration procedures requiring panels to choose between the parties' final offers based on specified factors including public interest and comparability.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned an employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits from the first insurer (Shelby Mutual) after he had received a lump-sum settlement from the second insurer (Hartford) for successive on-the-job injuries that together caused ongoing disability. The Superior Court had ordered the first insurer to pay benefits, but the Appeals Court reversed, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that reversal. The court held that when multiple injuries contribute to incapacity, the insurer covering the risk at the time of the most recent causally related injury bears full responsibility for compensation. Because the second injury contributed to the disability and the lump-sum agreement with the second insurer resolved all future payments for that incapacity, allowing recovery from the first insurer would constitute impermissible double recovery under the statutory scheme.

labor & employment