This case was an appeal from a manslaughter conviction in the death of the defendant's three-year-old son, where the defendant challenged the admission of his statement to police about the child's bruises, a relative's testimony about prior marks on the child and the defendant's response, and photographs of the home interior. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the initial police question and reply were admissible because the inquiry had not focused on the defendant as a suspect and the setting was not custodial. The relative's statement was properly admitted, with a limiting instruction, to show the defendant's general attitude or disposition toward the child rather than to prove the charged act, and the photographs were relevant to the absence of objects that could have caused the fatal injury. The court rejected the defendant's post-trial argument under Bumper v. North Carolina for lack of a timely objection at trial.
The case involved the conviction of a corporate officer for his company's failure to provide computing scales in retail stores selling prepackaged meat and fish products, in violation of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 98, section 56B. The court upheld the conviction against challenges that the statute was unconstitutional as an invalid exercise of police power, a denial of equal protection, and an undue burden on interstate commerce. The court reasoned that the law reasonably protects consumers by enabling checks on the weight and price of packaged goods, that distinctions in application between retail stores and delivery services are rational, and that no undue burden on commerce was shown. The statute was found to have a real and substantial relation to the general welfare.
This case involved a class action by limited partners in Ridgeville Associates against the general partners and mortgagee Maurice Gordon to challenge the validity of a second mortgage on the partnership's apartment buildings executed in 1964 and to address resulting liabilities. The Superior Court ruled the mortgage null and void, ordered accountings, a receivership, sale of assets, and payment of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding the mortgage enforceable only to the extent of Gordon's actual payments of $260,000 (less principal repayments) at six percent interest because the transaction was a partially failed attempt to facilitate a sale of partnership assets to general partner Fine, with Gordon aware of the partnership context and restrictions; the court also set aside certain findings, limited Gordon's obligations as mortgagee in possession, and left other liability issues for further proceedings without prejudice.
The case involved homeowners (the Kaufmans) who brought an equity action to resolve disputes over 1961 remodeling work on their house, including claims by the general contractor (Leard) and painter (Noel) for unpaid balances and a counterclaim by the architect (Brooks) for his fee. The court confirmed the master's findings and ordered the Kaufmans to pay Leard and Noel the amounts due plus interest, while requiring Brooks to reimburse the Kaufmans for all costs exceeding the $17,000 authorized limit. The core reasoning was that Brooks, acting as the Kaufmans' agent, was negligent in using inadequate plans, failing to obtain firm bids or written specifications, not promptly informing the owners of cost overruns, and authorizing excess work without clear disclosure or authority. The opinion addresses appeals by Brooks and Noel from the final decree and related motions.
The case concerned a dispute over a building permit issued for a swimming pool constructed in the front and side yards of a residence in Wellesley, Massachusetts, which neighbors challenged under the local zoning by-law. The board of appeal revoked the permit, and the Superior Court upheld that decision, finding the pool violated setback requirements. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, ruling that the pool qualified as a "structure" under the by-law because it was a large, permanent installation that materially occupied space above ground level. The court held that the pool therefore had to comply with the by-law's mandates for a front yard of at least thirty feet and side yards of at least twenty feet, which it did not. The opinion noted some ambiguity in how the yard rules apply to accessory uses but found no basis to exempt the pool from the front-yard requirement.
This case involves an appeal from a Superior Court decree that annulled a decision by the Watertown board of appeals granting a variance (and special permit) to River Manor, Inc., to replace an existing nursing home with a new building. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the board had jurisdiction to act, as the hearing notice sufficiently informed the public that approval was sought for the new nursing home despite incorrectly referencing a special permit unavailable under the zoning by-law in that district. The court further ruled that the plaintiffs' failure to attach a copy of the board's decision to their served notices was not a jurisdictional defect and that their bill in equity adequately stated a claim that statutory variance requirements were unmet. The court affirmed interlocutory decrees, reversed the final decree annulling the board's action, and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a determination on the merits of the variance under G. L. c. 40A, § 21.