Arthur Easterbrook Whittemore

This case was an appeal from a manslaughter conviction in the death of the defendant's three-year-old son, where the defendant challenged the admission of his statement to police about the child's bruises, a relative's testimony about prior marks on the child and the defendant's response, and photographs of the home interior. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the initial police question and reply were admissible because the inquiry had not focused on the defendant as a suspect and the setting was not custodial. The relative's statement was properly admitted, with a limiting instruction, to show the defendant's general attitude or disposition toward the child rather than to prove the charged act, and the photographs were relevant to the absence of objects that could have caused the fatal injury. The court rejected the defendant's post-trial argument under Bumper v. North Carolina for lack of a timely objection at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of a corporate officer for his company's failure to provide computing scales in retail stores selling prepackaged meat and fish products, in violation of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 98, section 56B. The court upheld the conviction against challenges that the statute was unconstitutional as an invalid exercise of police power, a denial of equal protection, and an undue burden on interstate commerce. The court reasoned that the law reasonably protects consumers by enabling checks on the weight and price of packaged goods, that distinctions in application between retail stores and delivery services are rational, and that no undue burden on commerce was shown. The statute was found to have a real and substantial relation to the general welfare.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a class action by limited partners in Ridgeville Associates against the general partners and mortgagee Maurice Gordon to challenge the validity of a second mortgage on the partnership's apartment buildings executed in 1964 and to address resulting liabilities. The Superior Court ruled the mortgage null and void, ordered accountings, a receivership, sale of assets, and payment of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding the mortgage enforceable only to the extent of Gordon's actual payments of $260,000 (less principal repayments) at six percent interest because the transaction was a partially failed attempt to facilitate a sale of partnership assets to general partner Fine, with Gordon aware of the partnership context and restrictions; the court also set aside certain findings, limited Gordon's obligations as mortgagee in possession, and left other liability issues for further proceedings without prejudice.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved homeowners (the Kaufmans) who brought an equity action to resolve disputes over 1961 remodeling work on their house, including claims by the general contractor (Leard) and painter (Noel) for unpaid balances and a counterclaim by the architect (Brooks) for his fee. The court confirmed the master's findings and ordered the Kaufmans to pay Leard and Noel the amounts due plus interest, while requiring Brooks to reimburse the Kaufmans for all costs exceeding the $17,000 authorized limit. The core reasoning was that Brooks, acting as the Kaufmans' agent, was negligent in using inadequate plans, failing to obtain firm bids or written specifications, not promptly informing the owners of cost overruns, and authorizing excess work without clear disclosure or authority. The opinion addresses appeals by Brooks and Noel from the final decree and related motions.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over a building permit issued for a swimming pool constructed in the front and side yards of a residence in Wellesley, Massachusetts, which neighbors challenged under the local zoning by-law. The board of appeal revoked the permit, and the Superior Court upheld that decision, finding the pool violated setback requirements. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, ruling that the pool qualified as a "structure" under the by-law because it was a large, permanent installation that materially occupied space above ground level. The court held that the pool therefore had to comply with the by-law's mandates for a front yard of at least thirty feet and side yards of at least twenty feet, which it did not. The opinion noted some ambiguity in how the yard rules apply to accessory uses but found no basis to exempt the pool from the front-yard requirement.

property

This case involves an appeal from a Superior Court decree that annulled a decision by the Watertown board of appeals granting a variance (and special permit) to River Manor, Inc., to replace an existing nursing home with a new building. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the board had jurisdiction to act, as the hearing notice sufficiently informed the public that approval was sought for the new nursing home despite incorrectly referencing a special permit unavailable under the zoning by-law in that district. The court further ruled that the plaintiffs' failure to attach a copy of the board's decision to their served notices was not a jurisdictional defect and that their bill in equity adequately stated a claim that statutory variance requirements were unmet. The court affirmed interlocutory decrees, reversed the final decree annulling the board's action, and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a determination on the merits of the variance under G. L. c. 40A, § 21.

propertyprocedure

The case involved three consolidated tort actions brought by property owners and tenants against Wellington Service Corp. for flood damage to a building at 175 Albany Street in Cambridge, allegedly caused when the defendant's 137-ton tractor-trailer rig, operating without proper permits under G.L. c. 85, § 30, stressed and eventually fractured a cast-iron water pipe elbow under the street on July 10, 1962. After the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs, the trial judge reserved the issues of proximate cause and sufficiency of the negligence evidence and reported them to the Supreme Judicial Court. The court held that the weight-limit violations were in the chain of proximate causation and that the verdicts were supported by competent evidence of negligence rather than conjecture. It reasoned that the jury could reasonably infer, from the rig's movements and the fall of the trailer onto wooden blocks, that downward pressure on the street pipe created strain transmitted through the rigid system, resulting in the delayed fracture at its weakest point, consistent with established physical principles.

torts & liabilitypropertybusiness & regulatory

This case concerns landowners in Braintree who petitioned the Land Court under G. L. c. 240, § 14A to challenge a 1966 zoning by-law amendment that permitted industrial access roads through residential districts, including strips adjacent to their home, following an earlier ruling that such use was illegal. The Land Court ruled the amendment invalid, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed after addressing jurisdiction and the merits. The court held that the amendment effected an arbitrary and discriminatory rezoning of specific residential parcels already in unlawful industrial use without individualized determinations of suitability, resulting in unequal treatment compared to other residential areas and an unreasonable burden on the petitioners' property. It rejected claims of improper delegation to the board of appeals but concluded the amendment violated uniformity and reasonableness requirements under zoning law. The decision allows the town other avenues, such as public ways or targeted approvals, to address access needs.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned the interpretation of a lease provision granting a five-year term 'with an option of further extension,' where the lessee claimed a right to a second five-year term on identical conditions and the lessor maintained that the clause required only negotiation for a new lease. The trial court found for the lessor based on extrinsic evidence including an attorney's letter and the parties' understandings, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that a general extension clause in a lease implies renewal on the same terms as the original absent contrary specification, consistent with precedents such as Cunningham v. Pattee and Mutual Paper Co. v. Hoague-Sprague Corp. The court ruled the lease unambiguous, that one party's unilateral mistake of law did not void the agreement, and that the lessee had sufficiently exercised the option through post-notice discussions and the complaint. It entered judgment declaring the lessee's right to a five-year extension from September 1967 at the existing $300 monthly rent.

property

The case concerned a developer's appeal from the Worcester planning board's approval of a subdivision plan conditioned on compliance with a regulation requiring all utility wires to be placed underground in residential subdivisions. The court upheld the regulation and the board's authority to impose the condition, ruling that it was consistent with the Subdivision Control Law's purposes of protecting safety, convenience, and welfare through regulation of ways and municipal services. The opinion reasoned that planning boards may set requirements for utility installations in approved ways, that underground placement advances public interests including emergency access and reduced congestion, and that the regulation included adequate standards for exceptions while not being preempted by other state or local laws on wires.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Beacon Textiles Corp. suing its insurer for coverage under a liability policy after selling defective yarn that discolored sweaters made by a customer, resulting in a claimed loss of $3,742.10. The trial court ruled for the defendant, but the appeals court determined that the discoloration was an accident within the policy's coverage and that the plaintiff was liable to its customer. The court interpreted the policy exclusion for injury to the insured's own products as barring recovery only for the yarn's value, while permitting recovery for the customer's added costs in labor and overhead. It sustained the plaintiff's exceptions and allowed partial recovery of $2,020.73.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case involved cross libels for divorce between a husband and wife. The probate judge dismissed the husband's libel and granted the wife a divorce on grounds of cruel and abusive treatment, along with custody of their two minor children, weekly support, and counsel fees. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the evidence and found no basis to reverse the decrees, concluding they were not plainly wrong with respect to custody, support, or claims of judicial bias. The court reversed a probate court decree dismissing the husband's appeal for contempt due to nonpayment of support, holding that such power belongs to the appellate court, but affirmed the underlying divorce, custody, and support orders.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a Medford police officer, Silverio, who was discharged by the city manager for refusing to answer questions from his superior about his associations with individuals suspected in an auto theft ring and his recent grand jury appearance. After the Civil Service Commission affirmed the discharge and the Municipal Court upheld it, Silverio petitioned for certiorari, arguing that answering would violate grand jury secrecy rules or his rights. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the evidence supported the discharge, as police officers have a duty to cooperate in investigations and the questions did not seek prohibited disclosures about grand jury proceedings. The court reasoned that statutory secrecy obligations primarily bind grand jurors, and Silverio's refusals were not justified by any overriding duty or constitutional protection in this context.

criminal lawlabor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved the conviction of Ricard for the murder of Charles C. King, where the defendant appealed arguing errors in jury selection regarding questions on psychiatry and insanity, and that the evidence of insanity required a directed verdict. The court decided that the trial judge did not abuse discretion by refusing the proposed voir dire questions and that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to consider the issue of criminal responsibility. The reasoning was that such questions were within the judge's discretion, there is no assumed general prejudice against psychiatrists, and while expert testimony supported insanity, evidence of provocation and the defendant's conduct allowed the jury to find otherwise. The judgment was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Tilley of breaking and entering Kathleen Dolan's dwelling house on August 16, 1967, after he and an accomplice were found inside shortly after the owner left with the doors locked. The trial judge, sitting without a jury, found Tilley guilty, and the court overruled his exceptions, holding that the Commonwealth had presented enough proof of a breaking. The reasoning relied on inferences from the locked doors, the ringing of the rear doorbell, the intruders' positions inside, and the unlikelihood of an unobstructed entry, concluding that one or both must have moved a door or window to a material degree to gain access. The court clarified that opening a closed but unlocked door or window constitutes a breaking under Massachusetts law and that the Commonwealth need not prove every possible window was secured.

criminal law

This case was a tort action for libel brought by Edward M. Joyce against the Globe Newspaper Co. over a 1963 news article reporting that Joyce had been 'committed' to Medfield State Hospital after a physician found him mentally deranged and had him involuntarily admitted under G.L. c. 123, §79. The plaintiff alleged the article falsely implied a judicial proceeding and order of commitment, damaging his reputation and business, despite the defendant's retraction. The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the word 'committed' in ordinary usage and under the relevant statute does not necessarily imply judicial action but can refer to placement in a hospital pursuant to statutory authority exercised by a physician. The court further reasoned that the article was a fair and accurate report of the underlying facts and verdict in Joyce's suit against the physician, creating no jury issue on falsity or defamation.

torts & liability

The case involved proceedings under G. L. c. 123A, § 6, to determine whether a defendant convicted in 1962 of assault with intent to rape should be committed to a treatment center for sexually dangerous persons after his prison sentence expired. The Superior Court judge allowed the commitment based on psychiatric examinations and testimony, denying the defendant's motions to dismiss and other challenges. The Supreme Judicial Court overruled the defendant's exceptions, holding that the 1962 proceedings did not bar the later commitment, that expert opinions on the ultimate issue were admissible with supporting evidence, and that the process did not violate due process, double jeopardy, or equal protection. The court reasoned that the statute permits broad use of expert reports and conclusions, that a prior criminal sentence does not adjudicate the question of sexual dangerousness after release, and that the procedures provide adequate safeguards including notice and counsel.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a petition for a writ of mandamus by the brother and coguardian of a woman severely injured by alleged medical malpractice, seeking to compel the Board of Registration in Medicine to hold a hearing on whether to suspend or revoke the licenses of two physicians involved. The Superior Court sustained the Board's demurrer, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the petitioner lacked standing to force the board to initiate proceedings and that mandamus does not lie to compel discretionary administrative actions. The court reasoned that the relevant statutes do not grant the petitioner a legal right to participate in or review the board's preliminary decision not to act, even though the board had considered the matter after investigation.

healthcareprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved two tort actions brought by plaintiffs against the defendants, trustees of Buy-Rite Realty Trust, seeking damages for water damage to property caused by the bursting of an eight-inch water pipe on March 7, 1963, due to freezing. An auditor found the pipe under the defendants' exclusive control and that their negligent failure to protect it caused the damage, leading to jury verdicts for the plaintiffs based on the report and other evidence. The defendants challenged whether they had sufficient control to owe a duty of care, whether a breach could be found, and the jury instructions on control. The court upheld the verdicts, concluding that the defendants had exercised control over the pipe and pump house to protect their interest in the sprinkler system supply, creating a duty they breached by inadequate maintenance. Key facts included the defendants' installation of heaters and padlocks, and their exclusive actions regarding the pipe after prior owners ceased involvement.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved a construction company's lawsuit against the town of Saugus for payment on a contract to adjust insurance claims after fires destroyed parts of the town's junior and senior high schools. The plaintiff argued the contract was valid under an emergency exception in G.L.c. 44, § 31 despite lacking a town appropriation, based on selectmen votes declaring emergencies to allow the town manager to act. The court directed a verdict for the town and overruled the plaintiff's exceptions, holding that the facts did not establish an extreme emergency involving health or safety of persons or property that would permit bypassing the appropriation requirement for adjusting fire losses. The reasoning emphasized that the statute provides a narrow exception for immediate actions to avert risks, which did not apply to negotiating insurance adjustments or related rebuilding plans, and that selectmen declarations alone could not expand its scope.

business & regulatory