Algernon Lee Butler

The case involved petitioner Larry Drake Atkinson's motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255 and 1651(a) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 to vacate his jury conviction for two counts of heroin possession with intent to distribute and two counts of distribution, on grounds that the government failed to disclose material evidence of perjury and bias by its key witness, Charles Edward Pennington, regarding prior convictions and payments received. The court granted the motion for a new trial, ordering the United States to retry Atkinson if it elects to do so. The core reasoning was that Pennington was the only witness linking Atkinson to the offenses, so the jury's assessment of his credibility was essential to the verdict, and newly discovered evidence sufficiently impugned that credibility that it might have induced reasonable doubt.

criminal lawprocedure

The case challenged North Carolina's system for electing the Robeson County Board of Education under the Equal Protection Clause, where seven of eleven members were chosen by all county voters including those in separate city administrative units, while the remaining four were elected only by voters in the county school district. Plaintiffs, representing Indian eligible voters living in the county district, argued that allowing non-residents of the district to vote for a majority of the board unconstitutionally diluted their votes. The court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding the system constitutional because city unit residents had a substantial interest in county board decisions on matters like pupil transportation and shared educational resources. It found the voting arrangement reasonable rather than arbitrary, noting that county district residents' greater stake was reflected in their exclusive vote for four members, and rejected related claims about racial representation or inconsistent local practices.

electionscivil rights

This case involved several taxpayers and members of Congress suing executive branch officials and military officers to enjoin shipments of war ordnance and other U.S. military support activities from Sunny Point, North Carolina, on the grounds that they violated Public Laws 93-50 and 93-52 by funding combat activities in Southeast Asia after August 15, 1973, and breached the Constitution's appropriations clause. The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that the claims raised non-justiciable political questions concerning foreign relations and the conduct of war. The court granted the motion, concluding that the issues were political questions under the Baker v. Carr factors because the Constitution commits foreign affairs and military decisions to the executive and legislative branches, judicial resolution would require policy determinations reserved for those branches, and there was an unusual need for adherence to political decisions already made.

federal powerprocedure

This case concerned the International Longshoremen's Association's effort to require the North Carolina State Ports Authority, a state agency operating port facilities, to negotiate in good faith over wages and working conditions for its security guards and dock and warehouse employees, whom the National Mediation Board had certified as covered by the Railway Labor Act. The court ruled for the union, holding that the Ports Authority qualifies as a carrier under the Act, that the Act applies to these employees, and that the union is entitled to the relief sought. It rejected Eleventh Amendment immunity, concluding that the state's operation of facilities in interstate commerce subjected it to federal authority under the Commerce Clause. The court further held that the Railway Labor Act preempts North Carolina General Statute § 95-98, which bars collective bargaining by state employees, because federal law favoring such bargaining controls under the Supremacy Clause.

labor & employmentfederal power

This case involves a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Ray Holt Lanier, a North Carolina prisoner, challenging his continued detention on 1964 convictions for breaking and entering and related offenses after he had been released. The court found that Lanier’s 1959 convictions were vacated in 1967 for lack of counsel, leading to a nol pros of those charges with the state’s solicitor present; Lanier was then allowed to leave jail without being held on the concurrent 1964 sentences, after which he lived openly for nearly five years until his rearrest in 1972. The court decided to grant the writ and order his release, reasoning that the state had acquiesced in his release, made no effort to reassert jurisdiction despite opportunities to do so (including a 1968 inquiry where officials told him to go home), and could not justify the delay by attributing fault to the petitioner.

criminal lawprocedure

In Bradford v. Weinstein, two North Carolina state prisoners filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the state's prison disciplinary procedures and the parole board's decision-making processes as violations of due process, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for rights including notice, hearings, counsel, and access to records, and attempting to proceed as a class action on behalf of all inmates. The court dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge disciplinary procedures because they had not been subjected to them, that the claims did not meet Rule 23 requirements for a class action due to a lack of common questions or typicality, and that parole suitability determinations do not trigger due process protections because they are discretionary administrative decisions rather than adversarial adjudications of rights. The court further reasoned that imposing such procedures would impose an unsustainable administrative burden on the parole system, potentially leading the state to eliminate parole altogether, and expressed doubt about federal judicial intervention in state prison disciplinary matters.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case is a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by a North Carolina prisoner who alleged that prison doctors failed to properly diagnose and treat his Hodgkin’s disease between March and July 1970, initially claiming negligence and later asserting intentional mistreatment that allowed the disease to progress. The defendants moved for summary judgment, supported by prison medical records. The court dismissed the complaint, holding that allegations of simple medical malpractice or negligence do not state a claim under § 1983 absent exceptional circumstances such as a total failure to provide care or treatment so inadequate as to shock the conscience; the records showed the plaintiff received examinations, X-rays, and later extensive treatment from multiple providers, refuting claims of intentional denial or mistreatment, and one defendant had no personal involvement. The court relied on precedents requiring more than a difference of opinion over treatment to establish a constitutional violation.

civil rightscriminal lawhealthcare

In Yahr v. Resor, soldiers stationed at Fort Bragg sued the Secretary of the Army and the base commander for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that military regulations unconstitutionally prevented them from holding public meetings and distributing anti-Vietnam War materials on the reservation, thereby violating their First Amendment rights. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court granted the motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 because mandamus does not lie to challenge discretionary military decisions; under the Administrative Procedure Act because that statute does not confer jurisdiction and courts generally refrain from interfering in internal military affairs; and under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000 even though constitutional rights were at stake.

free speechcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

In Mott v. Dail, a state prisoner convicted of involuntary manslaughter petitioned for habeas corpus relief, claiming entitlement to credit on his sentence for time spent in pre-trial custody. The court held that the petitioner must receive full credit for that pre-trial time. Although the relevant North Carolina statute granting such credit applied only to trials after its 1971 ratification, the court reasoned that limiting the benefit to post-enactment cases created an invidious discrimination against earlier defendants, following the equal-protection analysis in Cole v. North Carolina. State exhaustion was excused because recent North Carolina decisions had upheld the statute's prospective-only application.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case is a federal habeas corpus petition by a state prisoner convicted on a guilty plea to a crime against nature, who received the maximum 10-year sentence and sought credit for approximately four and a half months spent in jail between arrest and sentencing. The court granted the petition, ordering the state to credit the pre-trial detention time against the sentence. The core reasoning was that denying credit would violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition on double jeopardy and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' ban on cruel and unusual punishment, as pre-trial detention constitutes punishment that would cause total time served to exceed the statutory maximum; it would also violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause by discriminating against indigent defendants unable to make bail.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition by Charles Lee Parker, a Black prisoner serving a life sentence after pleading guilty in 1964 to first-degree burglary in North Carolina state court. Parker claimed that systematic exclusion of Black people from the grand jury violated his constitutional rights, but state courts held the claim was waived because it was not raised by a timely motion to quash the indictment before the guilty plea. The U.S. Supreme Court had affirmed on adequate state procedural grounds without reaching the merits and left open whether the issue could be considered in federal habeas. The court here decided that claims of racial exclusion from grand jury selection are cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings despite a state procedural default, because there was no knowing and intelligent waiver by the petitioner and because such exclusion denies equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court further held that it has the power to grant relief if the petitioner establishes a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff suing a nurse, a county hospital, and county trustees for personal injuries from an allegedly negligent hypodermic injection, with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The defendants raised governmental immunity and challenged federal subject matter jurisdiction under a North Carolina statute allowing suits against insured counties in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county, arguing this limited jurisdiction to state courts. The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on these defenses and granted the plaintiff's cross-motion, ruling that the federal district court is a court of competent jurisdiction in the county. The opinion reasoned that the statute's language does not restrict suits to state courts and that states lack power to limit federal diversity jurisdiction created by Congress under the Constitution.

procedurefederal powertorts & liability

This case involved the New Hanover County public school system's compliance with federal desegregation requirements after being declared an unconstitutional racially dual system in 1968. The court decided to order the school board to implement a comprehensive desegregation plan developed by the United States Office of Education, which includes student transportation to achieve racial balance, effective for the 1971-72 school year. The core reasoning was that Supreme Court precedents, such as Brown v. Board of Education and Green v. County School Board, impose an affirmative duty on school boards to eliminate racial discrimination in schools, and that busing is a permissible and necessary tool when other methods fail, as evidenced by the plan's feasibility despite the board's objections regarding costs and logistics.

civil rights

The case involved high school students seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent their principal from barring or disciplining them for wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War, claiming violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court denied the injunction, distinguishing the facts from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District because the school was located near military installations with many students having parents on active duty, leading officials to reasonably forecast substantial disruption, which partially materialized through hallway disturbances, refusals to comply, and belligerent behavior. The core reasoning emphasized that school officials had evidence of planned counter-protests and tension among students, and that the state's interest in maintaining an orderly educational environment for all pupils outweighed the students' symbolic speech rights under the circumstances.

free speechcivil rights

The case involved a challenge by three out-of-state attorneys to a North Carolina rule requiring applicants to have been bona fide residents of the state for at least 12 months before taking the bar exam. The court held that the rule was unconstitutional. It reasoned that the residency requirement created an unreasonable and arbitrary classification among applicants. Additionally, it unnecessarily burdened the plaintiffs' right to travel and arbitrarily denied them the opportunity to practice their profession. The court granted relief to the qualified plaintiffs who had passed the exam despite the rule.

civil rightsbusiness & regulatory

This case challenged a 1969 North Carolina law amending election statutes to extend the no-electioneering zone around polling places from 50 to 500 feet, but only in six of the state's 100 counties. Plaintiffs, residents of affected counties, sought to enjoin enforcement, claiming violations of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (which requires preclearance for changes in covered jurisdictions) and the Equal Protection Clause. The court held the amendment unenforceable in the four counties subject to the Voting Rights Act because the state had not submitted it for federal approval under Section 5. For all six counties, the court ruled that the selective application denied equal protection, as no evidence or legislative history provided a rational basis for treating those counties differently from the other ninety-four with respect to the right to electioneer. The decision rested on the absence of any justification for the geographic classification affecting voting-related activity.

electionscivil rightsfederal power

This case involved a challenge by African American students to two 1969 North Carolina local acts that created separate school administrative units in Warren County, splitting off the Warrenton City area and the Littleton-Lake Gaston district from the existing county system. The plaintiffs contended the laws were designed to preserve racial segregation by removing white students from the county schools, while the defendants maintained the acts were valid exercises of legislative power to improve education and would result in unitary systems. After reviewing the county's history of minimal desegregation efforts following Brown v. Board of Education and subsequent court orders requiring affirmative steps toward a nonracial system, the court held that the statutes served no legitimate state interest, impeded the constitutional duty to eliminate dual school systems, and prevented compliance with federal desegregation mandates. The court declared the acts unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their enforcement.

civil rights

The case involved a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus after convictions in the Sampson County Recorder’s Court for driving with a permanently revoked license and resisting arrest, followed by a de novo trial in Superior Court that resulted in consecutive sentences longer than the original 12-month term. The petitioner raised three grounds: lack of counsel in the initial proceedings, the Superior Court’s division of consolidated charges, and the imposition of harsher sentences on appeal. The court rejected the first two claims, finding no prejudice from the absence of counsel due to representation at the de novo trial and no federal question in the charge division. On the sentencing issue, the court applied North Carolina v. Pearce to hold that harsher sentences after a de novo trial violate due process unless based on evidence of subsequent events presented on the record, which the respondent failed to demonstrate, leading to the grant of habeas relief with an option for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Glover v. State of North Carolina, a state prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition alleging denial of counsel at his 1947 guilty pleas to seven felonies in Cumberland County Superior Court, for which he received sentences totaling eighteen to twenty years. The court first addressed whether the petition was moot after the sentences were fully served in 1962, concluding that ongoing collateral consequences under North Carolina law—such as disqualification from voting, jury service, public office, and certain professions—provided sufficient standing despite the lack of physical custody. Drawing on Fourth Circuit precedents expanding the writ's availability beyond immediate release, the court found the restraints substantial enough to proceed. On the merits, it held the convictions unconstitutional under the retroactive application of Gideon v. Wainwright because the petitioner was indigent, did not waive counsel, and received none at trial, ordering the convictions stricken from records but denying any credit toward later sentences.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case was a class action lawsuit brought by Black schoolchildren in Franklin County, North Carolina, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the county's school board maintained a racially segregated system in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and seeking injunctive relief to desegregate schools and faculty. The court issued an interim order in July 1966 requiring a new freedom-of-choice period for student assignments, barring racial discrimination in operations and staffing, mandating objective standards for teacher employment and retention, and directing reports on minority assignments. After a 1967 evidentiary hearing on motions for further relief, which raised claims of intimidation, ineffective choice plans, ongoing faculty segregation, and resource disparities between predominantly white and Black schools, the court made findings of fact detailing the prior complete segregation, evidence of community pressures, limited integration progress, and remaining inequalities in facilities, transportation, and staffing. The core reasoning focused on whether the freedom-of-choice mechanism could produce desegregation amid hostility and whether additional affirmative steps were needed to achieve compliance with constitutional requirements.

civil rights