The case concerned a challenge by the owner of the Carquinez bridge franchise to an order by the California Railroad Commission reducing tolls for automobiles and pedestrians. The company argued that the reduction violated the Contract Clause by impairing its franchise rights to a specified rate of return, that the commission's procedures denied due process, and that the new rates were confiscatory under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the state court's judgment upholding the order. It held that the governing statutes did not create a contractual entitlement to a fixed return and instead permitted regulatory adjustments to tolls, and that the record did not demonstrate the reduced rates would fail to provide just compensation for use of the property.
The case concerned whether trustees of the Missouri Pacific Railroad could recover approximately $24,000 in reparation payments made to Scott County Milling Co. under Interstate Commerce Commission orders that found coal shipping rates unreasonable and awarded damages, after the Commission later reopened the proceeding, reversed its findings, and vacated the orders. The Court held that the petitioners were entitled to recover the amount paid with interest. It reasoned that the Interstate Commerce Act requires carriers to comply with Commission reparation orders, making payments pursuant to such orders obligatory rather than voluntary, and that reversal of the underlying orders allows recovery because no enforceable damage claim exists without a valid Commission finding of unreasonableness.
The case involved patent infringement suits by Toledo Pressed Steel Company, owner of a 1929 patent for a burner attachment in outdoor warning torches and flares, against sellers of competing products. Lower federal courts reached conflicting results on validity and infringement. The Supreme Court held the patent invalid for lack of invention, reasoning that it simply combined an old torch body with a known cap featuring side air and flame openings that had already been used in earlier devices to protect flames from wind or rain.
This case concerned the validity and alleged infringement of U.S. Patent No. 1,930,987, which described a method and apparatus for testing the productivity of formations in rotary-drilled oil wells by lowering a single empty string of pipe equipped with a packer and valved inlet to obtain an undiluted fluid sample. The district court held both the method and apparatus claims invalid as anticipated by earlier patents, including Franklin (1882), Cox (1920), and Edwards (1924). The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, upholding the method claims as valid and infringed, while an earlier Fifth Circuit decision had already found the method claims invalid for lack of invention. The Supreme Court reviewed the conflicting lower-court rulings and analyzed whether the claimed combination was anticipated by or substantially disclosed in the prior art, emphasizing that packers and single-pipe testers were old in the field.
The case concerned a challenge to a 1934 New Jersey statute that made it a crime, punishable by up to 20 years in prison, for any person not engaged in a lawful occupation who was known to be a member of a 'gang' of two or more persons and had at least three prior convictions as a disorderly person or for any crime. Appellants were convicted under the law based on their prior Pennsylvania convictions and membership in an alleged gang. The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional on its face under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The core reasoning was that the term 'gang' lacked any fixed or common legal meaning, with dictionary and other definitions varying widely, so that the law failed to give fair notice of the conduct it prohibited and left enforcement to arbitrary guesswork.
The case concerned a challenge by a property owner in the Los Angeles County Flood Control District to a 1937 California statute allowing the district's board to accept transfers of storm drain improvements from eleven smaller drainage districts and to levy annual special assessments on all taxable real estate in the larger district to cover the transferred obligations. The appellant argued that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing assessments without providing an opportunity to be heard on whether his property received any benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed the California Supreme Court's denial of a writ of mandate, holding that the legislature had implicitly found that lands in the flood control district would be specially benefited by the acquisition and that this determination was conclusive absent a showing of no reasonable foundation. The Court reasoned that the statute's specific terms, the district's existing authority, and prior state precedent supported the implied legislative finding of benefits, making an individual hearing unnecessary.
