This case involves a lawsuit by Glyptal, a paint manufacturer, against Engelhard, a chemical supplier, claiming breach of warranty and unfair trade practices after cadmium pigments supplied for GE locomotive paint caused unexpected viscosity increases that failed buyer specifications. Engelhard counterclaimed to recover payment for the delivered products. On Engelhard's motion for summary judgment, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part as to Glyptal's complaint and denied summary judgment on the counterclaim. The rulings addressed whether order-acknowledgment terms disclaiming warranties and limiting remedies became part of the contracts under UCC rules for additional terms between merchants and whether certain supplier statements created express warranties.
This case involved David Frankina suing his former employer, the First National Bank of Boston, after his termination as part of a 1989 reduction in force, claiming age discrimination under the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, along with common-law claims for wrongful termination, breach of contract for lifetime employment or preferential rehiring, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court granted the bank's motion for summary judgment on all seven counts. It reasoned that Frankina failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact showing age was a factor in his selection for layoff, as the decision was based on comparative performance evaluations and the bank's legitimate need to cut costs and reorganize, with no evidence of pretext or discriminatory policy. The contract claims were dismissed because employment was at-will with no enforceable promise of lifetime employment or preferential treatment, as the alleged oral assurances lacked consideration and were not bargained-for exchanges.
The case involved Anne McLaughlin, who had obtained a jury verdict against Capitol Bank and Trust Company for breach of contract and fiduciary duty that was later overturned by the trial court. After the FDIC was appointed receiver for the insolvent bank, it published notices and mailed a claim deadline of April 4, 1991, to McLaughlin's attorney at the address in the bank's records; the attorney did not receive the mailed notice and submitted the claim late on April 30, 1991, leading to its denial. The court granted the FDIC's motion for summary judgment, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because McLaughlin failed to file a timely administrative claim under FIRREA. The core reasoning was that the FDIC satisfied the statute's publication and mailing requirements by sending notice to the last known address, and the late-filing exception did not apply since the attorney knew of the receivership in advance.
This case involved the Federal Trade Commission suing Patriot Alcohol Testers, Inc. and its president Anthony Prall for allegedly deceptive marketing of a coin-operated blood alcohol testing device called the Model 5000, which the company sold to distributors as a business opportunity. The FTC moved for partial summary judgment on whether six specific representations violated section 5(a) of the FTC Act as unfair or deceptive acts and whether Prall could be held personally liable. The court granted the motion in part, finding that the income-related claims, insurance discount claims, and accuracy claims were deceptive because they were likely to mislead reasonable consumers and were material, with supporting evidence from distributor affidavits showing actual earnings fell short; it also held Prall personally liable for the income misrepresentations due to his control and knowledge. The court denied the motion as to the maintenance-free and ease-of-placement claims, finding genuine issues of material fact remained, and denied summary judgment on Prall's liability for the insurance discount claims due to disputed facts on his knowledge.
This case involved an appeal by landlords from a bankruptcy court's denial of their motion to release funds from a debtor's estate. The landlords sought 80% of the proceeds from the assignment of a commercial lease, claiming entitlement under a lease provision requiring such payment upon assignment or subletting. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling that the lease provision was unenforceable under 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1), which invalidates clauses that restrict or condition the assignment of leases by a bankruptcy trustee. The court reasoned that enforcing the provision would hinder the trustee's ability to realize full value from the lease, contrary to the Bankruptcy Code's goal of maximizing estate assets for rehabilitation.
In Hoult v. Hoult, the plaintiff sued her father for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging nine years of sexual abuse from ages four to thirteen that caused lasting psychological and physical injuries; she claimed she had no memory of the abuse until psychotherapy in 1985. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the three-year Massachusetts statute of limitations for tort claims had run after the plaintiff reached the age of majority in 1979. The court denied the motion, applying the discovery rule to hold that a cause of action accrues only when the plaintiff actually knew or reasonably should have known of both the injury and its causal connection to the defendant’s conduct, and finding a genuine issue of material fact as to when that occurred here.
