Andrew Augustine Caffrey

This case involves a lawsuit by Glyptal, a paint manufacturer, against Engelhard, a chemical supplier, claiming breach of warranty and unfair trade practices after cadmium pigments supplied for GE locomotive paint caused unexpected viscosity increases that failed buyer specifications. Engelhard counterclaimed to recover payment for the delivered products. On Engelhard's motion for summary judgment, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part as to Glyptal's complaint and denied summary judgment on the counterclaim. The rulings addressed whether order-acknowledgment terms disclaiming warranties and limiting remedies became part of the contracts under UCC rules for additional terms between merchants and whether certain supplier statements created express warranties.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved David Frankina suing his former employer, the First National Bank of Boston, after his termination as part of a 1989 reduction in force, claiming age discrimination under the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, along with common-law claims for wrongful termination, breach of contract for lifetime employment or preferential rehiring, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court granted the bank's motion for summary judgment on all seven counts. It reasoned that Frankina failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact showing age was a factor in his selection for layoff, as the decision was based on comparative performance evaluations and the bank's legitimate need to cut costs and reorganize, with no evidence of pretext or discriminatory policy. The contract claims were dismissed because employment was at-will with no enforceable promise of lifetime employment or preferential treatment, as the alleged oral assurances lacked consideration and were not bargained-for exchanges.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved Anne McLaughlin, who had obtained a jury verdict against Capitol Bank and Trust Company for breach of contract and fiduciary duty that was later overturned by the trial court. After the FDIC was appointed receiver for the insolvent bank, it published notices and mailed a claim deadline of April 4, 1991, to McLaughlin's attorney at the address in the bank's records; the attorney did not receive the mailed notice and submitted the claim late on April 30, 1991, leading to its denial. The court granted the FDIC's motion for summary judgment, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because McLaughlin failed to file a timely administrative claim under FIRREA. The core reasoning was that the FDIC satisfied the statute's publication and mailing requirements by sending notice to the last known address, and the late-filing exception did not apply since the attorney knew of the receivership in advance.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This case involved the Federal Trade Commission suing Patriot Alcohol Testers, Inc. and its president Anthony Prall for allegedly deceptive marketing of a coin-operated blood alcohol testing device called the Model 5000, which the company sold to distributors as a business opportunity. The FTC moved for partial summary judgment on whether six specific representations violated section 5(a) of the FTC Act as unfair or deceptive acts and whether Prall could be held personally liable. The court granted the motion in part, finding that the income-related claims, insurance discount claims, and accuracy claims were deceptive because they were likely to mislead reasonable consumers and were material, with supporting evidence from distributor affidavits showing actual earnings fell short; it also held Prall personally liable for the income misrepresentations due to his control and knowledge. The court denied the motion as to the maintenance-free and ease-of-placement claims, finding genuine issues of material fact remained, and denied summary judgment on Prall's liability for the insurance discount claims due to disputed facts on his knowledge.

business & regulatory

This case involved an appeal by landlords from a bankruptcy court's denial of their motion to release funds from a debtor's estate. The landlords sought 80% of the proceeds from the assignment of a commercial lease, claiming entitlement under a lease provision requiring such payment upon assignment or subletting. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling that the lease provision was unenforceable under 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1), which invalidates clauses that restrict or condition the assignment of leases by a bankruptcy trustee. The court reasoned that enforcing the provision would hinder the trustee's ability to realize full value from the lease, contrary to the Bankruptcy Code's goal of maximizing estate assets for rehabilitation.

business & regulatoryfederal powerproperty

In Hoult v. Hoult, the plaintiff sued her father for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging nine years of sexual abuse from ages four to thirteen that caused lasting psychological and physical injuries; she claimed she had no memory of the abuse until psychotherapy in 1985. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the three-year Massachusetts statute of limitations for tort claims had run after the plaintiff reached the age of majority in 1979. The court denied the motion, applying the discovery rule to hold that a cause of action accrues only when the plaintiff actually knew or reasonably should have known of both the injury and its causal connection to the defendant’s conduct, and finding a genuine issue of material fact as to when that occurred here.

family lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved nursing home trade associations and providers suing the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services over approval of Massachusetts Medicaid reimbursement rates for nursing facilities. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act and that the approval was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. On the Secretary's motion to dismiss, the court granted dismissal in part for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding no private right of action against the Secretary under the Boren Amendment based on the Cort v. Ash factors and legislative intent, but allowed the APA claim to proceed. The court denied dismissal on standing grounds, holding that the plaintiffs' alleged injury from lower rates could be redressed by invalidating the approvals, and denied the motion for failure to state a claim. The case centers on federal oversight of state Medicaid plans and judicial review of agency actions.

healthcarefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a former bookkeeper who sued her employer, a real estate management company, and her supervisor for sexual harassment that allegedly occurred after she requested part-time work, leading to her resignation and subsequent firing. The plaintiff brought claims including intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of employment contract in violation of good faith and public policy, and violations of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, among others. On the defendants' motion to dismiss, the court denied dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress count, finding it not barred by workers' compensation exclusivity. The court granted dismissal of the breach of contract count and the civil rights count, determining that the claims failed to state viable theories under governing law. The decision was based on accepting the complaint's allegations as true and applying standards for Rule 12(b)(6) motions under Massachusetts statutes and precedents.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

This case involves a dispute between New England Reinsurance Corporation and Tennessee Insurance Company over overdue payments and access to books and records under a reinsurance agreement from 1979-1981, with both parties filing motions under the United States Arbitration Act to compel arbitration per the contract's clause. The plaintiff missed the 30-day deadline to appoint its arbitrator by about eight days, prompting the defendant to appoint an alternative, which the plaintiff rejected as unqualified. The court decided that the plaintiff retained its right to appoint its chosen arbitrator, reasoning that the agreement did not make time of the essence, the delay caused no prejudice, and the Act's policy favors arbitration before mutually acceptable panels rather than strict literal enforcement of timing provisions.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a former employee suing his employer TACC and its president for bad faith termination, breach of contract, and tortious interference, claiming he was fired to facilitate a corporate sale despite a retention clause in his contract. The court addressed a motion to disqualify the defendants' attorneys due to an alleged conflict of interest in representing both the company and the president, and because one attorney might testify as a witness. The court denied the motion, finding no actual conflict of interest existed that would prevent adequate representation of both defendants, that the clients had consented after disclosure, and that there was insufficient evidence that the attorney had relevant involvement requiring him to testify.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involves former independent insurance agents who sued Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company in state court, claiming they were entitled under Massachusetts law to commission rates set annually by the state Commissioner of Insurance for motor vehicle policies sold from 1982 to 1989, rather than the lower contractual rates actually paid. Nationwide removed the action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that joinder of the Commissioner destroyed complete diversity and that the court should abstain in light of related state-court proceedings. The court denied the motion, holding that the Commissioner had been fraudulently joined because the operative complaint stated no claim against her and sought no relief from her, and that abstention was unwarranted because the pending state litigation addressed different years and different issues. The court therefore retained jurisdiction over the case.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves a bankruptcy trustee, John Cullen, suing Robert Darvin, the former president and CEO of the bankrupt company Scandinavian Gallery, alleging that Darvin caused the company to convert leased computer equipment without the lessor's consent, leading to a settlement that harmed the estate. Cullen initially filed a complaint with civil RICO and other claims, later amending it to seek contribution or indemnity from Darvin under tort liability theories. The court denied Darvin's motion to dismiss Count I, finding the facts sufficient to allege joint tort liability for contribution under Massachusetts law, but granted dismissal of Count II. It also granted Rule 11 sanctions against Cullen for the initial complaint, reasoning that the RICO claims lacked a properly pleaded pattern of racketeering activity showing both relationship and continuity among predicate acts, and that reasonable prefiling inquiry had not occurred.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned Malden Mills Industries' dispute with the ILGWU National Retirement Fund over withdrawal from a multiemployer pension plan under ERISA and the MPPAA, including the timing of withdrawal, liability for delinquent contributions from December 1986 to May 1987, and whether Malden could obtain a refund or credit for earlier 1986 payments. In a prior ruling, the court granted summary judgment to the Fund, finding withdrawal occurred on May 15, 1987, imposing withdrawal liability of over $5 million, and denying any refund. On the Fund's motion for attorney's fees and costs, the court awarded mandatory fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2) but limited them to one-third of the documented hours attributable solely to the delinquent-contribution claim, resulting in an award of $12,846, while denying additional discretionary fees under § 1451(e) because the case presented novel legal issues on which Malden advanced a colorable position.

labor & employment

This case involves nursing home providers and their trade associations challenging Massachusetts' shift to a new prospective Medicaid reimbursement system that uses updated 'management minute ranges' based on patient case mix to set payment rates for long-term care facilities. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to block the state's use of the revised ranges, arguing it violated federal Medicaid requirements under the Boren Amendment, while state defendants moved to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment immunity and standing grounds. The court denied the request for injunctive relief, finding the plaintiffs unlikely to succeed on the merits because the federal agency had approved the state plan amendment as comprehensive and consistent with statutory standards. It also dismissed the pendent state-law claims but declined to dismiss the federal claims for lack of standing at this stage, noting the prospective nature of the relief sought.

healthcarefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

In Sierra Club v. Larson, environmental groups sued federal and state officials to halt further work on the Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel Project, claiming its proposed ventilation facilities violated the Clean Air Act and state regulations by bypassing preconstruction review, permitting, and emission controls. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction blocking construction activities, bids, permits, and related steps until an adjudicatory hearing occurred. The court denied the injunction, finding no showing of irreparable harm because actual construction of the facilities would not begin for years. It also dismissed the pendent state-law claims against state defendants, holding they were barred by the Eleventh Amendment under Pennhurst.

environmentprocedure

This case involved a challenge by the Norton School Committee under the Education of the Handicapped Act to a state Bureau of Special Education Appeals decision that ordered the school to reimburse a parent for her child's private school placement for two years. The court granted summary judgment upholding the reimbursement for the 1988-89 school year but denied it for 1989-90, denied the parent's motion for attorneys' fees and costs, and allowed the submission of additional evidence. The core reasoning examined whether the school's proposed individualized education program satisfied federal and stricter Massachusetts requirements for a free appropriate public education, including procedural safeguards, annual reviews, and the mainstreaming obligation to educate the child in the least restrictive environment to the extent appropriate.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

This case concerned Malden Mills' withdrawal from a multiemployer pension plan under ERISA and the MPPAA, with the parties disputing whether the withdrawal date was in 1986 or 1987 for purposes of calculating withdrawal liability and unpaid contributions. Malden sought declaratory relief claiming an earlier withdrawal date and credit for contributions, while the Fund counterclaimed for amounts due based on a May 1987 withdrawal. The court confirmed the arbitrator's award in favor of the Fund on summary judgment, holding that the employer could not retroactively amend its collective bargaining agreement to alter contribution obligations to the detriment of the third-party pension fund, that no contributions were made during the interim extension period, and that the withdrawal occurred upon execution of the new agreement in 1987.

labor & employment

This case arose from the sale of an Agusta A109 helicopter by Agusta Aviation Corporation to Hydroplanes, Inc., its subsequent resale to Boston Helicopter Charter, Inc., and a later crash that prompted Boston Helicopter and injured individuals to sue the manufacturers and seller for breach of warranty, with cross-claims for indemnity and contribution among the defendants. The court addressed motions for partial summary judgment by the manufacturers on the buyer's warranty claims and by Hydroplanes on its indemnity claim against the manufacturers. The core reasoning examined the express warranty's terms limiting coverage to defects in material and workmanship, its transfer to the plaintiff with a specified remaining balance of hours, the plaintiff's use of the warranty for repairs, and the expiration of the warranty period based on time and flight hours, leading to rejection of implied warranty claims as displaced by the contract language.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involves a dispute over the termination of a real estate management agreement between O'Connell Management Company and Carlyle-XIII Managers. O'Connell sued Carlyle for wrongful termination after Carlyle ended the contract claiming O'Connell breached its fiduciary duty by diverting a potential tenant to another property. The court denied Carlyle's motion for summary judgment, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether a breach occurred and whether any breach was properly cured under the agreement's terms, which required 30 days notice for non-monetary defaults.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Thomas Rey, who disputed a $25 cash fee with a Classic Cars tow truck driver after the driver changed his flat tire, leading to the driver's call to state police and Rey's arrest by Officer Kenney for disorderly conduct. Rey sued in state court with six counts: a federal §1983 claim against Kenney, state-law claims against Kenney for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and civil rights violations, a 93A unfair trade practices claim against Classic Cars, and a failure-to-train claim against the Commonwealth. After removal to federal court, the court granted Rey's motion to remand in part, sending Counts Two through Five (the state claims against Kenney and Classic Cars) back to Middlesex Superior Court while staying Count One (§1983) pending the state proceedings. The core reasoning was that the Commonwealth's non-consent did not bar removal due to Eleventh Amendment immunity, that the 93A claim was not a separate and independent removable claim under 28 U.S.C. §1441(c), and that Colorado River abstention principles of judicial economy favored staying the federal claim given the overlap with state claims and the predominance of state-law issues.

civil rightsprocedurecriminal lawbusiness & regulatory