John E. Allen

This case concerns the tax-exempt status of various properties owned by Phillips Exeter Academy, a private educational institution, under New Hampshire statutes providing exemptions for seminaries of learning and an additional $150,000 institutional exemption. The court overruled most exceptions, holding that the Administration Building is wholly exempt as its administrative functions serve exclusive educational purposes, while the open flag-pole area must be apportioned between taxable and nontaxable uses based on its relation to dormitories and other structures; it also addressed the qualifications of an expert witness on valuation and the applicability of res judicata to prior rulings on the institutional exemption. Core reasoning emphasized that taxability of unoccupied land depends on its proportional use with taxable versus exempt buildings, that the statutory test of market value applies uniformly without judicial modifications for hardship, and that the Academy's lack of state curriculum approval does not alter prior concessions in transferred cases.

taxesproperty

The case concerned the State Board of Medical Examiners' revocation of a medical license granted without examination to an applicant from Czechoslovakia, on the ground that the license had been obtained by fraud. The court reviewed the record and found insufficient evidence that any misstatements in the application had a causal effect on the Board's decision to issue the license. It further held that the Board lacked authority to grant the license without examination because the applicant was not "legally qualified" to practice medicine in Czechoslovakia, as no treaty existed between the United States and that country to confer such a right. On that basis the court concluded the original license was void and denied certiorari, leaving the revocation in place.

healthcarebusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a will contest between the executor of Angie Lambert's estate and her sister Etta Gale, the contestant, focusing on claims about the decedent's intent and family relations. During closing arguments, the executor's counsel made statements about a witness's federal government role without evidentiary support and argued that the contestant's consent to an autopsy demonstrated a lack of sisterly affection and that the procedure was driven by curiosity, inferences not supported by the record. The trial court allowed the arguments to stand after limited instructions, but the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that these remarks were improper, prejudicial, and beyond legitimate inference from the evidence, particularly as they attacked the credibility of key witnesses and the contestant's motives without factual basis. As a result, the court set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial, while declining to address a separate procedural issue about the record entry since the outcome on other grounds rendered it unnecessary.

procedurefamily law

The case concerned whether a six-year statute of limitations barred prosecution of the defendant, focusing on a statutory tolling provision that excludes from the limitations period any time the defendant was not usually and publicly resident in New Hampshire. The defendant argued that the tolling clause applied only to state residents whose usual residence had been interrupted. The court held that the provision applies to both residents and non-residents alike, so that time spent outside the state does not count toward the limitations period. The core reasoning was that the statute's plain language and legislative purpose require the limitations clock to run only during usual and public local residence within the state, and that construing it to favor non-residents would create an unwarranted discrimination not supported by the text or common-law background.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a negligence claim arising from a truck-bicycle collision near a school at dismissal time, in which the plaintiffs sought damages from the defendant driver. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdicts for the defendant and denied the plaintiffs' motions to set them aside. The court held that statutory speed limits for passing a school did not apply because the truck was over 700 feet away, that no fixed speed limit was required by the general reasonable-speed statute, and that whether the defendant's speed or conduct was negligent given the hazard was a factual question properly left to the jury. It further concluded that the trial court's jury instructions adequately covered the issues of special hazards, emergencies, and the parties' respective duties of care, with no legal error shown.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the Society of the Cincinnati's claim for a property tax exemption on its real estate in Exeter, New Hampshire, under a statute (R.L. c. 73, s. 24) that exempts real estate owned and occupied by charitable institutions for their charitable purposes, provided no income is applied elsewhere. The court decided that the Society was not a charitable institution within the meaning of the statute and that its real estate, including an idle historic tavern building and other parcels, was not occupied for charitable purposes, so the exemption did not apply. The core reasoning was that the Society's patriotic and member-benefit activities did not constitute obligatory public charitable trusts, as they lacked enforceable duties to the public or specific property devoted to such uses; the tavern was not in present use but only prospective, and other lands served non-charitable ends like fire protection without meeting the statute's occupancy requirement. The opinion distinguished prior cases on partial or productive uses and noted the legislature's omission of patriotic societies from the exempt list.

taxesproperty