John E. Allen

This case concerns the tax-exempt status of various properties owned by Phillips Exeter Academy, a private educational institution, under New Hampshire statutes providing exemptions for seminaries of learning and an additional $150,000 institutional exemption. The court overruled most exceptions, holding that the Administration Building is wholly exempt as its administrative functions serve exclusive educational purposes, while the open flag-pole area must be apportioned between taxable and nontaxable uses based on its relation to dormitories and other structures; it also addressed the qualifications of an expert witness on valuation and the applicability of res judicata to prior rulings on the institutional exemption. Core reasoning emphasized that taxability of unoccupied land depends on its proportional use with taxable versus exempt buildings, that the statutory test of market value applies uniformly without judicial modifications for hardship, and that the Academy's lack of state curriculum approval does not alter prior concessions in transferred cases.

taxesproperty

The case concerned the State Board of Medical Examiners' revocation of a medical license granted without examination to an applicant from Czechoslovakia, on the ground that the license had been obtained by fraud. The court reviewed the record and found insufficient evidence that any misstatements in the application had a causal effect on the Board's decision to issue the license. It further held that the Board lacked authority to grant the license without examination because the applicant was not "legally qualified" to practice medicine in Czechoslovakia, as no treaty existed between the United States and that country to confer such a right. On that basis the court concluded the original license was void and denied certiorari, leaving the revocation in place.

healthcarebusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a will contest between the executor of Angie Lambert's estate and her sister Etta Gale, the contestant, focusing on claims about the decedent's intent and family relations. During closing arguments, the executor's counsel made statements about a witness's federal government role without evidentiary support and argued that the contestant's consent to an autopsy demonstrated a lack of sisterly affection and that the procedure was driven by curiosity, inferences not supported by the record. The trial court allowed the arguments to stand after limited instructions, but the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that these remarks were improper, prejudicial, and beyond legitimate inference from the evidence, particularly as they attacked the credibility of key witnesses and the contestant's motives without factual basis. As a result, the court set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial, while declining to address a separate procedural issue about the record entry since the outcome on other grounds rendered it unnecessary.

procedurefamily law

The case concerned whether a six-year statute of limitations barred prosecution of the defendant, focusing on a statutory tolling provision that excludes from the limitations period any time the defendant was not usually and publicly resident in New Hampshire. The defendant argued that the tolling clause applied only to state residents whose usual residence had been interrupted. The court held that the provision applies to both residents and non-residents alike, so that time spent outside the state does not count toward the limitations period. The core reasoning was that the statute's plain language and legislative purpose require the limitations clock to run only during usual and public local residence within the state, and that construing it to favor non-residents would create an unwarranted discrimination not supported by the text or common-law background.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a negligence claim arising from a truck-bicycle collision near a school at dismissal time, in which the plaintiffs sought damages from the defendant driver. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdicts for the defendant and denied the plaintiffs' motions to set them aside. The court held that statutory speed limits for passing a school did not apply because the truck was over 700 feet away, that no fixed speed limit was required by the general reasonable-speed statute, and that whether the defendant's speed or conduct was negligent given the hazard was a factual question properly left to the jury. It further concluded that the trial court's jury instructions adequately covered the issues of special hazards, emergencies, and the parties' respective duties of care, with no legal error shown.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the Society of the Cincinnati's claim for a property tax exemption on its real estate in Exeter, New Hampshire, under a statute (R.L. c. 73, s. 24) that exempts real estate owned and occupied by charitable institutions for their charitable purposes, provided no income is applied elsewhere. The court decided that the Society was not a charitable institution within the meaning of the statute and that its real estate, including an idle historic tavern building and other parcels, was not occupied for charitable purposes, so the exemption did not apply. The core reasoning was that the Society's patriotic and member-benefit activities did not constitute obligatory public charitable trusts, as they lacked enforceable duties to the public or specific property devoted to such uses; the tavern was not in present use but only prospective, and other lands served non-charitable ends like fire protection without meeting the statute's occupancy requirement. The opinion distinguished prior cases on partial or productive uses and noted the legislature's omission of patriotic societies from the exempt list.

taxesproperty

The case concerned whether a conditional foreclosure judgment validly consolidated three separate mortgages held by the defendant bank into a single composite security covering the full title to the mortgaged property. The court held that the judgment was invalid to the extent it enlarged the defendant's security beyond the original mortgages and impaired the plaintiffs' attachment liens on the equity. It reasoned that judicial procedure cannot create substantive rights or alter lien priorities in ways not authorized by the underlying mortgages, and that a court may modify a judgment based on a mistake by the parties even if they had consented to it. The court therefore permitted amendment of the judgment and bill to protect the plaintiffs' redemption rights.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether New Hampshire's employers' liability statute applied to an injury suffered by a plaintiff at work, which required at least five persons employed in the business. The court held that a partner performing labor could not be counted as an employee because a partner is not in a hire relationship with the partnership or the other partners. It further ruled that the evidence on the number of qualifying employees was inconclusive and presented a factual issue for the jury, so the verdict for the defendants was upheld and judgment entered for them.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved a lawsuit against the Maine-New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Authority, a public agency created by interstate compact, for injury to the plaintiff's decedent arising from the Authority's officers attempting in its name to condemn an easement on the decedent's land for a utility's transmission line, an action the Authority lacked statutory power to take. The court held that the Authority could not be sued or held liable for such conduct because the consent to suit in the compact extended only to actions within its delegated powers, meaning the unauthorized acts were not attributable to the Authority itself. It further ruled that a survival statute did not permit recovery for the decedent's loss of life or continued enjoyment of life as an element of damages. The core reasoning rested on principles of sovereign immunity, the limited nature of legislative consent to suits against public agencies, and statutory construction limiting damages in survival actions to those an individual could have recovered before death.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a mentally incompetent plaintiff who purchased property from the defendant and later sought to rescind the contract in equity. The court upheld findings that the plaintiff lacked capacity to engage in the transaction, that the contract could be set aside if restoration were possible, and that the price paid exceeded the property's value, but it found insufficient evidence that the defendant could repay the purchase price. The decree was therefore modified to allow a money judgment for the difference between the price paid and the property's value, with credit for any mortgage. The reasoning centered on the requirement for competent parties to form a valid contract, the sufficiency of evidence from the plaintiff's physician regarding her mental state and improvidence, and equity's authority to grant relief on just terms even without full restoration.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned the validity of an exclusion clause in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy under New Hampshire's 1937 statute, which required Insurance Commissioner approval of policy forms specifying limits of liability. The dispute centered on whether a defendant who brought suit qualified as an insured, given a policy provision that excluded such persons from coverage. Drawing on prior decisions interpreting the 1927 and 1937 acts, the court found the clause similar to a permissible exclusion for a special classification of persons that did not remove public protections. It ruled that the clause would be enforceable only if the Commissioner had approved the form; otherwise, it would be void. The case was discharged for further determination on that point.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned a plaintiff's fall while stepping onto a stairway in the defendant's building, alleging that excessive wear on the top landing made the stairs hazardous. The court held that the evidence supported a jury finding of negligent maintenance by the defendant and that the plaintiff was not at fault as a matter of law. It reasoned that the tread's condition had become unduly dangerous beyond normal wear, the fall could reasonably be linked to the defect rather than other causes, and the plaintiff could rely on the defendant's duty of safety without needing to inspect or anticipate the risk in advance. The defendant's exceptions were overruled, allowing the verdict to stand.

torts & liability

The case concerned a dispute over how to fill a vacancy on the Board of Registrars in Portsmouth, where the city charter allowed the remaining members to appoint a replacement but they were unable to do so. The relators argued that the charter provisions were exclusive and that no appointment could be made, while the defendant contended that general state laws applicable to towns should apply as a supplement when the board failed to act. The court held that the special charter legislation for Portsmouth and other cities exclusively governs the filling of such vacancies and is not supplemented by the general statutes for towns. Its reasoning emphasized that the legislature had enacted individualized charter rules for each of the state's eleven cities without incorporating or referencing the town provisions, and that statutes granting ward officers certain election-related powers did not extend to appointing supervisors.

electionsprocedure

This case involved the interpretation of a will creating a trust with a life beneficiary (the testator's son) and remaindermen, focusing on whether the trustee must convert trust property (including real estate) to cash for distribution upon the life beneficiary's death, the scope of the trustee's sale powers, the status of a lapsed share due to a remainderman's predeceasing the testator, and the proper recipients of the shares. The court held that the will requires the trustee (including any successor) to sell the real estate without needing a probate court license, that Martha's share lapsed because the will did not create joint ownership and she left no issue, and that the remaining shares are payable to the administrators of the estates of deceased remaindermen William and George M. Tallant, as well as to defendant White and Frank E. Tallant. The reasoning centered on the will's language implying conversion to enable equal cash distributions given the unitary nature of the property, the extension of sale powers to successors as a general authority rather than personal confidence, the inapplicability of licensing statutes to trustees with will-granted powers, and the lack of evidence for joint tenancy or contrary intent regarding lapsed shares. Distribution is to occur after sale and accounting, with the Minnesota-domiciled estate's share handled by its domiciliary administrator.

propertyprocedurefamily law

This case involved the interpretation of New Hampshire's Spirituous Liquor and Beverages Act, specifically sections on transportation (s. 33) and possession (s. 34) of liquor. The court held that the transportation limits restricting amounts brought into the state unless bought at a state store apply even to liquor legally purchased outside the state, and that s. 34 does not override or partially repeal those limits. The core reasoning was that the two sections must be read together in context to fulfill the act's purposes of generating state revenue and restricting competition with state stores, with implied language added to s. 34 to reflect legislative intent. The case was discharged.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a challenge to an order by the State Milk Control Board restricting the frequency of milk deliveries, including limits on daily deliveries and the types of vehicles used. Plaintiffs sought review via certiorari rather than the statutory appeal process, raising issues of court jurisdiction over questions of law and the validity of the order. The court held that certiorari was an appropriate remedy for legal questions despite the availability of appeal, as the legislature could not bar judicial review of such issues under the state constitution. On the merits, the court found the order partially invalid, ruling it exceeded the board's authority by imposing restrictions on deliveries by non-motor or non-rubber-tired vehicles that did not serve the act's regulatory purposes and unduly interfered with competition and individual rights. The petition was granted only as to those aspects of the order and dismissed otherwise.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether New Hampshire's 1867 general laws governing cities (Gen. St., cc. 40-44) superseded or repealed earlier special city charter provisions on mayors' voting powers, particularly a casting vote, and the effect of the 1871 act (Laws 1871, c. 24) that changed the mayor's role to a veto power while expressly repealing inconsistent legislation. The court denied the motion for rehearing, ruling that the 1867 legislation established a uniform scheme for city government that necessarily superseded conflicting charter terms for existing cities. It relied on principles of statutory revision, where a comprehensive new statute supersedes prior inconsistent laws even without express repeal, as illustrated by precedent like Hillsborough County v. Manchester, and noted the 1871 act's explicit repeal reinforced this outcome.

electionsprocedure

The case involved a car collision in which Spear crossed the road and Penna's vehicle struck his, leading to mutual claims of negligence. The court upheld a jury finding that Penna was negligent due to excessive speed and lack of alertness, as shown by brake marks and distances, while Spear's conduct in crossing and accelerating was not negligent as a matter of law. On a separate issue, an ambiguous docket entry from a prior settlement between the parties, containing conflicting terms of "neither party" and "judgment satisfied," was corrected by amendment to remove surplusage, as it reflected a mutual mistake and did not bar Spear's action under res judicata. The court therefore entered judgment on the verdict for Spear and overruled exceptions in the related Penna action.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged under New Hampshire's child labor statute (P.L. c. 118) for permitting a boy under ten to sell or expose religious magazines on a public street as part of a Jehovah's Witnesses group activity, after notice from an inspector. The court discharged the defendant, holding that the activity did not violate the statute. The core reasoning was that the law targeted business employment and economic exploitation of minors, not religious service with negligible profit motive performed under the mother's supervision; the boy's participation lacked the occupational or business character contemplated by the prohibition on street sales or work, and the statute's language could not be extended beyond its original scope to cover such facts.

criminal lawlabor & employmentreligious liberty

The case involved a dispute between St. Regis Paper Co. and the New Hampshire Water Resources Board over whether the Board could be required to reconstruct or alter a state-constructed dam to accommodate the company's preferred use of a river. The court dismissed the bill, holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to such relief. The Board functions as a state agency rather than an independent corporation, with the state's interest controlling over private-law rules except where the legislation expressly provides otherwise. Although the Board may be sued like a private corporation, its liability is limited to contracts and wrongful conduct in project performance and does not extend to court-ordered changes in authorized state projects or interference with exempt state property. The legislature did not consent to suits that would impose duties or remedies beyond those explicitly allowed, and enforcement against state property is prohibited.

business & regulatoryenvironmentprocedure