The case involved a dissenting stockholder of a railroad corporation who sought an appraisal of her stock value after the sale of the company's assets to another railroad under state statutes. The court dismissed the petition, holding that the plaintiff's acceptance of a check tendered by the defendant operated as an accord and satisfaction that barred any further claims. The core reasoning was that the letter accompanying the check expressly offered it in full payment of the plaintiff's interest, and by cashing the check without repudiating those terms, she accepted the proposed settlement under principles of contract law established in prior cases.
This case concerned whether the plaintiffs could obtain permission under Revised Laws chapter 365, section 7, for a late appeal from a probate court decree after failing to provide the required notice of appeal within the sixty-day statutory period. The Superior Court found that the plaintiffs had been prevented from timely appealing by mistake and accident without their own neglect and granted the petition. On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside that finding and dismissed the petition, holding that the only evidence showed an unreasonable mistake of law by the plaintiffs' counsel's agent regarding the running of the appeal period and the need for a resident agent, which did not qualify as excusable mistake or accident under the statute or controlling precedent. The court emphasized that the statutory time limits exist to promote expeditious settlement of estates and that parties must show a good reason for relief from those limits.
The case concerned a dispute over whether a contract was formed when a woman transferred property to a home for the aged in exchange for lifetime membership and support. The dissenting opinion concluded that no binding contract existed because the decedent received only tentative admission for a six-month probationary period at a weekly rate, with final confirmation of permanent membership never occurring. The dissent reasoned that the documents showed the parties contemplated further action by the home that was never taken, so the home never assumed an obligation to provide lifetime care. As a result, the transfer of property was not supported by a completed contract. The opinion addressed issues of contract formation in the context of admission to a residential care facility.
This case involved a negligence action arising from a bus accident in which plaintiffs claimed the defendant's driver failed to avoid colliding with a parked truck, raising issues of statutory parking violations and the last clear chance doctrine. The court addressed multiple evidentiary rulings during trial, including the exclusion of inconsistent prior statements, a police accident report, and a diagram from a motor vehicle report, as well as challenges to jury instructions on negligence and juror deadlock. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding cumulative evidence and denying certain requested instructions, that the last clear chance doctrine did not apply because there was no evidence the bus driver knew the plaintiff was oblivious to the danger, and that the supplemental jury charge was proper under established state precedent. It therefore affirmed the judgments on the verdicts.
The case concerned the proper calculation of state legacy taxes owed by residuary legatees in the Burtman estate after the executors settled the widow's claims for $100,000, reducing the net amount the legatees actually received. The majority held that the tax must be paid on the full amount that would have passed under the will's terms ($622,617.98) rather than the lesser sum actually distributed ($522,617.98). The dissent reasoned that longstanding precedent, including Williams v. State and Caskey v. State, measures the tax solely by the amount that passes to the legatees, so any reduction—whether from market losses or settlements—requires a correspondingly lower tax.
The case concerned a personal injury claim brought under a New Hampshire statute that imposes liability on the owner or keeper of a dog for damages it causes, unless the injured person was committing a trespass or other tort at the time. The defendants argued that the plaintiff Elaine was trespassing by interacting with the dog and was therefore barred from recovery. The court ruled that her conduct did not constitute a trespass to chattels because the dog was not injured, and therefore the statutory bar did not apply. It entered judgment against the defendant Jane, the dog's owner who exercised care and control, but in favor of the defendant Louis, finding he was not a possessor or keeper of the animal under the statute.