Oliver Winslow Branch

The case involved a dissenting stockholder of a railroad corporation who sought an appraisal of her stock value after the sale of the company's assets to another railroad under state statutes. The court dismissed the petition, holding that the plaintiff's acceptance of a check tendered by the defendant operated as an accord and satisfaction that barred any further claims. The core reasoning was that the letter accompanying the check expressly offered it in full payment of the plaintiff's interest, and by cashing the check without repudiating those terms, she accepted the proposed settlement under principles of contract law established in prior cases.

business & regulatory

This case concerned whether the plaintiffs could obtain permission under Revised Laws chapter 365, section 7, for a late appeal from a probate court decree after failing to provide the required notice of appeal within the sixty-day statutory period. The Superior Court found that the plaintiffs had been prevented from timely appealing by mistake and accident without their own neglect and granted the petition. On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside that finding and dismissed the petition, holding that the only evidence showed an unreasonable mistake of law by the plaintiffs' counsel's agent regarding the running of the appeal period and the need for a resident agent, which did not qualify as excusable mistake or accident under the statute or controlling precedent. The court emphasized that the statutory time limits exist to promote expeditious settlement of estates and that parties must show a good reason for relief from those limits.

procedure

The case concerned a dispute over whether a contract was formed when a woman transferred property to a home for the aged in exchange for lifetime membership and support. The dissenting opinion concluded that no binding contract existed because the decedent received only tentative admission for a six-month probationary period at a weekly rate, with final confirmation of permanent membership never occurring. The dissent reasoned that the documents showed the parties contemplated further action by the home that was never taken, so the home never assumed an obligation to provide lifetime care. As a result, the transfer of property was not supported by a completed contract. The opinion addressed issues of contract formation in the context of admission to a residential care facility.

propertyhealthcarebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a negligence action arising from a bus accident in which plaintiffs claimed the defendant's driver failed to avoid colliding with a parked truck, raising issues of statutory parking violations and the last clear chance doctrine. The court addressed multiple evidentiary rulings during trial, including the exclusion of inconsistent prior statements, a police accident report, and a diagram from a motor vehicle report, as well as challenges to jury instructions on negligence and juror deadlock. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding cumulative evidence and denying certain requested instructions, that the last clear chance doctrine did not apply because there was no evidence the bus driver knew the plaintiff was oblivious to the danger, and that the supplemental jury charge was proper under established state precedent. It therefore affirmed the judgments on the verdicts.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned the proper calculation of state legacy taxes owed by residuary legatees in the Burtman estate after the executors settled the widow's claims for $100,000, reducing the net amount the legatees actually received. The majority held that the tax must be paid on the full amount that would have passed under the will's terms ($622,617.98) rather than the lesser sum actually distributed ($522,617.98). The dissent reasoned that longstanding precedent, including Williams v. State and Caskey v. State, measures the tax solely by the amount that passes to the legatees, so any reduction—whether from market losses or settlements—requires a correspondingly lower tax.

taxesproperty

The case concerned a personal injury claim brought under a New Hampshire statute that imposes liability on the owner or keeper of a dog for damages it causes, unless the injured person was committing a trespass or other tort at the time. The defendants argued that the plaintiff Elaine was trespassing by interacting with the dog and was therefore barred from recovery. The court ruled that her conduct did not constitute a trespass to chattels because the dog was not injured, and therefore the statutory bar did not apply. It entered judgment against the defendant Jane, the dog's owner who exercised care and control, but in favor of the defendant Louis, finding he was not a possessor or keeper of the animal under the statute.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved a property owner seeking a zoning variance to alter his pre-1930 dwelling in a general residence district into up to four family units, which exceeded the ordinance's specific exceptions but was claimed to be necessary due to the area's character. The court ruled that the board of adjustment could grant such a variance under the statute even beyond the ordinance's enumerated exceptions, and that the plaintiff had shown unnecessary hardship because literal enforcement would be arbitrary given that the district was already predominated by multiple-family dwellings. The core reasoning was that the proposed change would not affect the public interest or the ordinance's spirit, as no private rights were endangered and the neighborhood's existing conditions meant the variance imposed no significant restriction on the area's restricted character.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved plaintiffs suing utility companies for personal injuries from a truck accident allegedly caused by a telephone pole placed too close to a highway on a sharp turn, obstructing safe travel. The trial court submitted the negligence question to the jury, which found the pole created an unreasonable hazard, that the truck contacted it, and that this caused the truck body to detach and injure the plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that evidence including photographs, road agent testimony, and marks on the pole supported the jury findings, consistent with prior precedents on utility liability for highway obstructions. It also upheld evidentiary rulings admitting a prior witness statement to rehabilitate credibility after cross-examination suggested changed testimony. Exceptions were overruled.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a dispute over the sale of property by the plaintiff to the defendant, where the plaintiff contended that the conveyance was intended to be subject to an existing lease to third parties, while the defendant maintained that the lease was to be cancelled upon purchase. The trial court found that the deed failed to reflect the parties' mutual intention and reformed it to make the conveyance subject to the lease. On appeal, the court upheld this decision, ruling that testimony from the parties and others provided sufficient evidence of the defendant's intent to take the property subject to the lease, and that the trial court's findings on this disputed factual issue were entitled to deference. The court also held that certain requests for findings regarding the absence of fraud or the defendant's belief that the lease was cancelled were properly denied as inconsistent with the main conclusion. Exceptions were overruled, affirming the reformation decree.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who was injured after falling down stairs at her sister-in-law's home due to torn linoleum while visiting to perform unpaid sewing; she also sought damages for a later fall allegedly caused by weakness from the first injury. The trial court treated her as an invitee, but the Supreme Court held that she was a gratuitous licensee to whom the defendants owed only a duty to warn of known hidden dangers. The court found sufficient evidence that the defendant knew of the dangerous condition for several days yet failed to disclose it, that the second fall was a natural consequence of the first, and that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Accordingly, the defendants' motions for nonsuit and directed verdict were properly denied, and judgment was entered on the verdict for the plaintiff.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved a challenge by a neighboring property owner to a zoning board's decision granting Manchester Buick Company a variance to expand its preexisting nonconforming garage business, which was located in an apartment house district under the Manchester zoning ordinance. The court upheld the board's decision and dismissed the appeal. The core reasoning was that the state statute authorized variances in specific cases where they would not be contrary to the public interest, where literal enforcement would cause unnecessary hardship due to special conditions, and where the spirit of the ordinance would be observed and substantial justice done; the master's findings established that these statutory prerequisites were met, including no diminution in the plaintiff's property value and a public benefit from reduced traffic congestion.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case True v. Cook involved the interpretation of a homemade will devising property to Lena E. True, specifically the effect of language stating she was to live with Henry A. Cook during his lifetime. The defendants argued this created a condition precedent preventing the estate from vesting until full compliance, while also claiming the clause aimed to support Cook. The court ruled that the words created only a condition subsequent without any forfeiture provision, so True received a vested remainder estate; because her death made complete performance impossible without her fault, the condition was excused and title became absolute in her heirs. This followed the principle that impossibility by act of God vests the estate fully, leading to a decree quieting title for the plaintiffs.

property

The case concerned a union's petition for a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of its existing contract with an employer in light of New Hampshire's Willey Act and the federal Taft-Hartley Act, both addressing union security clauses in employment. The court held that the Taft-Hartley Act superseded the Willey Act's regulatory provisions as applied to the parties, granting judgment for the plaintiffs. The reasoning centered on Congress's preemption of the field of labor-management relations in interstate commerce, which excludes state regulation, and an interpretation of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act as permitting only state prohibitions of compulsory unionism rather than alternative regulatory schemes.

labor & employmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a workers' compensation dispute in which the plaintiff sought benefits after a workplace accident that aggravated her pre-existing hypertension and arteriosclerosis. The trial court awarded compensation under the specific-injury schedule of Revised Laws chapter 216 section 23, citing uncertainty over life expectancy, rather than the broader limit provisions of section 27. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to have her award calculated under the statutory section most favorable to her and that aggravation of a pre-existing condition by an accident does not bar recovery. Medical testimony established that the plaintiff could have continued working absent the accident, so the trial court's findings on disability percentages and the resulting award were erroneous. The court therefore ordered a new trial.

labor & employment

The case involved a challenge to a jury verdict based on a message transmitted by the sheriff to the jury during deliberations. The court held that whether this communication amounted to improper interference rendering the trial unfair presented a question of fact for the trial judge to decide. Relying on precedent from Brown v. Smith, the opinion explained that such motions to set aside a verdict are typical factual issues for the presiding justice, whose ruling is final if supported by evidence and will not be reviewed on appeal. The court found no basis to conclude the trial judge erred and therefore overruled the exceptions.

procedure

The case concerned a dispute over the extent of a right of way to use a common passageway described in a 1935 deed from Stanley F. Hill to the plaintiff, where a garage already stood on the passageway when both parties acquired their properties. The plaintiff claimed an unrestricted right to travel over the passageway based on the deed language granting the right "to travel over and upon a common passageway upon the easterly side of said premises." The trial court interpreted the deed to limit the plaintiff's right of way by the existence of the building, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed that interpretation as reflecting the parties' intent, overruling the plaintiff's exceptions.

property

The case involved a telephone utility's petition for emergency rate relief after sustained operating losses in New Hampshire, attributed to post-1926 economic changes including wage increases, which the commission had found did not constitute an emergency. The court vacated the commission's finding, holding that the company's acute financial distress—ongoing monthly losses impairing its credit and ability to fund operations—qualified as the type of emergency contemplated by the governing statute. It reasoned that the commission's ongoing investigation into permanent rates did not justify denying interim relief, that the company's offer of a repayment bond addressed concerns about over-recovery, and that the minimum emergency increase should cover operating losses plus bond interest on New Hampshire property. The court therefore remanded with instructions for the commission to approve an immediate rate increase of at least $770,000 annually, subject to the bond and pending final determination.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned charitable trusts and bequests made for the establishment and operation of Pittsfield Academy, including a 1839 conveyance requiring Congregationalist trustees and a 1890 gift with a reverter clause to a Congregational church if the property ceased use as an academy school. After the academy stopped functioning in 1942 and its buildings were no longer used for school purposes, the trustees sought court guidance on selling the property and redirecting the funds. The court ruled that the academy land and buildings could be sold, with most proceeds and other unrestricted funds transferred to the town of Pittsfield's trustees of trust funds for the maintenance of the local public high school; a portion equal to five-eighths of the building's value from the White gift was to be paid to the church under its reverter clause, and the income from the remaining funds was to be applied to high-school purposes including medals. The core reasoning was that the grantors' primary intent to promote education had become impossible to carry out in the exact manner specified due to changed circumstances, allowing modification under the cy pres doctrine and equitable deviation to fulfill the main charitable purposes as closely as possible.

propertyreligious liberty

The case Dube v. International Shoe Co. involved a claim by a plaintiff against her employer for an assault committed by a fellow employee, Boucher. The court decided in favor of the defendant employer, granting judgment for the defendant. The core reasoning was that there was no evidence the employee acted within the scope of his authority or that the employer should have anticipated the assault based on prior incidents, such as Boucher wandering the factory or a single altercation with a supervisor, which did not indicate a likelihood of assaulting female employees.

torts & liability

This case involved a dispute over a town's tax assessment of a water tank installed on a shoe factory's land to supply its sprinkler system. The court ruled that the tank was properly assessed as real property. The reasoning centered on the tank's status as a fixture, given its cement foundation, underground connection to the factory, and necessity for the property's beneficial use, which made it taxable as part of the realty under established principles. A conditional sales agreement retaining title with the vendor was irrelevant because title does not determine taxability, and the town was not bound by the parties' agreement. Other questions about tax sale notice and damages were waived or moot.

taxesproperty