This case involved the prosecution of defendants for holding open-air public meetings in a park without obtaining the required licenses under a city ordinance, after the city council refused their applications. The trial court found the council's refusal arbitrary and unreasonable, but the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the defendants could not defend against the criminal charges by challenging the denial and instead should have pursued civil remedies such as certiorari or mandamus. The court reasoned that the ordinance was valid on its face, as affirmed in prior cases like State v. Cox and Cox v. New Hampshire, and that a wrongful license denial does not excuse compliance or bar prosecution. Consequently, the appeal for the deceased defendant Derrickson was abated, and the surviving defendant Poulos's exceptions were overruled.
This case involves a dispute over a real estate broker's commission under an exclusive sales contract between the plaintiff broker and the defendant property owner. The plaintiff sought payment because the property was sold within ninety days after the contract ended to buyers he had negotiated with during its term, as provided by the agreement. The court reasoned that although the contract allowed for a commission upon such an event, the agreement could be extinguished by mutual consent or rescission if the broker breached his duty of reasonable efforts to sell, particularly given evidence of his inaction possibly tied to the owner's high asking price. Because it remained a factual issue whether the contract was still in force at the time of the sale to the Bickfords, the court ordered a new trial.
This case involved a dispute over a mortgage on real estate originally given by Mary S. Fowler, where the plaintiff (her successor) sought to enjoin foreclosure by the defendant (assignee of the deceased mortgagee), claiming the mortgage was barred by the statute of limitations or otherwise invalid. The trial court excluded the plaintiff's testimony about conversations with his uncle, the original mortgagee, under a statute disqualifying testimony about facts occurring before a decedent's death when an executor or administrator is a party. The court held that this evidentiary ruling was error because the statute applies only to executors, administrators, or guardians of insane persons, not to an assignee like the defendant, warranting a new trial. On the limitations issue, the plaintiff failed to show adverse possession by the mortgagor, so dismissal was proper there; additionally, equitable relief to enjoin foreclosure requires payment of the debt, and the presumption of payment did not apply given evidence of no payments. The facts stipulated at trial sufficiently established the mortgagor's title to support the bill in equity.
This case involved a negligence claim arising from a car collision where the plaintiff, a passenger in one vehicle, sought to overturn a jury verdict in favor of the defendant driver by arguing that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law. The court upheld the verdict, finding that the evidence did not conclusively establish the defendant's lack of due care, as he testified to looking both ways before entering the highway and may not have seen the approaching car due to its possible high speed, the angle of his vehicle, or a dip in the road. Both drivers owed each other a duty to act reasonably since neither had a statutory right of way, and the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant proceeded with appropriate caution. The court noted that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment only if the facts supported no other reasonable inference, which was not the case here.
In Burtman v. Butman, a beneficiary contested the validity of a specific clause in the will, which triggered a no-contest provision providing for forfeiture of his legacy if any part of the will was challenged. The court ruled that the no-contest clause was valid and enforceable, so the plaintiff forfeited his bequest by pursuing the contest, and his acceptance of the legacy precluded him from continuing the appeal unless he could show the contested clause violated public policy in good faith with probable cause. The core reasoning relied on the testator's clear intent as expressed in the will, the established validity of such conditions under Restatement of Property sections 428 and 429 regardless of whether the property was real or personal or whether there was a gift over, and the principle that New Hampshire courts give effect to testamentary intentions absent a public policy issue. Good faith and probable cause by themselves were held not to create an exception to forfeiture.
The case concerned whether plaintiffs could pursue a claim on a surety bond after filing their required statement of claim with the Secretary of State after the statutory deadline of November 2, 1948. The court determined that the timely filing provision was a condition precedent that the surety could waive through its own conduct, such as filing a claim in bankruptcy proceedings with knowledge of the late filing, and that the question of waiver was a factual issue for the Superior Court. It reasoned that the notice requirement benefited the principal and surety, who could voluntarily relinquish it, and that the statute did not limit the court's jurisdiction over claims where waiver applied. The surety's exceptions were overruled.