Francis Wayland Johnston

This case involved the prosecution of defendants for holding open-air public meetings in a park without obtaining the required licenses under a city ordinance, after the city council refused their applications. The trial court found the council's refusal arbitrary and unreasonable, but the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the defendants could not defend against the criminal charges by challenging the denial and instead should have pursued civil remedies such as certiorari or mandamus. The court reasoned that the ordinance was valid on its face, as affirmed in prior cases like State v. Cox and Cox v. New Hampshire, and that a wrongful license denial does not excuse compliance or bar prosecution. Consequently, the appeal for the deceased defendant Derrickson was abated, and the surviving defendant Poulos's exceptions were overruled.

free speechcriminal lawcivil rights

This case involves a dispute over a real estate broker's commission under an exclusive sales contract between the plaintiff broker and the defendant property owner. The plaintiff sought payment because the property was sold within ninety days after the contract ended to buyers he had negotiated with during its term, as provided by the agreement. The court reasoned that although the contract allowed for a commission upon such an event, the agreement could be extinguished by mutual consent or rescission if the broker breached his duty of reasonable efforts to sell, particularly given evidence of his inaction possibly tied to the owner's high asking price. Because it remained a factual issue whether the contract was still in force at the time of the sale to the Bickfords, the court ordered a new trial.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a mortgage on real estate originally given by Mary S. Fowler, where the plaintiff (her successor) sought to enjoin foreclosure by the defendant (assignee of the deceased mortgagee), claiming the mortgage was barred by the statute of limitations or otherwise invalid. The trial court excluded the plaintiff's testimony about conversations with his uncle, the original mortgagee, under a statute disqualifying testimony about facts occurring before a decedent's death when an executor or administrator is a party. The court held that this evidentiary ruling was error because the statute applies only to executors, administrators, or guardians of insane persons, not to an assignee like the defendant, warranting a new trial. On the limitations issue, the plaintiff failed to show adverse possession by the mortgagor, so dismissal was proper there; additionally, equitable relief to enjoin foreclosure requires payment of the debt, and the presumption of payment did not apply given evidence of no payments. The facts stipulated at trial sufficiently established the mortgagor's title to support the bill in equity.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a negligence claim arising from a car collision where the plaintiff, a passenger in one vehicle, sought to overturn a jury verdict in favor of the defendant driver by arguing that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law. The court upheld the verdict, finding that the evidence did not conclusively establish the defendant's lack of due care, as he testified to looking both ways before entering the highway and may not have seen the approaching car due to its possible high speed, the angle of his vehicle, or a dip in the road. Both drivers owed each other a duty to act reasonably since neither had a statutory right of way, and the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant proceeded with appropriate caution. The court noted that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment only if the facts supported no other reasonable inference, which was not the case here.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Burtman v. Butman, a beneficiary contested the validity of a specific clause in the will, which triggered a no-contest provision providing for forfeiture of his legacy if any part of the will was challenged. The court ruled that the no-contest clause was valid and enforceable, so the plaintiff forfeited his bequest by pursuing the contest, and his acceptance of the legacy precluded him from continuing the appeal unless he could show the contested clause violated public policy in good faith with probable cause. The core reasoning relied on the testator's clear intent as expressed in the will, the established validity of such conditions under Restatement of Property sections 428 and 429 regardless of whether the property was real or personal or whether there was a gift over, and the principle that New Hampshire courts give effect to testamentary intentions absent a public policy issue. Good faith and probable cause by themselves were held not to create an exception to forfeiture.

property

The case concerned whether plaintiffs could pursue a claim on a surety bond after filing their required statement of claim with the Secretary of State after the statutory deadline of November 2, 1948. The court determined that the timely filing provision was a condition precedent that the surety could waive through its own conduct, such as filing a claim in bankruptcy proceedings with knowledge of the late filing, and that the question of waiver was a factual issue for the Superior Court. It reasoned that the notice requirement benefited the principal and surety, who could voluntarily relinquish it, and that the statute did not limit the court's jurisdiction over claims where waiver applied. The surety's exceptions were overruled.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned the civil consequences under New Hampshire law of operating a motor vehicle after a license revocation. The court held that such a violation constitutes only prima facie evidence of unfitness to operate rather than an absolute bar to recovery in civil actions. This followed from the 1937 statutory amendment to the licensing law, which overruled the earlier Johnson precedent in its entirety. The reasoning emphasized that the statute applies uniformly to any violator without distinctions based on the reason for lacking a license, consistent with the Vassillion decision.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned a tort action for physical injuries to the person after the original defendant had died, raising questions about survival of the claim against the estate and potential liability of the deceased's insurer. The court ruled that the action abated and was barred because the plaintiff failed to procure a scire facias against the executrix within the time limits set by the survival statute in section 10 of chapter 355 of the Revised Laws. It further held that the insurer could not be held liable under the policy terms, which required the insured's obligation to pay to be finally determined by judgment after trial or written agreement before any action could lie against the company, and no estoppel applied to change that condition. The court therefore overruled the exceptions and dismissed the claim.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from a collision between the plaintiff's car and the defendant's truck at an intersection where the truck allegedly failed to stop at a stop sign. The court held that issues of the parties' negligence, the plaintiff's due care, and certain elements of damages such as medical expenses and loss of use of the automobile were properly submitted to the jury. It reasoned that evidence of the truck's position, the plaintiff's assumption the truck would stop, and medical testimony on future back vulnerability supported leaving liability and those damages questions for the jury. However, the court found error in submitting an $800 claim for lost commissions unrelated to any disability from the accident and in failing to adjust a travel expense item to reflect only the net loss, leading to the grant of a new trial on damages.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned the priority of a creditor's attachment on lumber against a claimed transfer of the lumber from Dillon to Hakala via an unrecorded writing, followed by a mortgage from Hakala to Beauregard. The court held that the February 1, 1949 transfer violated the Sales in Bulk Act because it was not in the ordinary course of business, was not recorded, and involved no change in possession, rendering it voidable as to creditors without notice such as the plaintiff. The court further reasoned that while the transfer was fraudulent and void under the statute as to Dillon's creditors, Beauregard's mortgage could take priority if he qualified as an innocent purchaser for value without knowledge of the noncompliance; absent a finding on that issue, the case required a new trial to determine Beauregard's good faith. The court rejected Hakala's subrogation claim to labor liens due to expiration and lack of proper securing.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a collision between two cars at the intersection of Main and Lake Streets, in which plaintiff Roy sued defendant Levy for negligence after Levy's vehicle struck Roy's, causing physical and psychological injuries. The jury returned a verdict for Roy in the amount of $3,500, which the trial court refused to set aside. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the evidence permitted the jury to find that the right-of-way statute did not apply because Roy reasonably believed he could cross safely, that Levy was traveling at an excessive speed, and that Roy's resulting headaches and psychoneurosis were caused by the accident rather than pre-existing conditions. The court also upheld the trial judge's evidentiary rulings on hypothetical questions to medical experts and the denial of motions for directed verdict and to strike testimony, concluding that the damages were not excessive as a matter of law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a negligence claim by the estate of Mrs. Cushman, who died in a fire while living in a county-owned dwelling provided to her husband as the jail turnkey; the suit alleged the county failed to maintain safe premises. The court held that the county was immune from liability because maintaining a jail, including employing a turnkey and providing incidental housing, is a governmental function, and New Hampshire precedent establishes that municipalities and counties are not liable for negligence in performing such functions absent a statute. The court rejected arguments that the arrangement was a commercial enterprise or that the county's liability insurance altered the immunity, reasoning that the policy covered only liabilities imposed by law independently of the insurance and did not waive governmental immunity. No landlord-tenant or independent licensee relationship existed, and any policy change was for the legislature, not the courts.

criminal lawtorts & liability

In D'Amours v. Hills, the court addressed whether the Director of the Register of Charitable Trusts, a state official, was required to post an appeal bond under Revised Laws chapter 365 section 3 to perfect an appeal in proceedings involving charitable trusts. The court held that the Director had no such obligation, as the statute did not expressly include the State. Drawing on precedent from State v. Kinne, the opinion reasoned that the State is not bound by statutes limiting its prerogatives, rights, or interests unless the law explicitly names the State, and this immunity extends to state officers acting in their official capacity. The court further noted that prevailing appellees could still recover costs against the county under a separate statute, Revised Laws chapter 397 section 12.

procedure

The case involved a dispute between a plaintiff and her brother-in-law (the defendant) over a one-third interest in a farm from her deceased husband's estate. The plaintiff claimed the defendant held the interest in constructive trust after purchasing it at a judicial sale by the estate's administrator, alleging a fiduciary relationship due to their family connection and prior declarations. The court ruled that no constructive trust existed and dismissed the bill in equity. It reasoned that the limited fiduciary duties between cotenants do not bar purchases at judicial sales, the plaintiff was estopped from claiming cotenancy due to her prior release of dower rights, and no confidential relationship was found on the evidence. An erroneous ruling that the suit was a collateral attack on the probate decree did not affect the outcome, as the lack of a trust was independently determined.

propertyprocedurefamily law

This case arose from a negligence claim after the defendant's truck struck a wagon on a road at night, injuring the plaintiffs. On appeal, the court reviewed rulings on the admissibility of spontaneous exclamations by a witness under the res gestae rule, the erroneous admission of a non-witness daughter's corroborative statement (deemed cured by jury instructions), the denial of a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence (upheld as within the trial court's discretion after finding it unlikely to change the outcome), and the exclusion of a negligence theory regarding the truck driver's failure to use a visor (sustained due to lack of supporting evidence on its utility). The court overruled all exceptions and entered judgment on the verdicts.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned a challenge by operators of music systems to a Manchester city ordinance that required licenses for centralized reproducing systems and coin-operated juke boxes, imposed annual fees of $10 per juke box or $100 per centralized system plus $1 per outlet, and prohibited reproduction of lewd or indecent recordings. The court upheld the ordinance as valid, holding that the city had authority under state statute to restrain immoral conduct through police-power regulation of such instruments and that the fees did not exceed probable administrative and inspection expenses. It further concluded that the ordinance's stated purpose supplied an adequate standard to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory licensing decisions and was not an improper delegation or tax measure.

business & regulatorycriminal lawfree speech

The case involved a real estate broker's action to recover a commission under a written exclusive listing agreement with the property owners. The referee found that the contract had been materially altered by changing the date of execution from May 2 to July 25, extending the two-month exclusive period, and that this finding was supported by evidence in the record. The court held that such a change in date was a material alteration as a matter of law because it affected the legal rights and obligations of the parties, rendering the instrument unenforceable. Judgment was therefore entered for the defendants, and the broker could not recover even under common counts for services performed after the alteration.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a dispute over whether the defendants were obligated to pay the plaintiff bank directly for boxes supplied by a third party, Mr. Darker, based on a letter they wrote promising to make payment to the bank upon delivery. The trial court found no contract but the Supreme Court reversed, entering judgment for the plaintiff bank for $2,500 plus interest. The court reasoned that the letter's clear language constituted an acceptance of Darker's equitable assignment of his payment rights to the bank, supported by consideration, and that the defendants' undisclosed subjective intent was irrelevant under an objective standard of contract interpretation; notations on checks and lack of actual knowledge by bank officials did not defeat the bank's rights.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned a dispute over whether the plaintiff could pursue a second petition for partition of real estate after an earlier petition was dismissed under prior law. The court held that chapter 266 of the Laws of 1949, which expanded the Superior Court's authority to grant partition to a fee simple holder regardless of the estates held by others, applied to the second petition and authorized relief. It reasoned that the earlier dismissal did not bar the new action because the statute provided a previously unavailable remedy, the new law was not considered in the first proceeding, and the statute was remedial rather than unconstitutionally retrospective under the New Hampshire Bill of Rights. The court further noted that partition rights are remedial in nature and that the statute did not operate in an injurious, oppressive, or unjust manner. The exception was overruled.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a petition to disqualify the defendants as heirs of George E. Hamblin on the ground that they were illegitimate children of an invalid marriage. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the plaintiff was precluded from raising the issue because the validity of the marriage had been actually litigated and finally decided in a prior probate proceeding that removed the widow as administratrix. The court reasoned that a probate decree cannot be attacked collaterally, that the prior adjudication of the marriage necessarily established the defendants' legitimacy as a matter of law, and that res judicata therefore barred the second petition even though the causes of action differed. A dissent argued that the prior proceeding addressed only the widow's status and did not resolve the children's right to inherit or any conflict-of-laws questions.

family lawprocedure