Mary Coon Walters

This case concerned a forfeiture action in which the state seized a vehicle containing cash and contraband, leading the trial court to order the car forfeited to the state. The owner timely appealed and obtained a stay of execution, but the state, without notice, obtained a new title to the vehicle from the motor vehicle division the day after the notice of appeal was filed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, ruling that retitling the vehicle removed the res from the court's control and eliminated jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed, reasoning that a forfeiture proceeding is in rem but that improper or self-help removal of the res by the prevailing party does not divest jurisdiction, and that in personam jurisdiction over appearing parties can coexist to allow the appeal to proceed.

criminal lawprocedureproperty

In Merrill v. Tabachin, Inc., the plaintiff sued the defendant corporation for breach of a 1986 contract to purchase a ranch, seeking damages or specific performance after the defendant was served in January 1987. Despite some communications between the plaintiff's attorney and two attorneys retained by the defendant, no answer or formal appearance was filed, leading to entry of a default judgment for over $172,000 in May 1987. The defendant moved to set aside the judgment, claiming the attorney exchanges created a constructive appearance that required three days' written notice before default and that excusable neglect or a meritorious defense justified vacating it. The court ruled that inconclusive exchanges among counsel demonstrated only awareness of the suit, not the affirmative acts needed to constitute an appearance or submission to jurisdiction, and found no excusable neglect along with prejudice to the plaintiff from the delay. It therefore affirmed denial of the motion to vacate.

procedureproperty

The case concerned a wrongful death suit by the estate of Wade Richardson, who was killed when an intoxicated driver, after being served alcohol at Carnegie Library Restaurant in violation of the Dramshop Act, stole an unattended dumptruck from Bennett-Cathey, Inc. with the keys left in the ignition and crashed into Richardson's vehicle. The trial court entered a default judgment against the restaurant but limited damages to the $50,000 statutory cap despite finding $250,000 in losses, and granted summary judgment to Bennett-Cathey. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that the theft was an unforeseeable intervening criminal act that broke the chain of causation for the truck owner and that the damages cap was constitutional under rational-basis review because the statute created a new cause of action with limited liability that applied equally to all plaintiffs and did not infringe the right to a jury trial on damages. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutionality of the cap and the key-in-ignition liability precedent.

torts & liability

In State v. Duran, the defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and armed robbery, for which he received a life sentence plus ten years, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial by shifting the burden of proof and introducing inadmissible hearsay. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, finding that substantial circumstantial evidence, including eyewitness and forensic testimony placing the defendant at the scene, supported the jury's determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the issue of identity. The court acknowledged that the prosecution improperly called the defendant's alibi witness primarily to impeach her and introduce a prior statement, and also mischaracterized expert testimony in closing argument, but concluded these errors were harmless because they did not prejudice the defendant given the other evidence of guilt and the lack of objection at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

Charles Gillespie was convicted of a fourth-degree felony and a misdemeanor and received consecutive sentences of eighteen months' imprisonment and 364 days, followed by a one-year parole period to begin after completion of both terms. The question presented was whether the parole period required by statute must begin immediately after the felony sentence ends or only after the full aggregate sentence, including the misdemeanor term, has been served. The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that parole commences upon expiration of the felony sentence alone, relying on the language of NMSA 1978, Sections 31-18-15(C) and 31-21-10(C) and its prior decision in Brock v. Sullivan; it therefore reversed the district court's denial of the motion to modify the sentence and overruled the inconsistent holding in State v. Smith.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over ownership of a bar and liquor license in Cimarron, New Mexico, where the named title holder, Severo M. Granado, held the property after his son Augustin Granado (a convicted felon barred by statute from owning a liquor license) arranged the purchase and made all payments but could not take title in his own name. After Augustin's death, his heirs sought a declaratory judgment imposing a resulting trust and ordering transfer of the property to them, which the trial court granted against Severo and his daughter Clara. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the four-year statute of limitations for the equitable claim did not begin to run until the trust was repudiated in 1982, that clear evidence supported the existence of a resulting trust with Augustin as the beneficial owner, and that the unclean-hands defense did not bar relief to the innocent heirs given the equities and the risk of unjust enrichment to the defendants.

propertyfamily lawprocedure