Mary Coon Walters

This case concerned a forfeiture action in which the state seized a vehicle containing cash and contraband, leading the trial court to order the car forfeited to the state. The owner timely appealed and obtained a stay of execution, but the state, without notice, obtained a new title to the vehicle from the motor vehicle division the day after the notice of appeal was filed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, ruling that retitling the vehicle removed the res from the court's control and eliminated jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed, reasoning that a forfeiture proceeding is in rem but that improper or self-help removal of the res by the prevailing party does not divest jurisdiction, and that in personam jurisdiction over appearing parties can coexist to allow the appeal to proceed.

criminal lawprocedureproperty

In Merrill v. Tabachin, Inc., the plaintiff sued the defendant corporation for breach of a 1986 contract to purchase a ranch, seeking damages or specific performance after the defendant was served in January 1987. Despite some communications between the plaintiff's attorney and two attorneys retained by the defendant, no answer or formal appearance was filed, leading to entry of a default judgment for over $172,000 in May 1987. The defendant moved to set aside the judgment, claiming the attorney exchanges created a constructive appearance that required three days' written notice before default and that excusable neglect or a meritorious defense justified vacating it. The court ruled that inconclusive exchanges among counsel demonstrated only awareness of the suit, not the affirmative acts needed to constitute an appearance or submission to jurisdiction, and found no excusable neglect along with prejudice to the plaintiff from the delay. It therefore affirmed denial of the motion to vacate.

procedureproperty

The case concerned a wrongful death suit by the estate of Wade Richardson, who was killed when an intoxicated driver, after being served alcohol at Carnegie Library Restaurant in violation of the Dramshop Act, stole an unattended dumptruck from Bennett-Cathey, Inc. with the keys left in the ignition and crashed into Richardson's vehicle. The trial court entered a default judgment against the restaurant but limited damages to the $50,000 statutory cap despite finding $250,000 in losses, and granted summary judgment to Bennett-Cathey. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that the theft was an unforeseeable intervening criminal act that broke the chain of causation for the truck owner and that the damages cap was constitutional under rational-basis review because the statute created a new cause of action with limited liability that applied equally to all plaintiffs and did not infringe the right to a jury trial on damages. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutionality of the cap and the key-in-ignition liability precedent.

torts & liability

In State v. Duran, the defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and armed robbery, for which he received a life sentence plus ten years, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial by shifting the burden of proof and introducing inadmissible hearsay. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, finding that substantial circumstantial evidence, including eyewitness and forensic testimony placing the defendant at the scene, supported the jury's determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the issue of identity. The court acknowledged that the prosecution improperly called the defendant's alibi witness primarily to impeach her and introduce a prior statement, and also mischaracterized expert testimony in closing argument, but concluded these errors were harmless because they did not prejudice the defendant given the other evidence of guilt and the lack of objection at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

Charles Gillespie was convicted of a fourth-degree felony and a misdemeanor and received consecutive sentences of eighteen months' imprisonment and 364 days, followed by a one-year parole period to begin after completion of both terms. The question presented was whether the parole period required by statute must begin immediately after the felony sentence ends or only after the full aggregate sentence, including the misdemeanor term, has been served. The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that parole commences upon expiration of the felony sentence alone, relying on the language of NMSA 1978, Sections 31-18-15(C) and 31-21-10(C) and its prior decision in Brock v. Sullivan; it therefore reversed the district court's denial of the motion to modify the sentence and overruled the inconsistent holding in State v. Smith.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over ownership of a bar and liquor license in Cimarron, New Mexico, where the named title holder, Severo M. Granado, held the property after his son Augustin Granado (a convicted felon barred by statute from owning a liquor license) arranged the purchase and made all payments but could not take title in his own name. After Augustin's death, his heirs sought a declaratory judgment imposing a resulting trust and ordering transfer of the property to them, which the trial court granted against Severo and his daughter Clara. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the four-year statute of limitations for the equitable claim did not begin to run until the trust was repudiated in 1982, that clear evidence supported the existence of a resulting trust with Augustin as the beneficial owner, and that the unclean-hands defense did not bar relief to the innocent heirs given the equities and the risk of unjust enrichment to the defendants.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

The case involved a workers' compensation claim where an employee injured on the job negotiated and signed a lump sum settlement agreement with the employer and insurer, which was then filed for approval, but the employee died before the hearing and the insurer attempted to withdraw its consent. The hearing officer denied approval of the settlement on the ground that the parties were no longer in agreement at the time of the hearing, a decision affirmed by the court of appeals. The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, holding that the signed and filed agreement provided evidence of a binding contract, that the hearing officer lacked statutory grounds under NMSA 1978 § 52-5-14(A) to disapprove it based on repudiation, and that one party's attempt to rescind did not justify withholding approval if the settlement was otherwise fair and equitable. The court remanded with instructions to approve the payment.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involves a defendant's appeal of his criminal convictions, where he raised claims under the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, Fifth Amendment due process, as well as issues of hearsay, probable cause, and insufficient evidence. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' resolution of all issues except the claim of insufficient evidence regarding the escape from custody charge. The court reasoned that the court of appeals improperly used a summary calendar procedure without reviewing the trial transcript to assess whether the evidence supported the conviction, particularly on whether the defendant was in custody before fleeing, as indicated by the undisputed facts in the docketing statement. Therefore, it remanded the case to the court of appeals to properly review the evidence on that charge.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether plaintiff Angelo Jimenez could stack uninsured/underinsured motorist coverages for two vehicles insured under a single policy issued by defendant Foundation Reserve, despite a limit-of-liability clause, after he was injured by an underinsured driver and received a $25,000 liability payment. The trial court granted summary judgment allowing stacking, full recovery of medical payments already reimbursed, and certain costs, and Foundation appealed. The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the statutory definition of underinsured motorist and related public policy rendered the clear limit-of-liability clause unenforceable to prohibit stacking when separate premiums were paid, while addressing subrogation rights and expert witness fees for a vacated hearing.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Production Credit Ass'n v. Williamson, the Williamsons appealed the denial of their motion to set aside a special master's foreclosure sale of their ranch, arguing that the lack of personal notice of the sale violated due process and that court rules required actual notice to them as parties. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order, holding that the sale complied with statutory requirements. The court reasoned that the specific statute governing notice for foreclosure sales (NMSA 1978, Section 39-5-1) controlled over the more general service rule (SCRA 1-005), and that publication and posting provided sufficient notice. It further concluded that the Williamsons, who had been served in the foreclosure action, participated in the proceedings, and consented to the judgment directing sale "pursuant to law," received all process due under the state and federal constitutions.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned whether long-term leaseholds and buildings built on them, used as security for construction loans, qualify as "real estate" subject to redemption rights after a foreclosure sale. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that neither the leaseholds nor the removable buildings constitute real estate for redemption purposes. The court reasoned that under common law, a leasehold is personal property regardless of its term, and the parties' intent, as shown in the lease allowing removal of the buildings, confirmed they were personal property rather than real estate.

property

The case involved a dispute between a commercial tenant, Beulah Easterling, and her landlord, defendant Peterson, over the landlord's reentry and lockout of the leased premises after the tenant repeatedly failed to pay rent on time. Easterling sued for breach of contract and damages, arguing that the landlord's consistent acceptance of late payments over fifteen months, along with notices of default followed by payment, created a waiver of the lease's timely payment requirement and right to reenter. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding there were no material facts in dispute regarding default and the right to reentry. On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, holding that the pleadings and deposition raised genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the landlord's conduct implied a waiver or estoppel, which must be resolved at trial rather than on summary judgment.

propertyprocedure

The case involved George Ashlock suing Sunwest Bank after the bank failed to credit interest to his new checking account despite a mail solicitation promising high interest on transferred savings funds; due to a bank error, no interest was paid from 1981 until the mistake was discovered in 1986, and the bank refused to pay back interest. Ashlock prevailed at trial with an award of about $23,000 in damages, costs, and fees under the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act. The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed, holding that the bank's undisputed conduct satisfied the Act's elements of a knowingly made false or misleading representation in trade or commerce that tended to deceive, including its failure to deliver the promised service, and that the statute does not require proof of intent to deceive at the time of the initial representation. The court also rejected the bank's arguments that federal banking law preempted the state Act or that the Act's exemption for regulated transactions applied.

business & regulatory

The case was a wrongful death action by the estate of adult passenger Wayne Baxter against bars and their owners, alleging they illegally served alcohol to Baxter and intoxicated driver Robert Reynolds shortly before a fatal car accident. The trial court denied motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, but the court of appeals reversed, relying on Trujillo v. Trujillo to hold that Baxter's voluntary intoxication was the proximate cause of his death and that no duty was owed to him. The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, applying the duty analysis from Lopez v. Maez and related cases to conclude that tavernkeepers may be liable if they breach statutory duties by serving intoxicated persons and that Baxter could potentially recover as an injured third party depending on factual issues such as his complicity. The court emphasized that the dramshop statute aims to protect the public, including potentially innocent passengers, from injuries caused by illegal alcohol service.

torts & liability

The case involved Electric Supply Company (ESCO) suing general contractor Kitchens Construction and its surety under New Mexico's Little Miller Act to recover payment for materials supplied to a subcontractor on a state project. After a bench trial, the district court ruled for ESCO, and the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that Kitchens's oral promise to pay was enforceable because its main purpose served Kitchens's own business interests rather than merely guaranteeing the subcontractor's debt, rendering the statute of frauds inapplicable. The court also ruled that ESCO's computer-generated invoices were admissible as business records under the evidence rules, as they derived from an existing data compilation and were supported by proper foundational testimony, even though they were not the original invoices.

business & regulatory

In Meyer v. Jones, a defendant charged with first-offense DWI in Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court sought a jury trial, which the metropolitan judge denied under NMSA 1978, Section 34-8A-5(B)(1) limiting jury trials in such cases. The district court granted mandamus relief, finding the statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because magistrate courts elsewhere allowed juries and because potential probation up to three years could exceed six months. The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, holding that the authorized imprisonment of up to 90 days controls the petty-offense analysis under federal and state constitutions, probation terms do not trigger a jury-trial right per U.S. Supreme Court precedent, and the geographic distinction is permissible given the attorney requirement for metropolitan judges and interests in judicial economy.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Melnick, whose long-term insurance agency contract with State Farm was terminated in 1980; after a review process upheld the termination, Melnick sued claiming breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the at-will agency relationship, abandoning any claim for breach of the express contract terms. The trial court initially denied but later granted State Farm’s motion for a directed verdict, finding that while a duty of good faith applies to contracts, State Farm had not acted in bad faith. On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a trial court may reconsider and grant a directed verdict on interlocutory rulings and that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot override the express terms of an integrated at-will contract or create a requirement of good cause for termination. The court reviewed standards for directed verdicts and concluded that judgment as a matter of law for State Farm was proper.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Caroline Morro was injured by a third-party driver with $25,000 liability coverage and sought underinsured motorist benefits under multiple auto policies, including one issued by defendant Foundation Reserve on her daughter's vehicle (under which she was a class two insured) and two policies she held with Farmers Insurance (under which she was a class one insured). The trial court granted summary judgment allowing Morro to stack the underinsured motorist limits across all three policies to establish the tortfeasor's underinsured status and awarded her recovery with a prorated offset for the tortfeasor's payment. On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed, holding that stacking was permitted even when combining class one and class two coverages. The court reasoned that the legislature's intent in mandating underinsured motorist coverage was to compensate injured parties and place them in the same position as if the tortfeasor had carried equal liability limits, and that prior precedents equating underinsured and uninsured coverage and allowing stacking for class one insureds supported extending the same treatment here to fulfill that purpose.

torts & liability

James Graff sued Western New Mexico University for breach of employment contract and violation of civil rights after the university did not renew his position as business manager. The trial court granted summary judgment to the university, and the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed. The court found that Graff's contracts were temporary appointments for one year at a time, explicitly stating that administrators serve at the pleasure of the president, creating no expectation of continued employment. Because Graff had no property interest in his job, he was not entitled to due process protections under federal law, and the university's decision not to renew did not breach the contracts.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned whether Continental Insurance could enforce a clause in its uninsured motorist policy that offset amounts paid under a separate workers' compensation policy against benefits due to an injured employee. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the offset provision was unenforceable. The court reasoned that the clause conflicted with the uninsured motorist statute's mandate of minimum liability coverage, as the only statutory conditions for benefits are the insured's entitlement to damages and the other driver's lack of insurance; it further noted that workers' compensation and uninsured motorist coverages are distinct, with the former not intended to limit recovery from other sources like the latter.

business & regulatorylabor & employmenttorts & liability