William H. Bobbitt

The case concerned whether a jury should have been instructed on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense in a prosecution for the shooting death of Willie Mae Evans. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support submitting involuntary manslaughter as a permissible verdict. The state's evidence indicated an intentional shooting, while the defendant's testimony described an accidental discharge caused by stumbling but did not show reckless or wanton handling of the rifle that would constitute culpable negligence. As a result, the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant James Clifford Roberts, who was convicted of misdemeanor assault on a child under twelve after grabbing and pulling nine-year-old Kathy Cates by the arm. The court reviewed the sufficiency of evidence for a separate kidnapping charge arising from the same brief incident, in which Roberts dragged the child 80-90 feet toward a nursery building. Drawing on the common-law definition of kidnapping as adopted and modified by North Carolina statutes, prior decisions such as State v. Dix, and the requirement of forcible carrying away, the majority held the evidence insufficient to prove the elements of kidnapping. The court reasoned that the short distance, lack of complete dominion and control for an appreciable time, and immediate availability of help meant the victim was not carried beyond the immediate vicinity in a manner constituting the felony.

criminal law

The case was a negligence action arising from a motor vehicle accident in which plaintiff Foy sought damages from defendant Bremson and others. Plaintiff assigned error to the trial court's jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine as applied to Bremson, arguing it failed to state that the doctrine would not apply if Bremson's own negligence contributed to the emergency. The Court of Appeals ordered a new trial on all issues based on errors regarding burden of proof. The Supreme Court modified that decision, holding that the sudden emergency instruction was incomplete and erroneous for omitting the limitation on the doctrine's availability when a party's prior negligence helped create the emergency, and that this error warranted a new trial on the issues between plaintiff and Bremson. It affirmed the new trial on other issues for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case Hartley v. Ballou involved a home buyer's claim against the seller for basement water leakage after purchase, based on alleged breach of implied warranty concerning waterproofing. The trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, but the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the trial judge misapplied the law on implied warranties in real property sales by permitting recovery for post-repair damages after the buyer had accepted the seller's 1970 waterproofing efforts and continued residing in the home; recovery, if any, was limited to pre-acceptance inconvenience and expenses. It further explained that implied warranties apply to undiscoverable defects but do not extend to known issues once addressed and accepted. The opinion also addressed procedural requirements under Rule 52(a)(1), requiring special findings of fact and separate conclusions of law rather than jury-style issues in non-jury trials.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether tangible personal property owned by nonresident converters, held temporarily by Hanes Dye & Finishing Company in Forsyth County for processing such as dyeing or finishing before reshipment outside North Carolina, acquired a tax situs in the state and was subject to ad valorem taxation under North Carolina statutes for 1972. The State Board of Assessment had determined that the goods were taxable at the location where they were situated in Hanes's custody for a substantial business purpose. The court interpreted G.S. 105-304, which provides that property of nonresident taxpayers with no principal office in the state is taxable at the place where it is "situated" (defined as more or less permanently located), and concluded that goods shipped from outside the state to Hanes for processing and then reshipped out of state did not meet this standard and thus were not taxable. The judgment was affirmed as to those goods but modified and remanded for further factual clarification and consideration regarding any goods purchased from North Carolina mills or shipped to in-state customers.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned plaintiffs' exercise of a recorded option agreement to purchase real property from defendants Jaynes within the two-year term, and Jaynes' subsequent sale of most of the property to defendants McLean while the specific performance action was pending. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to specific performance against Jaynes, but McLean's rights as subsequent purchasers depended on whether they had actual notice of the pending lawsuit. The core reasoning was that the recorded option provided constructive notice only of the option itself, not of its exercise or the lawsuit, and the lis pendens notice was cross-indexed too late to bind McLean; therefore a limited new trial was required solely on the actual-notice issue to determine if McLean qualified as bona fide purchasers without notice.

propertyprocedure