William H. Bobbitt

The case concerned whether a jury should have been instructed on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense in a prosecution for the shooting death of Willie Mae Evans. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support submitting involuntary manslaughter as a permissible verdict. The state's evidence indicated an intentional shooting, while the defendant's testimony described an accidental discharge caused by stumbling but did not show reckless or wanton handling of the rifle that would constitute culpable negligence. As a result, the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant James Clifford Roberts, who was convicted of misdemeanor assault on a child under twelve after grabbing and pulling nine-year-old Kathy Cates by the arm. The court reviewed the sufficiency of evidence for a separate kidnapping charge arising from the same brief incident, in which Roberts dragged the child 80-90 feet toward a nursery building. Drawing on the common-law definition of kidnapping as adopted and modified by North Carolina statutes, prior decisions such as State v. Dix, and the requirement of forcible carrying away, the majority held the evidence insufficient to prove the elements of kidnapping. The court reasoned that the short distance, lack of complete dominion and control for an appreciable time, and immediate availability of help meant the victim was not carried beyond the immediate vicinity in a manner constituting the felony.

criminal law

The case was a negligence action arising from a motor vehicle accident in which plaintiff Foy sought damages from defendant Bremson and others. Plaintiff assigned error to the trial court's jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine as applied to Bremson, arguing it failed to state that the doctrine would not apply if Bremson's own negligence contributed to the emergency. The Court of Appeals ordered a new trial on all issues based on errors regarding burden of proof. The Supreme Court modified that decision, holding that the sudden emergency instruction was incomplete and erroneous for omitting the limitation on the doctrine's availability when a party's prior negligence helped create the emergency, and that this error warranted a new trial on the issues between plaintiff and Bremson. It affirmed the new trial on other issues for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case Hartley v. Ballou involved a home buyer's claim against the seller for basement water leakage after purchase, based on alleged breach of implied warranty concerning waterproofing. The trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, but the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the trial judge misapplied the law on implied warranties in real property sales by permitting recovery for post-repair damages after the buyer had accepted the seller's 1970 waterproofing efforts and continued residing in the home; recovery, if any, was limited to pre-acceptance inconvenience and expenses. It further explained that implied warranties apply to undiscoverable defects but do not extend to known issues once addressed and accepted. The opinion also addressed procedural requirements under Rule 52(a)(1), requiring special findings of fact and separate conclusions of law rather than jury-style issues in non-jury trials.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether tangible personal property owned by nonresident converters, held temporarily by Hanes Dye & Finishing Company in Forsyth County for processing such as dyeing or finishing before reshipment outside North Carolina, acquired a tax situs in the state and was subject to ad valorem taxation under North Carolina statutes for 1972. The State Board of Assessment had determined that the goods were taxable at the location where they were situated in Hanes's custody for a substantial business purpose. The court interpreted G.S. 105-304, which provides that property of nonresident taxpayers with no principal office in the state is taxable at the place where it is "situated" (defined as more or less permanently located), and concluded that goods shipped from outside the state to Hanes for processing and then reshipped out of state did not meet this standard and thus were not taxable. The judgment was affirmed as to those goods but modified and remanded for further factual clarification and consideration regarding any goods purchased from North Carolina mills or shipped to in-state customers.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned plaintiffs' exercise of a recorded option agreement to purchase real property from defendants Jaynes within the two-year term, and Jaynes' subsequent sale of most of the property to defendants McLean while the specific performance action was pending. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to specific performance against Jaynes, but McLean's rights as subsequent purchasers depended on whether they had actual notice of the pending lawsuit. The core reasoning was that the recorded option provided constructive notice only of the option itself, not of its exercise or the lawsuit, and the lis pendens notice was cross-indexed too late to bind McLean; therefore a limited new trial was required solely on the actual-notice issue to determine if McLean qualified as bona fide purchasers without notice.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Castor, the defendant appealed his second-degree murder conviction, challenging the admission of an officer's testimony that the defendant remained silent when confronted in custody with accusatory statements from a witness implicating him in a robbery and shooting. The North Carolina Supreme Court held this evidence inadmissible, ruling that a defendant's silence in response to such statements while under arrest cannot constitute a voluntary implied admission of guilt due to the coercive circumstances and self-incrimination concerns. The core reasoning drew on precedents like State v. Guffey and Miranda v. Arizona, emphasizing that defendants in custody have a right to remain silent without that silence being used against them, and the court awarded a new trial. A dissent argued the error was harmless given overwhelming other evidence of guilt.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant James Perry Potter, who was convicted of two counts of armed robbery after entering a food market and taking money from two separate cash registers by threatening employees with a revolver. Potter challenged his convictions on grounds that he lacked mental capacity to stand trial due to paranoid schizophrenia, which was controlled only by medication (termed 'synthetic sanity'), and that his mental condition exempted him from criminal responsibility as a matter of law; he also contested the two separate robbery convictions. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that Potter was competent to stand trial because he met the standard of understanding the proceedings and assisting in his defense at the time, regardless of medication, and rejected the claim of legal exemption from responsibility, applying the established test of whether the defendant knew the nature and quality of his acts or could distinguish right from wrong. The court further determined that two distinct armed robberies occurred because the defendant forcibly took property from two different victims in their care, even though the money belonged to the store. The opinion affirms the convictions while addressing related evidentiary and procedural issues from the trial and appeals.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over gravel, sand, and dirt removed and sold from the plaintiff's farm by the defendant under a writing later declared null and void, with the defendant having made partial payments to the plaintiff. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff for the full amount collected by the defendant from sales, but the Supreme Court vacated that judgment. The court decided that unresolved factual issues existed regarding the proper measure of damages and the defendant's estoppel defense. The core reasoning was that the defendant, lacking any valid easement or profit, held at most a license and thus was liable only for the in-situ value of the removed materials rather than full sales proceeds, while estoppel could bar further recovery if the plaintiff had consented and accepted payments.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved defendant Samuel A. Poole, who was convicted of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling at night with intent to commit rape based solely on circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the denial of Poole's motion for judgment as in case of nonsuit, assessing whether the State's evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury. The court held that the evidence failed to provide substantial proof identifying Poole as the intruder, as the victim could not identify him, there were gaps in the timeline and location of key items like the truck and rifle, and other details did not sufficiently connect him to the crime. The majority concluded the motion should have been granted, leading to reversal. Dissenting justices argued the circumstantial evidence, including matching buttons and possession of the rifle, was substantial enough for jury consideration.

criminal law

In State v. Bryant, defendants were charged under North Carolina's 1971 obscenity statute, G.S. 14-190.1, for disseminating hard-core pornographic material. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision upholding the charges and the statute's constitutionality as applied. The court reasoned that, under the U.S. Supreme Court's Miller v. California guidelines, states may prohibit material that appeals to prurient interest, depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and lacks serious value, and that the defendants' hard-core materials clearly fell within this category with adequate notice of prohibited conduct. The opinion reviewed the evolution of federal obscenity standards from Roth through Memoirs to Miller, noting that the state statute aligned sufficiently with Miller for prosecutions involving such extreme content.

criminal lawfree speech

The case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of North Carolina General Statute 14-190.1, an obscenity law, as applied to the defendant's conduct. The Court of Appeals had upheld the statute's validity, relying on its earlier rulings in related cases. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that decision, holding that the defendant's actions violated the statute as interpreted in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's Miller v. California decision. The court limited its review to the constitutional issue raised on appeal and found no merit in other assignments of error. Non-constitutional claims were not further reviewed since no petition for certiorari was filed.

criminal lawfree speech

This case involves a defendant convicted of first-degree murder for shooting his wife, with the defendant raising nineteen assignments of error primarily concerning jury instructions on lesser degrees of homicide and flight, as well as the admission of photographic evidence and a post-trial civil judgment for counsel fees. The court noted that most assignments failed to comply with appellate rules but reviewed the merits due to the life sentence, concluding there was no evidence to support an instruction on voluntary manslaughter and that the existing instructions and evidence admissions were proper. The court affirmed the murder conviction and related judgment. It vacated the counsel fees judgment, however, because it was entered without notice or a hearing as required by statute.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Tuggle, the defendant appealed his convictions for robberies and kidnapping, challenging the admission of in-court identification testimony from witnesses who had previously identified him from photographs without counsel present and the testimony of another robbery victim from a nearby store. The court conducted voir dire hearings and found that the identifications were based on the witnesses' independent observations during the crimes rather than any suggestive procedures. It also held that evidence of a similar robbery committed nearby on the same night was admissible to prove identity, subject to limiting instructions to the jury. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, concluding there was no prejudicial error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case Dunn v. City of Charlotte involved petitioners challenging three annexation ordinances adopted by the City under G.S. 160-453.14 and 160-453.17, claiming the City's reports failed to include required details on service extensions such as timetables for water and sewer mains, fire protection plans, and financing methods. The court affirmed the lower court's judgments upholding the annexations, holding that the record demonstrated substantial compliance with the statutes and that petitioners had not shown by competent evidence any material prejudice to their substantive rights from alleged deficiencies. Core reasoning included that the burden shifted to petitioners after facial compliance was shown, that plans adequately provided for services like fire protection via tankers until hydrants were installed and financing from general revenues, and that any omissions did not invalidate the proceedings since a statement of intent referencing the service plans was included in the ordinances.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Overman, Overman Jr. was charged with rape after an alleged incident involving Miss Sutton, while his parents Overman Sr. and Gaynell Overman were charged as accessories after the fact for assisting him in avoiding detection. The court reversed the parents' convictions because the evidence failed to show they knew a rape had occurred, as opposed to some other involvement or injury, despite proof they helped remove Sutton and made false statements to officers. The court upheld Overman Jr.'s conviction, determining that Sutton's testimony sufficiently established the elements of rape and that no prejudicial errors occurred in the jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, or other trial procedures.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by plaintiff Lee, who was injured while using his employer's electric saw to build a doghouse for personal use during a required Saturday morning shift in the employer's shop and warehouse. The Industrial Commission denied compensation, finding that the injury did not arise out of the employment because Lee was engaged in a personal activity that did not benefit the business. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that decision, holding the injury compensable. The court reasoned that the injury occurred in the course of employment, as Lee was on duty as required, and arose out of it because the employer had permitted and encouraged employees to use shop equipment and scrap materials for personal projects during lulls, making such activity a reasonably expected incident of the job with a causal connection to the employment.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved two law students at the University of North Carolina who challenged university regulations classifying them permanently as nonresidents for tuition purposes based on their initial enrollment, even after they established domicile in the state for six months or more. The North Carolina Supreme Court held, following the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Vlandis v. Kline, that the regulation was invalid and that students could qualify for in-state tuition upon meeting domicile requirements notwithstanding continued enrollment. Based on stipulated facts showing both petitioners' intent to remain in North Carolina indefinitely along with other indicia of residency such as voting and tax payments, the court determined that Glusman and Lamb qualified for in-state rates during specified periods after the six-month threshold. The court vacated the lower court judgment and remanded the matter to the university's Residence Status Committee for further proceedings applying the corrected legal standard.

civil rightsfederal power

This case involved a criminal defendant's appeal from a conviction, challenging the trial court's handling of a prior statement he made to police and several aspects of the jury instructions. The defendant argued that the statement should not have been admitted even for impeachment because the voir dire findings did not explicitly confirm full Miranda warnings, and he also claimed errors in the definitions of reasonable doubt, the limiting instruction on the statement, comments on the evidence, and failure to instruct on voluntary intoxication. The court held that under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. New York (adopted in State v. Bryant), a prior inconsistent statement that was not coerced could be used to impeach the defendant's trial testimony even if it did not meet Miranda standards for substantive use. The court further found no prejudicial error in the jury instructions, as the charge correctly limited the statement to credibility purposes and the defendant failed to identify specific deficiencies. The verdict and judgment were affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Williams, who was charged with first-degree murder after evidence showed he fired a rifle into an occupied poolroom building, causing the death of Herman Adams. The court considered whether this violated G.S. 14-34.1 (discharging a firearm into occupied property) and qualified as a predicate felony under the felony-murder rule in G.S. 14-17. It held that the statute creates such a felony when the discharge is willful or wanton with knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe the building is occupied, that evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury, and that the felony-murder doctrine applies without needing separate proof of premeditation. However, the court granted a new trial because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on evidence from a witness that could support a complete defense or reduce the charge to second-degree murder, such as facts indicating the shooting occurred inside rather than into the building.

criminal lawgunsprocedure