
State v. Eury
Supreme Court of North Carolina · 1986-08-12 · cited 12×
In State v. Eury, the defendant was convicted of capital and noncapital charges and appealed the trial court's denial of her motion to allow both of her defense attorneys to deliver closing arguments to the jury after the prosecution's argument. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred by restricting the defense to one opening and one closing argument, in violation of N.C.G.S. § 84-14, which permits unlimited addresses by up to three counsel per side in capital cases and two addresses in noncapital cases, subject to order rules under related statutes and court rules. Drawing on precedents such as State v. Gladden and State v. Raper, the Court reasoned that if the defendant presents evidence she may open before the State and use two counsel, or if she presents none she may open and close, and that the denial of both counsel closing constituted prejudicial error warranting a new trial on all charges. The Court noted that the case had lost its capital status due to the jury's life sentence recommendation, but applied the same principles to the noncapital offenses.
criminal lawprocedure
Cavenaugh v. Cavenaugh
Supreme Court of North Carolina · 1986-08-12 · cited 26×
This case involved enforcement of a marital separation agreement that had been incorporated into a divorce decree, with the defendant arguing he lacked the ability to pay due to declining income and rising debts. The trial court had ordered specific performance and payment of arrearages without findings on the defendant's financial capacity or evidence that the legal remedy of execution was inadequate. The Supreme Court held that when a defendant presents evidence of inability to comply, the trial judge must make findings of fact on ability to pay before decreeing specific performance of a separation agreement or arrearages. It also ruled that the finding of an inadequate legal remedy lacked evidentiary support. The decision reversed the Court of Appeals in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further findings consistent with the opinion.
family lawprocedure
State v. Diaz
Supreme Court of North Carolina · 1986-08-12 · cited 79×
The case concerned whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Bienvenido Diaz's conviction for trafficking in more than 10,000 pounds of marijuana under N.C.G.S. § 90-95(h)(1), based on his alleged involvement in a large-scale smuggling operation. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the evidence was adequate to submit the case to the jury, finding substantial circumstantial proof that Diaz rented a vehicle used by participants, appeared in a code book, and was present at the scene acting in concert with others. The majority explained that all evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State and that inferences from direct and circumstantial facts could reasonably connect Diaz to the crime without improper stacking. A dissent maintained that the links to Diaz rested on speculation and required stacking inferences, rendering the evidence insufficient as a matter of law.
criminal lawprocedure
Chavis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
Supreme Court of North Carolina · 1986-08-12 · cited 14×
The case involved homeowners suing their fire insurer after a claim was denied following destruction of their property by fire. The insurer had requested that the insureds sign a broad, unlimited release authorizing access to all their banking and financial records from any institutions, which the insureds refused. The trial court directed a verdict for the insurer on grounds that failure to produce the records violated policy conditions, preventing the arson issue from reaching the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the statutory policy language requires only reasonable and specific document production related to the insured property, and the overbroad release exceeded those limits.
propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure
State v. Prevette
Supreme Court of North Carolina · 1986-07-02 · cited 43×
In State v. Prevette, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping after binding the victim's hands, knees, and feet and gagging her, leading to her suffocation; the jury convicted on theories of premeditation and deliberation as well as felony murder. The defendant argued on appeal that the restraint element of kidnapping was not separate from the acts causing the murder, and the court examined whether the evidence supported an independent kidnapping conviction for the purpose of terrorizing the victim. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the kidnapping conviction must be vacated because the binding of the victim was an inherent feature of the murder by suffocation, with no distinct evidence of restraint for terrorizing, but it found no error in the murder conviction or other rulings on evidence and jury instructions. The court reasoned that the specific jury instruction tied the kidnapping restraint directly to preventing removal of the gag, making the offenses indistinguishable under double jeopardy principles.
criminal law
State v. Gilliam
Supreme Court of North Carolina · 1986-07-02 · cited 1×
This case involved defendants convicted of kidnapping and sexual assault who challenged their convictions on grounds that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors based on race, violating their constitutional rights to equal protection. The court held that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which changed the standard for proving such discrimination, did not apply retroactively to cases where jury selection occurred before that ruling, so the prior standard from Swain v. Alabama applied; under Swain, the defendants failed to demonstrate systematic exclusion over time and abandoned their state constitutional claims. The court also ruled that evidence of weapons found on the defendants was admissible to corroborate the victim's identification testimony and that the prosecutor's references to them in closing argument were proper, finding no prejudicial error in the trial.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure