Joseph Branch

In State v. Eury, the defendant was convicted of capital and noncapital charges and appealed the trial court's denial of her motion to allow both of her defense attorneys to deliver closing arguments to the jury after the prosecution's argument. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred by restricting the defense to one opening and one closing argument, in violation of N.C.G.S. § 84-14, which permits unlimited addresses by up to three counsel per side in capital cases and two addresses in noncapital cases, subject to order rules under related statutes and court rules. Drawing on precedents such as State v. Gladden and State v. Raper, the Court reasoned that if the defendant presents evidence she may open before the State and use two counsel, or if she presents none she may open and close, and that the denial of both counsel closing constituted prejudicial error warranting a new trial on all charges. The Court noted that the case had lost its capital status due to the jury's life sentence recommendation, but applied the same principles to the noncapital offenses.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved enforcement of a marital separation agreement that had been incorporated into a divorce decree, with the defendant arguing he lacked the ability to pay due to declining income and rising debts. The trial court had ordered specific performance and payment of arrearages without findings on the defendant's financial capacity or evidence that the legal remedy of execution was inadequate. The Supreme Court held that when a defendant presents evidence of inability to comply, the trial judge must make findings of fact on ability to pay before decreeing specific performance of a separation agreement or arrearages. It also ruled that the finding of an inadequate legal remedy lacked evidentiary support. The decision reversed the Court of Appeals in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further findings consistent with the opinion.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Bienvenido Diaz's conviction for trafficking in more than 10,000 pounds of marijuana under N.C.G.S. § 90-95(h)(1), based on his alleged involvement in a large-scale smuggling operation. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the evidence was adequate to submit the case to the jury, finding substantial circumstantial proof that Diaz rented a vehicle used by participants, appeared in a code book, and was present at the scene acting in concert with others. The majority explained that all evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State and that inferences from direct and circumstantial facts could reasonably connect Diaz to the crime without improper stacking. A dissent maintained that the links to Diaz rested on speculation and required stacking inferences, rendering the evidence insufficient as a matter of law.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved homeowners suing their fire insurer after a claim was denied following destruction of their property by fire. The insurer had requested that the insureds sign a broad, unlimited release authorizing access to all their banking and financial records from any institutions, which the insureds refused. The trial court directed a verdict for the insurer on grounds that failure to produce the records violated policy conditions, preventing the arson issue from reaching the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the statutory policy language requires only reasonable and specific document production related to the insured property, and the overbroad release exceeded those limits.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Prevette, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping after binding the victim's hands, knees, and feet and gagging her, leading to her suffocation; the jury convicted on theories of premeditation and deliberation as well as felony murder. The defendant argued on appeal that the restraint element of kidnapping was not separate from the acts causing the murder, and the court examined whether the evidence supported an independent kidnapping conviction for the purpose of terrorizing the victim. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the kidnapping conviction must be vacated because the binding of the victim was an inherent feature of the murder by suffocation, with no distinct evidence of restraint for terrorizing, but it found no error in the murder conviction or other rulings on evidence and jury instructions. The court reasoned that the specific jury instruction tied the kidnapping restraint directly to preventing removal of the gag, making the offenses indistinguishable under double jeopardy principles.

criminal law

This case involved defendants convicted of kidnapping and sexual assault who challenged their convictions on grounds that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors based on race, violating their constitutional rights to equal protection. The court held that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which changed the standard for proving such discrimination, did not apply retroactively to cases where jury selection occurred before that ruling, so the prior standard from Swain v. Alabama applied; under Swain, the defendants failed to demonstrate systematic exclusion over time and abandoned their state constitutional claims. The court also ruled that evidence of weapons found on the defendants was admissible to corroborate the victim's identification testimony and that the prosecutor's references to them in closing argument were proper, finding no prejudicial error in the trial.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case concerned whether the North Carolina Utilities Commission could approve a rate increase for Glendale Water, Inc., a utility that had been found to provide inadequate service, including bacteria contamination, low pressure, and billing issues. The Commission granted Glendale an annual revenue increase of $34,883 using the operating ratio method, based on findings about the company's expenses and small rate base, while also noting the service deficiencies. The Public Staff and Attorney General appealed, contending that inadequate service required denial of any increase. The Supreme Court upheld the Commission's order, holding that the operating ratio methodology was appropriate and that the approved rates were supported by the evidence and findings.

business & regulatory

The case concerned a defendant's challenge to the admission of rectal swab and slide evidence collected from a sexual assault victim, along with related testimony, in a prosecution for rape and first-degree sexual offense. The defendant argued that the State failed to establish an adequate chain of custody and that the evidence was irrelevant to proving anal penetration. The court held that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence, as the detailed testimony from multiple witnesses sufficiently tracked the handling of the rape kit from collection through laboratory analysis, with no basis to suspect tampering or alteration. The court reasoned that any weaknesses in the chain went to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. A concurring and dissenting opinion contended that the evidence was insufficient to support the sexual offense conviction because the sperm could equally have originated from outside the rectum.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the State presented sufficient evidence, independent of the defendant's statements, to establish the corpus delicti of driving while impaired and thereby support denial of a motion to dismiss. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the trial court properly denied the motion. The court explained that its prior decision in State v. Parker expanded the corpus delicti rule to allow conviction in non-capital cases when a confession or admission is supported by substantial independent evidence tending to establish its trustworthiness, including facts showing the defendant had the opportunity to commit the crime; it is no longer always necessary to have independent proof of the crime's occurrence itself. The court distinguished State v. Brown, noting that the defendant's admissions here—that he owned and drove the wrecked vehicle after drinking—were corroborated by evidence of the accident scene and other circumstances. The opinion clarified that the rule applies equally to confessions and admissions and that the independent evidence need only support a reasonable inference that the crime occurred when considered together with the statements.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether defendant Hickory Construction Co. had waived its contractual right to compulsory arbitration in a dispute with plaintiff Servomation Corp. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that no waiver occurred. Under state law and precedent such as Cyclone Roofing Co. v. LaFave Co., arbitration agreements are enforceable and waiver requires a showing of prejudice to the opposing party through actions like incurring costs from unavailable discovery or suffering a long trial. The court found no such prejudice on the record, noting that interrogatories and summary judgment arguments did not meet the prejudice standard and that public policy strongly favors arbitration. It reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for an order staying the lawsuit and compelling arbitration.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved defendant John Edward Gardner's convictions for robbery, rape, and other sexual offenses against victim Candace Barnhill, where the key issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred by barring defense counsel from reading an excerpt from a Court of Appeals opinion during closing argument. That excerpt discussed the risks of mistaken eyewitness identifications due to factors like unconscious transference. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court's refusal did not constitute prejudicial error warranting reversal. The court reasoned that counsel was permitted to make the same arguments without quoting the opinion directly, that the record did not show how the ruling restricted the argument, and that overwhelming evidence—including the victim's identifications, a thumbprint on the crime scene doorknob, and recovery of stolen rings from the defendant—made it unlikely the ruling affected the verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved defendant Floyd Edward Richardson, who was convicted in North Carolina of breaking or entering and felonious larceny based on a confession obtained during investigations in other states. The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant could be convicted and punished for both offenses arising from the same incident and whether the confession was involuntary due to alleged threats and promises by officers. The court held that both convictions were permissible under precedent from State v. Gardner and that the confession was voluntary, as the trial court's findings showed no improper inducements and the defendant's statements were made in the context of his own inquiries about cooperation benefits, considering the totality of circumstances including his experience with the criminal justice system. The decision reversed the Court of Appeals.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Rogers, defendants Rogers and Carraway were tried and convicted of first-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill in connection with the shooting death of Charles Hall and wounding of his family at their home. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the guilt-phase verdicts for both defendants, rejecting claims of error in the denial of motions to investigate a detective, suppress statements, prohibit death-qualified juries, and limit peremptory challenges to black jurors. The court vacated Rogers' death sentence for murder after proportionality review found it excessive compared to similar cases and imposed life imprisonment, while remanding Carraway's assault sentence for a new hearing. The rulings rested on prior precedents upholding the jury selection process, the sufficiency of evidence supporting the trial court's factual findings on the motions, and statutory requirements for capital sentencing review.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Moore, the defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual offense and first-degree kidnapping after a trial that included admission of a knife found during a warrantless search of his home. The defendant argued on appeal that the search was invalid because the consent given by the woman identified as his mother was unsupported by competent evidence due to a discrepancy in her name (Velma versus Verna), and that the kidnapping indictment was defective for failing to allege the aggravating elements required for a first-degree charge. The court held that the trial judge's findings were supported by the officer's testimony and the consent form itself, establishing valid third-party consent by the person in possession of the premises. On the indictment issue, the court concluded that the charging document did not sufficiently allege any of the statutory elements elevating the offense to first degree, making it valid only for second-degree kidnapping, so judgment on the first-degree conviction was arrested and the case remanded for resentencing on the lesser offense while the sexual offense conviction was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Campbell, the defendant was charged under N.C.G.S. § 14-318.4 with felony child abuse for allegedly causing serious injuries, including permanent disfigurement and impairment to a two-year-old child's hands while providing sole care and supervision. The Court of Appeals had reversed the conviction, ruling that the evidence was insufficient to prove the defendant intended to inflict serious injury. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated the conviction, holding that the statute requires only that the defendant intentionally inflict an injury that proves to be serious, not that the defendant specifically intend the injury to be serious. The Court found sufficient evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, to allow a jury to infer intentional infliction based on the child's uninjured condition before the defendant took custody, the nature and extent of the burns (clear demarcation lines, no splash marks, and required immersion time of ten to fifteen seconds), and the presence of bruises suggesting the child was held in place.

criminal law

The case involved defendant Perry, who was charged with conspiring to possess and manufacture 28 grams or more of heroin and with trafficking in heroin by possessing and transporting that amount. The court dismissed the appeals from the conspiracy convictions because the trial judge had continued prayer for judgment without conditions, leaving no final judgment from which an appeal could lie. On the trafficking charges, the court upheld the denial of the motion to dismiss, finding sufficient evidence of constructive possession based on the defendant's connection to the premises where the drugs were located. The court also affirmed the mandatory 45-year minimum sentence, ruling that the defendant's intent to sell and bad character were proper aggravating factors not inherent in the offense.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Freeland, the defendant was convicted of two sexual assaults and first-degree kidnapping, with the kidnapping charge elevated due to the sexual assaults; he challenged the admission of opinion testimony by the victim's mother regarding her truthfulness and character, the trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial after a detective mentioned the defendant's post-arrest silence, and the imposition of separate judgments for the kidnapping and underlying assaults. The court held that the mother's testimony was improperly admitted but constituted harmless error because it did not create a reasonable possibility of a different trial outcome, given the victim's detailed testimony and lack of meaningful impeachment. It also found no error in denying a mistrial. On the sentencing issue, the court determined that the legislature did not intend double punishment for first-degree kidnapping and the sexual assault that elevated it, based on the 1979 statutory revision following prior case law like State v. Williams, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing where the trial court could arrest judgment on either the kidnapping or one assault conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Mason, the defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, and first-degree kidnapping, challenging the trial court's limits on his in camera offer of proof under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 412, the prosecutor's closing arguments, and his separate sentencing for kidnapping alongside the sexual assault convictions. The court held that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in restricting questions during the Rule 412 hearing, as they did not seek admissible evidence of sexual behavior and the confrontation right is not unlimited. It further found the prosecutor's arguments improper but not grossly so or reversible, given the evidence of inconsistencies in a witness's testimony. Finally, the court ruled that the defendant could not be separately punished for first-degree kidnapping based on the same sexual assaults supporting the other convictions, requiring a new sentencing hearing where judgment could be arrested on one of the offenses.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Hamlet, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the defendant's convictions for felonious breaking or entering and larceny based solely on the doctrine of recent possession, absent any direct evidence linking the defendant to the crimes. The Court explained that the doctrine permits an inference of guilt when a defendant possesses stolen property sufficiently soon after the theft under the circumstances, with factors including the time elapsed, the nature of the items, and whether they are typically traded in lawful channels. Applying these principles to the evidence—stolen towels, linens, and other goods found in a car the defendant was driving 28 days after the break-in—the Court held that the passage of time and characteristics of the property did not support the presumption of guilt. The convictions were therefore reversed.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Long, the defendant challenged sentences above the presumptive terms for first-degree burglary and felonious assault convictions, claiming the trial court should have found a statutory mitigating factor based on his confession and should not have applied certain aggravating factors. The court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to the mitigating factor as a matter of right because his confession came after arrest, and the trial judge did not abuse discretion in refusing to treat the confession as sufficiently early. It remanded the burglary sentence for a new hearing because the judge had mistakenly applied a mandatory life term instead of the proper range for a Class C felony, and remanded the assault sentence because the young ages of the victims had not been shown to increase their vulnerability beyond that of an average person. The court affirmed the kidnapping sentences, which were below the presumptive term.

criminal lawprocedure