William A. Devin

The case involved petitioners seeking court approval under G.S. 41-11 to sell land (lot #6 from a 1913 partition of E.C. Prince's estate) for reinvestment, where contingent remainders existed in favor of unborn or unknown heirs. The Superior Court had allowed the sale on an ex parte petition by J.R. Barnes and his wife, who claimed ownership via a 1945 deed from some heirs and relied on prior proceedings and a guardian ad litem for contingents, but the Supreme Court reversed. The core reasoning was that the proceeding had a fatal defect of parties, as the statute requires service of summons on all persons then in being who might hold an interest, and the 1945 deed could not bind potential future takers who would inherit directly from the testator upon contingencies like Chester Prince dying without issue. The court held that without proper joinder of living heirs of E.C. Prince, the proceeding was ineffective despite arguments of estoppel, res judicata, or curative statutes.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Morgan, the defendant admitted shooting and killing the victim but claimed self-defense at trial; the jury convicted him of second-degree murder. On appeal, he challenged the exclusion of evidence showing the victim's specific 1952 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, certain other evidentiary rulings, and portions of the jury instructions on self-defense. The court held that only evidence of the victim's general reputation for violence (known to the defendant) is admissible to support a self-defense claim, not specific prior acts, and found the trial court's evidentiary rulings and instructions free of error. It therefore affirmed the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of the defendant for performing an abortion on Maline Brewington using instruments. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of expert medical testimony regarding the instruments' potential effect and the trial judge's questions to a defense witness about certain exhibits. The court determined that the expert's statement was not prejudicial error in light of the overall evidence and prior precedent, and that the judge's questions sought only clarification without indicating an opinion. Other assignments of error concerning jury instructions on reasonable doubt and corroborative evidence were also found to lack merit. The court therefore concluded there was no reversible error in the trial.

abortioncriminal law

This case concerned title to land originally conveyed in 1904 by the trustees of Washington Academy to the Board of School Trustees of the Town of Washington for nominal consideration, with language stating the property was to be held only so long as used for school purposes. After the original school building was removed and a new one built elsewhere, the successor school board sought to sell the property at public auction, leading to a dispute over whether the 1904 deed created a condition subsequent that would revert title or merely expressed the purpose of the conveyance. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the habendum clause did not impose a condition subsequent or reserve any right of re-entry, as the law requires clear language manifesting intent to create such a restriction, and a mere statement of purpose is insufficient. The court therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment that the board held fee simple title and could convey the property, noting that subsequent legislative action appointing trustees to release any remaining interest further supported this outcome.

property

The case Scarborough v. World Insurance Co. involved a dispute over whether a life insurance policy covered the death of Adrian C. Midgett, who died following an altercation in which he was the aggressor. The policy provided coverage only for deaths resulting directly from bodily injuries sustained through purely accidental means. The court determined that because the insured voluntarily initiated the confrontation with aggressive behavior, knowing or reasonably anticipating the risk of harm, his death did not qualify as resulting from accidental means under the policy terms. Consequently, the court reversed the lower court's judgment and granted the defendant's motion for nonsuit.

business & regulatory

This case involved personal injury claims by the plaintiffs against defendant Austin, the driver of a truck, and defendant Jernigan, the admitted owner, based on allegations that Austin's negligent operation proximately caused the accident. The plaintiffs relied on G.S. 20-71.1 to establish prima facie evidence of agency, allowing the case to reach the jury on respondeat superior liability. The court granted a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred by admitting two pieces of evidence on the agency issue: a portion of Austin's answer stating he drove with Jernigan's consent, and a hearsay statement by Austin that he was driving for his 'boss man.' These rulings were prejudicial to Jernigan because the evidence was incompetent to prove agency against him, even though the statute creates only prima facie and not conclusive evidence of employment scope.

torts & liabilityprocedure