William A. Devin

The case involved petitioners seeking court approval under G.S. 41-11 to sell land (lot #6 from a 1913 partition of E.C. Prince's estate) for reinvestment, where contingent remainders existed in favor of unborn or unknown heirs. The Superior Court had allowed the sale on an ex parte petition by J.R. Barnes and his wife, who claimed ownership via a 1945 deed from some heirs and relied on prior proceedings and a guardian ad litem for contingents, but the Supreme Court reversed. The core reasoning was that the proceeding had a fatal defect of parties, as the statute requires service of summons on all persons then in being who might hold an interest, and the 1945 deed could not bind potential future takers who would inherit directly from the testator upon contingencies like Chester Prince dying without issue. The court held that without proper joinder of living heirs of E.C. Prince, the proceeding was ineffective despite arguments of estoppel, res judicata, or curative statutes.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Morgan, the defendant admitted shooting and killing the victim but claimed self-defense at trial; the jury convicted him of second-degree murder. On appeal, he challenged the exclusion of evidence showing the victim's specific 1952 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, certain other evidentiary rulings, and portions of the jury instructions on self-defense. The court held that only evidence of the victim's general reputation for violence (known to the defendant) is admissible to support a self-defense claim, not specific prior acts, and found the trial court's evidentiary rulings and instructions free of error. It therefore affirmed the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of the defendant for performing an abortion on Maline Brewington using instruments. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of expert medical testimony regarding the instruments' potential effect and the trial judge's questions to a defense witness about certain exhibits. The court determined that the expert's statement was not prejudicial error in light of the overall evidence and prior precedent, and that the judge's questions sought only clarification without indicating an opinion. Other assignments of error concerning jury instructions on reasonable doubt and corroborative evidence were also found to lack merit. The court therefore concluded there was no reversible error in the trial.

abortioncriminal law

This case concerned title to land originally conveyed in 1904 by the trustees of Washington Academy to the Board of School Trustees of the Town of Washington for nominal consideration, with language stating the property was to be held only so long as used for school purposes. After the original school building was removed and a new one built elsewhere, the successor school board sought to sell the property at public auction, leading to a dispute over whether the 1904 deed created a condition subsequent that would revert title or merely expressed the purpose of the conveyance. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the habendum clause did not impose a condition subsequent or reserve any right of re-entry, as the law requires clear language manifesting intent to create such a restriction, and a mere statement of purpose is insufficient. The court therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment that the board held fee simple title and could convey the property, noting that subsequent legislative action appointing trustees to release any remaining interest further supported this outcome.

property

The case Scarborough v. World Insurance Co. involved a dispute over whether a life insurance policy covered the death of Adrian C. Midgett, who died following an altercation in which he was the aggressor. The policy provided coverage only for deaths resulting directly from bodily injuries sustained through purely accidental means. The court determined that because the insured voluntarily initiated the confrontation with aggressive behavior, knowing or reasonably anticipating the risk of harm, his death did not qualify as resulting from accidental means under the policy terms. Consequently, the court reversed the lower court's judgment and granted the defendant's motion for nonsuit.

business & regulatory

This case involved personal injury claims by the plaintiffs against defendant Austin, the driver of a truck, and defendant Jernigan, the admitted owner, based on allegations that Austin's negligent operation proximately caused the accident. The plaintiffs relied on G.S. 20-71.1 to establish prima facie evidence of agency, allowing the case to reach the jury on respondeat superior liability. The court granted a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred by admitting two pieces of evidence on the agency issue: a portion of Austin's answer stating he drove with Jernigan's consent, and a hearsay statement by Austin that he was driving for his 'boss man.' These rulings were prejudicial to Jernigan because the evidence was incompetent to prove agency against him, even though the statute creates only prima facie and not conclusive evidence of employment scope.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves plaintiffs seeking to establish a parol trust on a deed conveying absolute title, based on an alleged promise to reconvey that was made with fraudulent intent not to perform. The court applied established precedent limiting such trusts to cases involving fraud, mistake, or undue influence, but found the evidence insufficient to prove fraud. The trial court had granted a nonsuit, and the appellate court affirmed, ruling that the proof did not make out a case for the jury.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a junk dealer who sought a writ of mandamus to compel the city tax collector to issue a business license after the Burlington City Council revoked his prior license for violating local ordinances regulating junk yard operations. The trial court denied the writ, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that mandamus is available only to enforce a clear legal right to a purely ministerial duty and will not issue to compel an illegal act or where the validity of municipal ordinances would need to be tested in an action to which the city is not a party. It noted that the council had followed the procedures in its ordinances, which were authorized under the city's police power to regulate such businesses, and that the plaintiff had not shown compliance or a right to the license.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a criminal prosecution in which the defendant challenged the admission of evidence obtained through a search warrant. The court held that the warrant was invalid under G.S. 15-27 because no supporting affidavit appeared in the record and the required oath and examination of the complainant had not been properly documented. As a result, the statute rendered any evidence discovered through the illegal warrant incompetent, and its admission at trial was error. The defendant, who had not moved for nonsuit, was therefore entitled to a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a North Carolina zoning statute (G.S. 160-173) required a city to rezone all corners of a street intersection uniformly when the owner of one corner applied, specifically if a platted but unopened street extension created four corners. The plaintiff sought to restore his lot's industrial zoning after the city changed two corners to residential. The court held that the statute applied and the plaintiff was entitled to the rezoning via mandamus. The reasoning centered on the Deaton map's incorporation into the zoning ordinance, which established the intersection's four corners, and the city's acceptance of the dedication through official adoption and lot sales, distinguishing it from dead-end street precedents.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involves a tort action for private nuisance causing special damage, which had previously been upheld on demurrer. Following a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed, challenging the trial court's rulings on the admission and rejection of evidence as well as the judge's numerous questions to witnesses during testimony. The court affirmed the judgment, finding no prejudicial error in the evidentiary rulings and determining that the judge's questions did not convey any impression to the jury regarding witness credibility or the sufficiency of proof on any material fact. The court reasoned that while trial judges have authority to ask clarifying questions, such interruptions must not create an appearance of judicial bias, but here the issues were fairly presented without reversible error.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff's suit for personal injuries sustained when the defendant backed her automobile into the plaintiff, with the plaintiff appealing the trial court's admission of certain testimony and portions of its jury instructions on negligence. The court held that the trial judge committed no prejudicial error in these rulings or in the charge to the jury. It reasoned that the instructions adequately described the defendant's duty to maintain a continuous lookout while reversing and correctly explained concepts of foreseeability, proximate cause, and actionable negligence under North Carolina law. The court further noted that, absent evidence of concurring negligence by others, requiring the defendant's negligence to be the proximate cause did not impose an improper burden on the plaintiff. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed with no error found.

torts & liability

The case involved a defendant convicted on charges of possessing tax-paid whiskey for sale and selling tax-paid whiskey. On appeal, the defendant challenged rulings on the admission of testimony, the denial of a nonsuit motion, the jury instructions regarding the charges, and a post-notice modification to the sentence. The court reviewed the record and found that the evidentiary rulings were sustainable, the nonsuit denial was proper, the jury charge accurately presented the two counts for decision with the correct burden of proof, and any inadvertent references were promptly corrected without prejudice. The sentence change was deemed necessary due to the defendant's refusal to consent to terms rather than retaliatory. The court therefore held there was no error in the trial or judgment.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute over land purchased at an execution sale, where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had agreed beforehand to buy the property and hold title in trust for them rather than for their own benefit. The defendants moved for nonsuit, arguing the evidence showed only a parol agreement to purchase with an option to repurchase, but the trial court denied the motion and submitted the trust issue to the jury. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, was sufficient to support a finding of an express trust enforceable in equity because North Carolina has not adopted the seventh section of the Statute of Frauds. The court also upheld the jury's rejection of the defendants' unclean-hands defense based on an alleged intent to defeat a later federal tax lien. No other errors warranted disturbing the verdict and judgment.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a collision at an intersection where the plaintiff's car, entering on a green light, was struck by the defendant's truck. The trial court had commented on the lack of evidence for contributory negligence. The appellate court held that there was sufficient evidence that the plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout, so the issue should have been submitted to the jury without the judge's expression of opinion, warranting a new trial. The decision was based on the duty of drivers to exercise reasonable care regardless of traffic signals and the prohibition on judicial comments about evidence sufficiency under G.S. 1-180.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a negligence claim by plaintiff Tillman, a passenger in an automobile driven by Lindsay, against defendant Bellamy for injuries from a collision between the two vehicles. The trial court instructed the jury on the defendant's negligence and on whether Lindsay's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury but did not address the possibility that both drivers' negligence could have concurred as proximate causes. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that this omission violated the requirement under G.S. 1-180 to declare and explain the law on all material phases of the case arising on the evidence. The court granted a new trial, reasoning that when evidence supports concurring negligence by multiple parties, the jury must be instructed that the defendant remains liable unless the other driver's negligence was the sole proximate cause.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a deed conveying land to defendant David Carter in exchange for his promise to provide ongoing services to the grantor; the plaintiff alleged breach of this covenant and sought damages. The court held that the evidence supported a finding of breach and entitlement to at least nominal damages, but it identified error in the trial court's jury instructions on the second issue regarding the value of the unperformed services. The instructions improperly relied on an unsupported allegation in the complaint without evidence of the services' value, the plaintiff's actual losses, or the cost of obtaining equivalent services elsewhere, and failed to apply the correct measure of damages, which is the reasonable value of the promised support lost or the cost of substitute performance. Because no proper standard or data for calculating damages was provided, the court ordered a new trial.

propertyprocedure

In Worthington v. Wooten, the plaintiff attempted to bring a new action against the same defendants on the same subject matter that had already been addressed in a prior lawsuit. The trial court ruled that the plaintiff was estopped from proceeding because a previous judgment in the earlier case was valid and conclusive. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the prior judgment binds the parties not only on issues actually litigated but also on those that could properly have been litigated, provided the court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter. The court further noted that such a judgment cannot be collaterally attacked even if irregular or erroneous, and that estoppel by judgment may be applied when the necessary facts appear in the pleadings without requiring a formal plea in those exact terms.

procedure

This case involved a rear-end car collision on a highway where defendant Elbert Potter's vehicle struck a stopped truck owned by Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., and driven by Luther Cobb, which had itself stopped behind another parked car; plaintiff Norma Potter, a passenger in Potter's car, sued, and Potter filed a cross-action seeking contribution from the truck defendants as joint tort-feasors under G.S. 1-240. The trial court sustained the truck defendants' demurrer to the cross-complaint, and the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. The court held that the cross-complaint failed to allege facts showing the truck defendants were liable as joint tort-feasors because any negligence by the truck driver in stopping had ceased to be a proximate cause, and Potter's own failure to maintain a proper lookout and avoid the collision constituted the sole active negligence. The opinion emphasized that the statute requires allegations of concurrent negligence creating common liability, which were not present here as the truck was stationary and any prior fault was insulated by intervening acts.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a negligence action by plaintiff White against defendant Keller arising from a traffic accident where Keller's jeep and hay baler struck a parked car owned by Vander Linden and then a bridge, causing injury. Keller appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for nonsuit and the setting aside of the verdict, as well as the nonsuit of his cross-claim for contribution against Vander Linden. The court held that the setting aside of the verdict was within the trial judge's discretion and unreviewable, that the denial of nonsuit was not appealable without a final judgment, and that the evidence was insufficient to support a contribution claim against Vander Linden because his parked car's position did not proximately cause the accident. The rulings were affirmed, leaving the case pending for retrial between White and Keller.

proceduretorts & liability