Harry C. Martin

The case involved a tenured faculty member at Appalachian State University who sued university officials, claiming they retaliated against him for opposing the relocation and division of a historical collection, in violation of his free speech rights under the North Carolina Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals' rulings on defendants' summary judgment motions based on sovereign and qualified immunity. It held that most claims against the institutions and officials in their official capacities were barred by immunity under § 1983, but allowed claims for prospective injunctive relief and individual-capacity damages against one defendant to proceed, along with a direct state constitutional claim for monetary damages against that defendant in his official capacity. The core reasoning addressed distinctions between official and individual capacities, the non-applicability of sovereign immunity to certain § 1983 claims in state court, and the sufficiency of evidence showing a connection between the plaintiff's speech and the adverse actions taken against him.

free speechcivil rights

This case arose from a title insurance company's lawsuit against an attorney, his law firm, and a development company for fraud, conspiracy, negligence, breach of warranty, and unfair or deceptive practices under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, stemming from a fraudulent title certification that enabled an improper loan secured by land subject to restrictive covenants. The trial court entered judgments including trebled damages for unfair practices, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the North Carolina Supreme Court granted review. The court held for the first time that causes of action for unfair practices are not assignable, though the plaintiff could pursue the claim via subrogation to the bank's rights; it reversed the Court of Appeals as to the developer Southeastern Shelter Corporation and remanded for entry of a $34,364.38 judgment against it, while dismissing review as to the law firm. Other issues, such as motions for new trial and challenges to restrictive covenants, were rejected as lacking merit or improperly raised. The decision turned on statutory interpretation of assignability under the unfair practices law and principles of subrogation.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involved plaintiffs Marc Bryson and Lois Bryson filing claims against Rachel Sullivan, as administratrix of Millie Bryson's estate, seeking recovery for caregiving services provided to Millie before 1987 and alleging breach of fiduciary duty and self-dealing related to a reimbursement award Rachel obtained for her own caregiving. The claims followed a 1989 consent decree settling prior disputes between the parties over Millie's property and came after Rachel denied the new claims as barred by the decree, statutes of limitations, and res judicata. The trial court addressed Rachel's motions for sanctions under N.C. R. Civ. P. 11(a) for allegedly filing a complaint not well-grounded in fact or law and for improper purpose, as well as attorneys' fees under N.C.G.S. § 6-21.5. The court analyzed the timing and standards for imposing such sanctions, including that Rule 11 violations are assessed based on the circumstances at the time of signing and that fee awards may follow adjudication even after a voluntary dismissal, while distinguishing improper-purpose claims from legal-sufficiency requirements.

procedureproperty

In State v. Drdak, the defendant was charged after a single-vehicle crash, and the State sought to introduce hospital blood test results showing a blood alcohol concentration of 0.178 grams per milliliter that had been obtained through routine medical testing rather than police-ordered procedures. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the records, but the Court of Appeals reversed; the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed that decision and held the evidence admissible. The court reasoned that N.C.G.S. § 20-139.1(a) permits admission of blood alcohol evidence as "other competent evidence" without requiring compliance with the specific collection and testing protocols of N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2, that the physician-patient privilege did not bar disclosure after a court order, and that no due process violation occurred absent bad faith by the State in failing to preserve the sample. The court also rejected related evidentiary and constitutional claims concerning lay witness testimony and cross-examination.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an employment contract dispute where plaintiff J. Rex Davis sued his former employer and its owners for breach of an agreement providing for a fixed salary plus accrued percentage compensation (APC) based on company net income, payable upon termination or sale of the company, as well as an option to purchase. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants on claims for 25% of sale proceeds exceeding $2 million and contract reformation, but a jury awarded Davis $62,860.36 on the APC claim; the Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgments and reduced the award to $8,882.12. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the summary judgments and remanded those issues for trial, while also reinstating the full jury award, reasoning that the contract unambiguously required APC to be calculated per generally accepted accounting principles using income figures at termination and paid upon the earliest triggering event, and that disputes over the sale proceeds and calculation methods raised triable factual issues. The Court further held that the evidence supported the jury's full APC amount beyond the admitted underpayment.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a North Carolina resident employed as a plumber's helper who was injured on a construction site in Virginia when he contacted an exposed electrical wire and sued the electrical subcontractor for negligence, after receiving workers' compensation benefits under North Carolina law. The trial court dismissed the suit under Virginia's workers' compensation statute, which bars claims against subcontractors, applying the doctrine of lex loci delicti commissi. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal, holding that while Virginia substantive tort law governs the negligence claim, North Carolina law determines whether the exclusive remedy bar applies because the plaintiff is covered by the North Carolina statute and its associated bargain between employees and potential tortfeasors. The court reasoned that this approach respects the statutory framework protecting North Carolina workers and aligns with state public policy.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentprocedure