Harry C. Martin

The case involved a tenured faculty member at Appalachian State University who sued university officials, claiming they retaliated against him for opposing the relocation and division of a historical collection, in violation of his free speech rights under the North Carolina Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals' rulings on defendants' summary judgment motions based on sovereign and qualified immunity. It held that most claims against the institutions and officials in their official capacities were barred by immunity under § 1983, but allowed claims for prospective injunctive relief and individual-capacity damages against one defendant to proceed, along with a direct state constitutional claim for monetary damages against that defendant in his official capacity. The core reasoning addressed distinctions between official and individual capacities, the non-applicability of sovereign immunity to certain § 1983 claims in state court, and the sufficiency of evidence showing a connection between the plaintiff's speech and the adverse actions taken against him.

free speechcivil rights

This case arose from a title insurance company's lawsuit against an attorney, his law firm, and a development company for fraud, conspiracy, negligence, breach of warranty, and unfair or deceptive practices under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, stemming from a fraudulent title certification that enabled an improper loan secured by land subject to restrictive covenants. The trial court entered judgments including trebled damages for unfair practices, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the North Carolina Supreme Court granted review. The court held for the first time that causes of action for unfair practices are not assignable, though the plaintiff could pursue the claim via subrogation to the bank's rights; it reversed the Court of Appeals as to the developer Southeastern Shelter Corporation and remanded for entry of a $34,364.38 judgment against it, while dismissing review as to the law firm. Other issues, such as motions for new trial and challenges to restrictive covenants, were rejected as lacking merit or improperly raised. The decision turned on statutory interpretation of assignability under the unfair practices law and principles of subrogation.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involved plaintiffs Marc Bryson and Lois Bryson filing claims against Rachel Sullivan, as administratrix of Millie Bryson's estate, seeking recovery for caregiving services provided to Millie before 1987 and alleging breach of fiduciary duty and self-dealing related to a reimbursement award Rachel obtained for her own caregiving. The claims followed a 1989 consent decree settling prior disputes between the parties over Millie's property and came after Rachel denied the new claims as barred by the decree, statutes of limitations, and res judicata. The trial court addressed Rachel's motions for sanctions under N.C. R. Civ. P. 11(a) for allegedly filing a complaint not well-grounded in fact or law and for improper purpose, as well as attorneys' fees under N.C.G.S. § 6-21.5. The court analyzed the timing and standards for imposing such sanctions, including that Rule 11 violations are assessed based on the circumstances at the time of signing and that fee awards may follow adjudication even after a voluntary dismissal, while distinguishing improper-purpose claims from legal-sufficiency requirements.

procedureproperty

In State v. Drdak, the defendant was charged after a single-vehicle crash, and the State sought to introduce hospital blood test results showing a blood alcohol concentration of 0.178 grams per milliliter that had been obtained through routine medical testing rather than police-ordered procedures. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the records, but the Court of Appeals reversed; the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed that decision and held the evidence admissible. The court reasoned that N.C.G.S. § 20-139.1(a) permits admission of blood alcohol evidence as "other competent evidence" without requiring compliance with the specific collection and testing protocols of N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2, that the physician-patient privilege did not bar disclosure after a court order, and that no due process violation occurred absent bad faith by the State in failing to preserve the sample. The court also rejected related evidentiary and constitutional claims concerning lay witness testimony and cross-examination.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an employment contract dispute where plaintiff J. Rex Davis sued his former employer and its owners for breach of an agreement providing for a fixed salary plus accrued percentage compensation (APC) based on company net income, payable upon termination or sale of the company, as well as an option to purchase. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants on claims for 25% of sale proceeds exceeding $2 million and contract reformation, but a jury awarded Davis $62,860.36 on the APC claim; the Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgments and reduced the award to $8,882.12. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the summary judgments and remanded those issues for trial, while also reinstating the full jury award, reasoning that the contract unambiguously required APC to be calculated per generally accepted accounting principles using income figures at termination and paid upon the earliest triggering event, and that disputes over the sale proceeds and calculation methods raised triable factual issues. The Court further held that the evidence supported the jury's full APC amount beyond the admitted underpayment.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a North Carolina resident employed as a plumber's helper who was injured on a construction site in Virginia when he contacted an exposed electrical wire and sued the electrical subcontractor for negligence, after receiving workers' compensation benefits under North Carolina law. The trial court dismissed the suit under Virginia's workers' compensation statute, which bars claims against subcontractors, applying the doctrine of lex loci delicti commissi. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal, holding that while Virginia substantive tort law governs the negligence claim, North Carolina law determines whether the exclusive remedy bar applies because the plaintiff is covered by the North Carolina statute and its associated bargain between employees and potential tortfeasors. The court reasoned that this approach respects the statutory framework protecting North Carolina workers and aligns with state public policy.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a consumer who sued a car dealership for fraudulently failing to make payments on a traded-in vehicle as promised, obtaining a default judgment that included treble damages and attorney fees under North Carolina's unfair or deceptive practices statute (N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 and § 75-16). The plaintiff then sought to collect the full award from the dealership's surety bond, which is required under N.C.G.S. § 20-288(e) to cover consumer losses from dealer violations of motor vehicle laws. The trial court and Court of Appeals granted summary judgment against the surety for the entire amount, but the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding the surety liable only for the actual compensatory damages. The core reasoning was that the bond statute covers only losses actually "suffered" by the consumer due to the dealer's violations, while treble damages and attorney fees are statutory enhancements not constituting such losses, and the surety could assert this limitation defense independently.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved Carl Smiley Wynne, who was convicted of first-degree murder and kidnapping of Aaron Parker, a mentally retarded black man, after an assault at a mobile home that included racial slurs and ended with the victim's death by stabbing; Wynne received a death sentence. The North Carolina Supreme Court found no errors in the guilt phase of the trial, including in jury selection regarding capital punishment views under Wainwright v. Witt standards. However, it vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding due to McKoy error in the jury instructions on mitigating circumstances, which required unanimity among jurors for findings of mitigation. The court reasoned that this violated federal constitutional requirements and that factors like the defendant's age and criminal history did not support submission of certain mitigators to the jury.

criminal law

The case arose when plaintiff Rogers was stopped and detained for about 35 minutes by a T.J. Maxx security officer who suspected her of shoplifting lingerie, though she had not entered that department or taken any merchandise. She sued T.J.X. Companies and the officer for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress, seeking compensatory and punitive damages; the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims, the Court of Appeals affirmed on punitive damages, and the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed only that issue. The court held that summary judgment on punitive damages was improper because the plaintiff's evidence, viewed favorably, showed sufficient aggravating conduct beyond the detention itself, including the officer's use of a self-designed badge, repeated badgering and insults, threats of handcuffing and arrest, continued detention after innocence was clear, and coercion to sign an unfilled liability release. This forecast demonstrated willful and wanton disregard for her rights, creating a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The decision reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Donna Jones Arnold, who was indicted for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder after her husband was stabbed to death in a church parking lot by Carl Stuffel, a man with whom she had an affair and who had lived with the family. Following a trial, the jury convicted Arnold of second-degree murder and conspiracy, leading to consecutive prison sentences. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in submitting second-degree murder as a possible verdict and reversed that conviction while affirming the conspiracy conviction. The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed with the Court of Appeals on both points and affirmed its decision. The core reasoning centered on whether the evidence supported instructing the jury on second-degree murder and whether Arnold had sufficiently counseled or procured Stuffel to commit the killing as an accessory before the fact.

criminal law

In State v. Moore, a Black defendant charged with first-degree murder moved to quash his indictment on the ground that the grand jury foreman had been selected through a racially discriminatory process, in violation of article I, sections 19 and 26 of the North Carolina Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, and the Court of Appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the defendant had standing to raise the claim because article I, section 26 protects the integrity of the judicial system itself, not merely the outcome of any particular case, and that the deliberate appointment of a Black foreman solely on the basis of race was not a racially neutral selection method. Because the indictment was therefore invalid, the court quashed it, vacated the conviction and sentence, and allowed the State to seek a new indictment.

criminal lawcivil rights

In this North Carolina divorce case, the plaintiff sought an absolute divorce along with alimony and equitable distribution of marital property; after the divorce was granted, the trial court appointed a real estate appraiser under Evidence Rule 706 to value the properties and ordered the parties to split the appraiser's fees. The defendant challenged the appointment because the appraiser did not meet the qualifications specified in an earlier order and objected to the amount and allocation of the $5,500 appraisal fee plus a $250 testimony fee. The Supreme Court held that the appointment was valid under Rule 706(a), the appraiser was properly allowed to testify and receive reasonable compensation for appraisal work under Rule 706(b), but no fee could be awarded for testimony given without a subpoena; it therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals' ruling on these issues.

family lawpropertyprocedure

In State v. Turnage, Jerry Wayne Turnage was convicted of second-degree murder for the shooting death of his estranged wife Carolyn Turnage. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision that had overturned the conviction on grounds that the state's evidence failed to contradict the defendant's extrajudicial statements claiming the shooting was accidental. The Court held that circumstantial evidence of prior domestic violence, inconsistencies between the defendant's statements and physical evidence such as the bullet path, lack of powder burns, the gun's safety mechanism, and the victim's defensive posture, along with the defendant's post-shooting statements, was sufficient to allow a jury to find intent rather than accident.

criminal lawgunsfamily law

The case involved Jean Bullard Brewer, who was convicted of first-degree murder for driving her mentally handicapped sixteen-year-old daughter onto railroad tracks in her car, centering it in the path of an oncoming train, and then exiting the vehicle before the train struck and killed the passenger. The defendant appealed from her life sentence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support first-degree murder and that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on second-degree murder. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the State presented substantial evidence of each element—including premeditation and deliberation shown by the defendant's deliberate positioning of the car, her exit from it, and motive evidence regarding the burden of caring for her daughter—and that no evidence supported submission of the lesser offense. The court held there was no trial error.

criminal law

The case concerned a 1987 lawsuit by Sunamerica Financial Corp. to recover $1,313.97 allegedly loaned to defendant Bonham under a 1977 consumer credit contract for stereo equipment, with the complaint served in 1989. Defendant moved for summary judgment, raising the four-year UCC statute of limitations under N.C.G.S. § 25-2-725 as an affirmative defense, and sought attorney's fees under N.C.G.S. § 6-21.5. The trial court granted summary judgment and awarded $300 in fees, finding a complete absence of a justiciable issue because the claim accrued no later than 1979 and was filed years after the 1983 deadline, with no facts supporting tolling. The Court of Appeals and North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute authorizing fees must be strictly construed and that plaintiff's filings and affidavits showed no good-faith argument for extension or modification of law.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Roy Burt Enterprises, Inc. v. Marsh, a seller sued buyers for unpaid amounts on fertilizer purchases, and the buyer responded with a verified letter asserting that the fertilizer was contaminated and had damaged his crops, land, pond, animals, and health. The trial court granted summary judgment to the seller on the account, which the Court of Appeals affirmed as to defendant Waymon Marsh. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact existed. The court reasoned that the buyer's evidence created triable questions under the UCC as to whether acceptance had been revoked within a reasonable time after discovery of the nonconformity, before any substantial change in the goods, and with adequate notice to the seller.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Sanchez, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after a jury found him guilty based on premeditation and deliberation; the case centered on the admissibility and weight of his confession to police, which he gave after receiving Miranda warnings in Spanish. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court committed prejudicial error by excluding expert psychological testimony that the defendant, due to limited intelligence and other factors, did not understand his Miranda rights and thus could not validly waive them. The court reasoned that while the trial judge had ruled the confession admissible, North Carolina Rule of Evidence 104(e) permits a party to introduce otherwise competent evidence to the jury concerning the weight or credibility of that evidence, including circumstances surrounding the waiver. The majority distinguished this from improper testimony on the ultimate legal issue of voluntariness, ordering a new trial without addressing other claims of error.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In State v. Mash, the defendant was retried and convicted of first-degree murder for the 1986 beating death of Randall Cupp, receiving a life sentence after an earlier death sentence was reversed on appeal. The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed claims of error from the second trial, including restrictions on jury voir dire about impartiality and attitudes toward alcohol and expert testimony, denial of a venue change due to pretrial publicity, limits on opening statements, and the sufficiency of evidence for premeditation and deliberation given the defendant's intoxication. The court held that the trial judge acted within its discretion in controlling voir dire and opening statements, that the defendant failed to show prejudice or meet the burden for venue change, and that substantial circumstantial evidence supported the jury's findings on the elements of the crime despite intoxication. All assignments of error were overruled, resulting in a finding of no prejudicial error in the trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved post-divorce proceedings in which the defendant sought appointment of a guardian ad litem under Rule 17 due to mental health issues, over the plaintiff's objection that incompetency determinations must follow Chapter 35A procedures exclusively. The district court appointed the guardian after an evidentiary hearing, but the Court of Appeals vacated the order on the Chapter 35A ground. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the plaintiff lacked standing as an aggrieved party because the appointment did not directly injure his rights and any potential future harm was speculative, and that the interlocutory order was not immediately appealable absent a showing that it affected a substantial right.

family lawprocedure

This case is a shareholders' derivative action in which the trial court, after remand, approved a proposed settlement of some claims, entered judgment for defendants on others, and dismissed the suit. Defendants challenged subject matter jurisdiction on grounds that the complaint was not properly verified at filing, as required by N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 23(b), and that the later verification was invalid because it was notarized by an attorney of record. The court held that the verification requirement is procedural rather than jurisdictional, that defendants had waived any objection by failing to raise it during years of litigation, and that the trial court therefore had authority to proceed with the case.

business & regulatoryprocedure