John Webb

The case concerned whether the City of Durham could impose stormwater utility fees on property owners, including churches, to fund its full stormwater management program, which included pollution reduction efforts beyond physical infrastructure. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that N.C.G.S. §§ 160A-311 and -314 did not authorize fees to finance the entire program but that Article XIV, Section 5 of the North Carolina Constitution provided independent authority for the city to regulate water pollution and, as a supplementary power, to assess fees reasonably necessary to carry out that function. The court reasoned that the fees, calculated based on impervious surface area, were a valid exercise of this authority to comply with federal water quality requirements. The opinion also addressed administration of the fees under the statutes and rejected challenges to the calculation method.

environmentproperty

Ellen Bring challenged the North Carolina State Bar Council's refusal to approve her law school, New College, preventing her from sitting for the bar exam under Rule .0702, which requires graduation from an approved school. She argued that N.C.G.S. § 84-24 unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the Board of Law Examiners without adequate standards, violating Article I, Section 6 and Article II, Section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, and that the denial was arbitrary and capricious. The Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the statute and the Council's decision, holding that the legislative goals of promoting the welfare of the state and profession, combined with procedural safeguards, provided sufficient guidance under precedents like Adams v. N.C. Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources and prior bar admission cases. The court rejected claims of unconstitutional delegation or arbitrary action, noting the Board's expertise in evaluating qualifications.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned an interlocutory order from the superior court granting summary judgment on some but not all claims between DKH CORP. and Rankin-Patterson Oil Co. The North Carolina Supreme Court examined the impact of N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) on the appealability of such an order when the trial court certifies no just reason for delay. The court decided that the Court of Appeals was required to hear the appeal under the rule's language stating the judgment shall be subject to review, reversing the dismissal and remanding for a merits decision. The reasoning relied on the rule's text, its adoption under constitutional authority, and prior interpretations distinguishing it from other appeal statutes.

procedure

The case involved the City of Charlotte's condemnation of private land to construct a water supply pipeline, with the dispute centering on whether the city could take a fee simple estate or only an easement. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the city could condemn a fee simple interest in the property. The court reasoned that eminent domain is a sovereign power, the legislature determines the extent of the taking, and judicial review is limited to whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion; here, expert testimony on the need for full control supported the city's choice, and conflicting evidence did not show arbitrariness. The court also noted related benefits, such as enabling lower-cost electricity for the project.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Zuniga, the defendant, convicted of murder and rape and facing a capital sentence, challenged the trial court's failure to submit the statutory mitigating circumstance of his age under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7). The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court was required to submit this mitigator because expert testimony provided substantial evidence of the defendant's mild mental retardation, organic brain damage, and low mental age (equivalent to 7-10 years old) despite his chronological age of 27-30. The court reasoned that chronological age alone is not determinative and that such evidence of immaturity or impaired development must be considered by the jury, and it further held that the omission was reversible error not shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since statutory mitigators require separate consideration. As a result, the defendant was entitled to a new capital sentencing proceeding.

criminal law

In Griffin v. Griffin, the case centered on whether an attorney, Charles Henderson, received adequate notice before a district court imposed sanctions on him for filing pleadings in an adoption proceeding. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the sanctions order violated due process because Henderson had been notified only that sanctions might be sought for the adoption petition itself, yet sanctions were ultimately imposed for other filings without prior warning of those specific grounds. The Court reasoned that constitutional due process requires advance notice of the exact charges or bases for sanctions before depriving a person of property, and that post-hearing findings or general awareness of possible sanctions do not suffice when the notice was misleading. It therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the sanctions order.

procedurefamily lawcivil rights