John Webb

The case concerned whether the City of Durham could impose stormwater utility fees on property owners, including churches, to fund its full stormwater management program, which included pollution reduction efforts beyond physical infrastructure. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that N.C.G.S. §§ 160A-311 and -314 did not authorize fees to finance the entire program but that Article XIV, Section 5 of the North Carolina Constitution provided independent authority for the city to regulate water pollution and, as a supplementary power, to assess fees reasonably necessary to carry out that function. The court reasoned that the fees, calculated based on impervious surface area, were a valid exercise of this authority to comply with federal water quality requirements. The opinion also addressed administration of the fees under the statutes and rejected challenges to the calculation method.

environmentproperty

Ellen Bring challenged the North Carolina State Bar Council's refusal to approve her law school, New College, preventing her from sitting for the bar exam under Rule .0702, which requires graduation from an approved school. She argued that N.C.G.S. § 84-24 unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the Board of Law Examiners without adequate standards, violating Article I, Section 6 and Article II, Section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, and that the denial was arbitrary and capricious. The Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the statute and the Council's decision, holding that the legislative goals of promoting the welfare of the state and profession, combined with procedural safeguards, provided sufficient guidance under precedents like Adams v. N.C. Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources and prior bar admission cases. The court rejected claims of unconstitutional delegation or arbitrary action, noting the Board's expertise in evaluating qualifications.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned an interlocutory order from the superior court granting summary judgment on some but not all claims between DKH CORP. and Rankin-Patterson Oil Co. The North Carolina Supreme Court examined the impact of N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) on the appealability of such an order when the trial court certifies no just reason for delay. The court decided that the Court of Appeals was required to hear the appeal under the rule's language stating the judgment shall be subject to review, reversing the dismissal and remanding for a merits decision. The reasoning relied on the rule's text, its adoption under constitutional authority, and prior interpretations distinguishing it from other appeal statutes.

procedure

The case involved the City of Charlotte's condemnation of private land to construct a water supply pipeline, with the dispute centering on whether the city could take a fee simple estate or only an easement. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the city could condemn a fee simple interest in the property. The court reasoned that eminent domain is a sovereign power, the legislature determines the extent of the taking, and judicial review is limited to whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion; here, expert testimony on the need for full control supported the city's choice, and conflicting evidence did not show arbitrariness. The court also noted related benefits, such as enabling lower-cost electricity for the project.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Zuniga, the defendant, convicted of murder and rape and facing a capital sentence, challenged the trial court's failure to submit the statutory mitigating circumstance of his age under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7). The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court was required to submit this mitigator because expert testimony provided substantial evidence of the defendant's mild mental retardation, organic brain damage, and low mental age (equivalent to 7-10 years old) despite his chronological age of 27-30. The court reasoned that chronological age alone is not determinative and that such evidence of immaturity or impaired development must be considered by the jury, and it further held that the omission was reversible error not shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since statutory mitigators require separate consideration. As a result, the defendant was entitled to a new capital sentencing proceeding.

criminal law

In Griffin v. Griffin, the case centered on whether an attorney, Charles Henderson, received adequate notice before a district court imposed sanctions on him for filing pleadings in an adoption proceeding. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the sanctions order violated due process because Henderson had been notified only that sanctions might be sought for the adoption petition itself, yet sanctions were ultimately imposed for other filings without prior warning of those specific grounds. The Court reasoned that constitutional due process requires advance notice of the exact charges or bases for sanctions before depriving a person of property, and that post-hearing findings or general awareness of possible sanctions do not suffice when the notice was misleading. It therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the sanctions order.

procedurefamily lawcivil rights

The case concerned the application of the 'thin skull' rule in a tort action where the plaintiff sought damages for severe emotional distress, including a flashback triggered by her preexisting dissociative disorder, allegedly caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct. The trial court allowed recovery of full damages under the rule after the jury found liability, and the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals to reinstate that judgment. The court reasoned that evidence supported a finding that the conduct could have caused severe distress in a person of ordinary mental condition, and the jury instructions properly required such a determination before applying the thin skull rule to extend liability for the plaintiff's unusual susceptibility. The instructions were deemed adequate even though given in the damages portion of the charge, as the jury was presumed to have followed them, and no prejudice resulted.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Pearson, the defendant was stopped by state troopers on an interstate highway after officers observed a slight odor of alcohol and noted nervous behavior and inconsistent statements about his whereabouts; a subsequent frisk revealed contraband in his pants, leading to charges. The superior court upheld the search based on consent to search the vehicle, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the seizure as a lawful protective frisk under Terry v. Ohio without relying on consent. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the totality of circumstances—including the defendant's cooperative demeanor, the minor odor of alcohol, ordinary nervousness, and lack of any indication of weapons or prior criminal history—did not support a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or that the defendant was armed and dangerous, and that the vehicle consent form did not extend to his person.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether inculpatory statements made by the defendant during police questioning were admissible at his murder trial. The court held that the defendant was in custody when he stated he thought he needed a lawyer present, that this statement was a clear invocation of his right to counsel, and that officers should have ceased questioning. Because the statements were obtained after the invocation and without counsel or initiation by the defendant, they were improperly admitted. The court concluded the error was not harmless and ordered a new trial.

criminal law

The case concerned whether North Carolina's restrictions on funding medically necessary abortions for Medicaid-eligible women violated the state constitution, after the legislature limited payments from the State Abortion Fund while continuing to fund other medical services including childbirth. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims. The court held that indigent women do not constitute a suspect class and that there is no fundamental right to state-funded abortions, applying rational basis review. It concluded that encouraging childbirth is a legitimate governmental objective rationally advanced by the funding restrictions, without violating provisions such as Article I, Sections 1 and 19, or Article XI, Section 4 of the North Carolina Constitution.

abortionhealthcarecivil rights

In State v. Gray, the defendant was tried and convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, he challenged a pretrial statement by the trial judge to the jury about the court reporter's role in creating a record for Supreme Court review, as well as the excusal for cause of five prospective jurors whose views on capital punishment were deemed to substantially impair their ability to serve. The North Carolina Supreme Court overruled both assignments of error, holding that the judge's comment did not improperly dilute the jury's sense of responsibility and that the record supported the excusals under Wainwright v. Witt standards. The court further conducted a proportionality review and concluded that the death sentence was not disproportionate to sentences imposed in comparable cases involving similar aggravating circumstances.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a defendant's appeal from his conviction and death sentence for the murders of a father and his two young sons in North Carolina. The court addressed multiple claims of error, including challenges to the jury selection process for the death penalty phase, the admission of evidence regarding the father's murder as intertwined with the charged crimes, the testimony of state witnesses regarding prior statements, and the jury's rejection of mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court overruled all assignments of error, holding that the jury questions were straightforward and proper, the evidence was admissible under rules allowing intertwined crimes, witness statements were appropriately limited by instructions, and the death sentence was proportionate given the facts of the triple murder involving kidnapping and cruelty. The court affirmed the verdict and found no error in the trial proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a registered nurse, Leahy, challenging the North Carolina Board of Nursing's revocation of her license for inadequate documentation of patient treatment, failure to recognize congestive heart failure symptoms, not notifying a doctor promptly, and improper prioritization during emergencies involving two patients. The court applied the whole record test to assess whether substantial evidence supported the Board's findings of fact and considered whether expert testimony was needed to define the nursing standard of care. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, concluding that testimony from witnesses provided adequate support for the findings and that the Board could use its specialized knowledge and experience under N.C.G.S. § 150B-41(d) to evaluate compliance with nursing standards without separate expert evidence.

healthcareprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether Avery County had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Water Supply Watershed Protection Act (WSWPA) and whether the Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the Environmental Management Commission (EMC). The North Carolina Supreme Court held that Avery County had standing because it was not accepting benefits under the challenged statute. The Court further ruled that the WSWPA was constitutional, finding adequate legislative standards and procedural safeguards to guide the EMC, and that an unconstitutional 1993 amendment exempting one watershed could be severed without invalidating the rest of the Act. The decision reversed the Court of Appeals.

environmentcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a capital sentencing hearing in which, after the jury had begun deliberations, the trial court excused one juror and replaced her with an alternate, then instructed the jury to start over; the court also excluded expert testimony that the defendant would not pose a danger in prison. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the substitution violated the state constitutional right to a jury of twelve and was barred by statutes governing alternate jurors in criminal and capital cases, which require their discharge once deliberations begin and limit their use before penalty-phase deliberations start. The court further concluded that the excluded expert opinion was relevant under U.S. Supreme Court precedent and should have been admitted to assist the jury. Because the improper substitution required reversal, the court ordered a new capital sentencing proceeding without reaching harmless-error analysis on the testimony issue.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Skeels, the defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and armed robbery, along with related charges, arguing errors including insufficient evidence for kidnapping, failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter, inconsistent verdicts, and improper prosecutorial comments. The court arrested judgment on the kidnapping conviction due to a lack of evidence showing unlawful confinement or removal of the victim without consent. It affirmed the other convictions, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence for armed robbery, that any error in manslaughter instructions was harmless given the premeditation verdict, no inconsistency in the verdicts, and that the prosecutor's statements did not improperly comment on the defendant's silence. The court also held there was no abuse of discretion in delaying a ruling on a motion to dismiss an attempted robbery charge.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a criminal trial in which the defendant was convicted based primarily on the testimony of an eyewitness who faced pending forgery and uttering charges in the same prosecutorial district, with those trials continued for eighteen months. The trial court barred the defendant from cross-examining the witness about those charges or any expectation of favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony. Relying on Davis v. Alaska, the appellate court held that the restriction violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights because the pending charges could suggest state leverage over the witness and potential bias, which the jury needed to assess for credibility. The court concluded the error was not harmless and ordered a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with first-degree murder by torture after he participated in prolonged abuse of a victim, including beatings, burns with a soldering iron and torch, and carving into the victim's skin. The defendant argued that evidence was insufficient for the charge because he had left the residence days before the victim died from being bound, gagged, and confined in a closet by others. The court decided that the trial court did not err in submitting the murder by torture theory to the jury. The core reasoning was that murder by torture requires only that the defendant intentionally inflicted grievous pain and suffering as part of a course of conduct and that this was a proximate cause of death, regardless of intervening acts or lack of premeditation; the defendant's participation formed part of the ongoing pattern leading to the victim's death.

criminal law

This case addressed whether the filing of a civil juvenile petition alleging abuse and neglect initiates adversarial proceedings that trigger a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that it does not and reversed the superior court and Court of Appeals decisions suppressing the defendant's statement. The court reasoned that under Kirby v. Illinois, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only when formal criminal proceedings begin, as that is when the government commits to prosecution, and a civil abuse and neglect petition does not meet this standard or intertwine with criminal proceedings in a way that would invoke the protection. The court further concluded that no statutory right to counsel was violated in this context. The case was remanded for consideration of the defendant's Fifth Amendment and state constitutional claims.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

This case involved class actions by retired state and local government employees in North Carolina challenging reductions in their disability retirement benefits due to statutory changes. The plaintiffs argued that the reductions violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution by impairing vested contractual rights to benefits calculated under prior law. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that the relationship between employees and the retirement systems was contractual, as benefits were earned compensation (delayed salaries) rather than gratuities, and the statutory reservation of amendment rights applied only to coordinating with Social Security changes. The court held that the benefit reductions impaired the contracts without a reasonable and necessary justification for an important public purpose, and it upheld class certification for affected retirees while rejecting expansion to future disabled employees.

labor & employmentcivil rights