Yvette McGee Brown

The case involved residential customers of electric utilities CEI and Ohio Edison, subsidiaries of FirstEnergy, who sued in common pleas court alleging fraud, breach of contract, and related claims after the companies ended longstanding discounted rates for all-electric homes that had been approved and later modified by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO). The customers claimed the utilities had promised the discounts would continue as long as the homes remained all-electric, but the utilities unilaterally terminated them in 2009 following PUCO orders that consolidated rate schedules and introduced mitigating credits. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over the fraud claim because it was not a pure tort but instead challenged the reasonableness and lawfulness of utility rates and practices, matters committed to PUCO's exclusive authority under R.C. 4905.26. The court reasoned that special discount rates are a commission-authorized practice, and complaints about overcharges or rate propriety must be resolved by the commission regardless of how the claim is labeled. It therefore reversed the appeals court and reinstated the trial court's dismissal of the fraud claim.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claimant, Jeff Holmes, who sought participation in the Ohio fund for multiple work-related injuries sustained from an electrical shock, after administrative denials and appeals. A jury allowed participation for only one minor condition (an abrasion), leading Holmes to request reimbursement of attorney fees and costs under R.C. 4123.512(F) for the full appeal. The trial court awarded the costs without apportioning them based on the outcomes for each condition, but the court of appeals reversed. The Ohio Supreme Court held that once a claimant's right to participate is established on appeal, the statute requires the trial court to award costs using effort expended as the criterion, without requiring apportionment by individual claim or condition. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the full costs.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved disciplinary proceedings against attorney James W. Westfall Jr. by the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, which filed a seven-count complaint alleging multiple violations of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct. The violations included failures to communicate with clients, improper handling of client fees and withdrawals from representation, misleading communications about his law firm, failure to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation, and failure to remit payroll taxes for employees. After a hearing, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline found most of the alleged violations proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the board's recommendation and imposed a two-year suspension from the practice of law, with six months stayed, contingent on conditions including restitution to clients and compliance with tax obligations.

business & regulatorytaxesprocedure

The case concerned whether the federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) preempted the City of Girard's eminent domain action to acquire 41.5 acres of vacant land (Mosier Yard) owned by Youngstown Belt Railway Company, which the city intended for a landfill and which contained no active tracks or rights-of-way. The railway company claimed preemption because the taking would interfere with its speculative future plans for rail-related industrial development, including a potential agreement with a buyer to haul debris. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the ICCTA did not preempt the proceedings, ruling that the trial court had jurisdiction to decide the issue and that the city's action would not unreasonably burden rail transportation given the undeveloped nature of the parcel and the vagueness of the railway's intentions. The court reversed the appellate judgment finding preemption and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

federal powerpropertybusiness & regulatory

In this medical malpractice case, plaintiff Margaret Branch sued the Cleveland Clinic after suffering a stroke during deep-brain stimulation surgery for cervical dystonia, alleging the surgeon struck a ventricle and caused permanent injuries. After a jury verdict for the clinic, the court of appeals reversed based on three claimed trial court errors: permitting late introduction of a computer simulation recreating the surgery, barring an adverse inference argument about an unsaved pre-surgery brain map, and giving a jury instruction that evidence of alternative treatment methods is not proof of negligence. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and reinstated the verdict, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in any of the three rulings because the demonstrative evidence was based on retained notes, no recognized alternative methods were shown to justify an adverse inference, and the instruction was appropriate given the parties' disputes over surgical choices. The core reasoning focused on the limited scope of appellate review of discretionary evidentiary and instructional decisions when supported by the record.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Billiter, the defendant was originally sentenced in 1998 for aggravated burglary and domestic violence with an incorrect term of postrelease control (up to three years instead of the required five years under statute). After release, he was supervised under postrelease control, later pled guilty to escape for violating its terms in 2004, and received a prison sentence. Years later, he sought to withdraw his escape plea, arguing the conviction was void because the flawed postrelease control meant he was not legally under detention. The Ohio Supreme Court held that res judicata does not bar a collateral attack on the escape conviction when the underlying postrelease control sentence was improper, as the error rendered that portion of the sentence void and unenforceable. The core reasoning was that a statutorily mandated term of postrelease control cannot be imposed incorrectly without affecting the validity of subsequent enforcement actions like escape prosecutions.

criminal lawprocedure