Yvette McGee Brown

The case involved residential customers of electric utilities CEI and Ohio Edison, subsidiaries of FirstEnergy, who sued in common pleas court alleging fraud, breach of contract, and related claims after the companies ended longstanding discounted rates for all-electric homes that had been approved and later modified by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO). The customers claimed the utilities had promised the discounts would continue as long as the homes remained all-electric, but the utilities unilaterally terminated them in 2009 following PUCO orders that consolidated rate schedules and introduced mitigating credits. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over the fraud claim because it was not a pure tort but instead challenged the reasonableness and lawfulness of utility rates and practices, matters committed to PUCO's exclusive authority under R.C. 4905.26. The court reasoned that special discount rates are a commission-authorized practice, and complaints about overcharges or rate propriety must be resolved by the commission regardless of how the claim is labeled. It therefore reversed the appeals court and reinstated the trial court's dismissal of the fraud claim.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claimant, Jeff Holmes, who sought participation in the Ohio fund for multiple work-related injuries sustained from an electrical shock, after administrative denials and appeals. A jury allowed participation for only one minor condition (an abrasion), leading Holmes to request reimbursement of attorney fees and costs under R.C. 4123.512(F) for the full appeal. The trial court awarded the costs without apportioning them based on the outcomes for each condition, but the court of appeals reversed. The Ohio Supreme Court held that once a claimant's right to participate is established on appeal, the statute requires the trial court to award costs using effort expended as the criterion, without requiring apportionment by individual claim or condition. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the full costs.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved disciplinary proceedings against attorney James W. Westfall Jr. by the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, which filed a seven-count complaint alleging multiple violations of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct. The violations included failures to communicate with clients, improper handling of client fees and withdrawals from representation, misleading communications about his law firm, failure to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation, and failure to remit payroll taxes for employees. After a hearing, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline found most of the alleged violations proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the board's recommendation and imposed a two-year suspension from the practice of law, with six months stayed, contingent on conditions including restitution to clients and compliance with tax obligations.

business & regulatorytaxesprocedure

The case concerned whether the federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) preempted the City of Girard's eminent domain action to acquire 41.5 acres of vacant land (Mosier Yard) owned by Youngstown Belt Railway Company, which the city intended for a landfill and which contained no active tracks or rights-of-way. The railway company claimed preemption because the taking would interfere with its speculative future plans for rail-related industrial development, including a potential agreement with a buyer to haul debris. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the ICCTA did not preempt the proceedings, ruling that the trial court had jurisdiction to decide the issue and that the city's action would not unreasonably burden rail transportation given the undeveloped nature of the parcel and the vagueness of the railway's intentions. The court reversed the appellate judgment finding preemption and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

federal powerpropertybusiness & regulatory

In this medical malpractice case, plaintiff Margaret Branch sued the Cleveland Clinic after suffering a stroke during deep-brain stimulation surgery for cervical dystonia, alleging the surgeon struck a ventricle and caused permanent injuries. After a jury verdict for the clinic, the court of appeals reversed based on three claimed trial court errors: permitting late introduction of a computer simulation recreating the surgery, barring an adverse inference argument about an unsaved pre-surgery brain map, and giving a jury instruction that evidence of alternative treatment methods is not proof of negligence. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and reinstated the verdict, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in any of the three rulings because the demonstrative evidence was based on retained notes, no recognized alternative methods were shown to justify an adverse inference, and the instruction was appropriate given the parties' disputes over surgical choices. The core reasoning focused on the limited scope of appellate review of discretionary evidentiary and instructional decisions when supported by the record.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Billiter, the defendant was originally sentenced in 1998 for aggravated burglary and domestic violence with an incorrect term of postrelease control (up to three years instead of the required five years under statute). After release, he was supervised under postrelease control, later pled guilty to escape for violating its terms in 2004, and received a prison sentence. Years later, he sought to withdraw his escape plea, arguing the conviction was void because the flawed postrelease control meant he was not legally under detention. The Ohio Supreme Court held that res judicata does not bar a collateral attack on the escape conviction when the underlying postrelease control sentence was improper, as the error rendered that portion of the sentence void and unenforceable. The core reasoning was that a statutorily mandated term of postrelease control cannot be imposed incorrectly without affecting the validity of subsequent enforcement actions like escape prosecutions.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over the validity of a 2005 divorce decree in which a magistrate had signed the trial judge's name on the judgment entry in violation of Civ.R. 58(A). The Ohio Supreme Court held that the decree was voidable rather than void because the trial court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter. The court reasoned that noncompliance with the signature requirement of Civ.R. 58(A) is a mechanical irregularity that does not deprive the judgment of effect, and that a collateral attack years later was untimely where the parties had relied on the decree. It therefore reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the 2005 divorce decree.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Harris, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed two consolidated criminal cases involving defendant Mario Harris, who had pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and related offenses. The trial court imposed prison terms and ordered forfeitures but omitted statutorily required driver's license suspensions under R.C. 2925.03. The court held that the failure to impose a mandatory license suspension renders that portion of the sentence void, allowing resentencing limited to adding the suspension, and that a nonmandatory forfeiture order need not appear in the judgment entry of conviction for it to qualify as a final, appealable order under Crim.R. 32(C). This ruling resolved a conflict with another appellate district and followed precedents treating omissions of mandatory sentencing terms as jurisdictional errors. The decisions were based on the principle that sentences must conform to statutory requirements and that forfeitures involve separate procedural considerations beyond the core conviction entry.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a Teamsters union representing employees in the Cuyahoga County Sanitary Engineering Division who were excluded from a county early-retirement incentive plan established by the Board of County Commissioners under R.C. 145.297. After a grievance hearing upheld the exclusion and the county prosecutor declined to act, the union filed a taxpayer action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to include the division or recover plan funds. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, ruling that the union lacked standing for the taxpayer action and had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies through the grievance process, rendering the statutory compliance issue moot. The court reasoned that the employees received notice and an opportunity to appeal administratively, and pursuing further remedies would not have been futile because the board had authority to grant relief.

labor & employmentprocedure

In State v. Davis, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether a threat made during a police investigation but before any court proceedings could support a conviction for witness intimidation under R.C. 2921.04(B). Tracy Davis was convicted after threatening his ex-wife, who had observed his altercation with a deputy sheriff, but the Second District Court of Appeals reversed that conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, holding that the statute requires an ongoing criminal action or proceeding in a court of justice for a person to qualify as a protected witness. The court reasoned that the statutory text distinguishes between immediate protections for crime victims and the narrower protections for witnesses, which apply only after formal court proceedings have begun, and that a police investigation alone does not trigger those protections.

criminal law

The case involved disciplinary proceedings against Ohio attorney Joseph G. Stafford for multiple alleged violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct arising from his representation of a client in a protracted divorce matter from 2005 to 2008, including failures to answer pleadings, improper motions to amend complaints, and ex parte communications with the court. After a hearing, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline found six violations, dismissed others, and recommended a 12-month stayed suspension. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the findings of misconduct but overruled the recommendation for a stayed suspension, imposing an actual 12-month license suspension instead, based on the need to address the pattern of professional rule violations and protect the integrity of judicial proceedings.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between property owners Thomas and Derrell Wilkes and Ohio Edison Company over structures (a swimming pool and shed) the Wilkeses built on land subject to a 1949 utility easement for an electric transmission line. After Ohio Edison sought a court order to enforce the easement by requiring removal of the structures, the Wilkeses filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio asking it to order the company to relocate the transmission line instead. The commission dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the matter concerned competing property rights rather than a regulatory issue requiring its expertise. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the commission lacks authority to adjudicate controversies involving property rights and that the Wilkeses had not demonstrated any independent regulatory claim or need for the commission's specialized expertise under R.C. 4905.26.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Palmer, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether Paul Palmer, convicted of sexual battery in 1995, could be subject to the Adam Walsh Act's sex-offender registration and notification requirements, which were enacted in 2007 and applied retroactively. Palmer petitioned the trial court to contest his automatic Tier III classification and moved to dismiss an indictment charging him with failing to register and verify his address under the Act. The trial court dismissed the indictment, ruling that neither the Adam Walsh Act nor prior Megan's Law applied to Palmer, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, holding that prior precedent in State v. Bodyke left the statutory petition process intact and that State v. Williams barred retroactive application of the Adam Walsh Act, authorizing pretrial dismissal of the indictment under Crim.R. 12 when the regulations could not apply. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings.

criminal lawprocedure