J. R. Campbell

The case involved a defendant charged with second-degree theft for shoplifting who objected at trial to the prosecutor's use of her prior shoplifting conviction to impeach her credibility on cross-examination. The court held that the prior conviction was admissible under the 1986 amendment to OEC 609(1) and that applying the amended rule did not violate ex post facto principles. The core reasoning was that voters' addition of the word "dishonesty" to the evidence rule reflected an intent to expand the category of impeachable convictions beyond those involving only false statements, making second-degree theft admissible for credibility purposes. The court also upheld the denial of a mistrial because the questioning was proper.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with first-degree robbery who was convicted of the lesser offense of second-degree robbery after a co-defendant testified in rebuttal at trial. The trial court limited the scope of the defendant's cross-examination of that witness, and the defendant challenged the limitation on appeal. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the conviction, holding that the appellate court should not have addressed the issue because the defendant failed to make an offer of proof at trial regarding the excluded testimony and did not properly raise the statutory issue below. The court reasoned that an offer of proof is required even on cross-examination to create an adequate record for appellate review under the state constitution and overruled prior cases holding otherwise.

criminal lawprocedure

In Soursby v. Hawkins, the plaintiffs sought to rescind their purchase of undeveloped land after learning that zoning ordinances prohibited residential use, contrary to an innocent misrepresentation by the defendants' real estate agent that the property was suitable for building a home. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on grounds including waiver, a disclaimer in the earnest money agreement, and the plaintiffs' failure to investigate zoning, but the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court affirmed, remanding for trial. The court held that factual issues existed as to whether the disclaimer merged into the deed and whether the plaintiffs' reliance was reasonable, so the defendants had not shown entitlement to judgment as a matter of law under ORCP 47C.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether an Oregon defendant convicted of initiating a false report, a Class C misdemeanor, could refuse a sentence of probation and instead demand that the court impose a jail sentence. After trial, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on five years' probation with conditions including 30 days' jail time (credited as served) and no contact with a named individual; the defendant objected and stated he would not comply with probation. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that a convicted defendant has the right to elect to refuse probation and require the court to impose sentence instead. The court reached this conclusion after examining the relevant statutes governing sentencing and probation, prior case law, and the absence of any statutory requirement that a defendant accept probation, while declining to address other issues raised on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a Hillsboro city ordinance that criminalized uninvited door-to-door solicitation for the sale of goods violated Article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution. Defendants were convicted in municipal court for selling household products door-to-door, and the circuit court affirmed those convictions. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The court reasoned that the ordinance, modeled on the "Green River" type, constituted a content-based restriction targeting commercial speech and sales activity, which exceeded the city's authority to regulate nuisances because it broadly prohibited protected expression without being limited to specific harms.

free speechbusiness & regulatorycriminal law

In Fromme v. Fred Meyer, Inc., a workers' compensation claimant petitioned for judicial review of a board order in 1986, and while the appeal was pending the legislature amended ORS 656.236(2) to bar employers from recovering court costs from unsuccessful claimants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the board and initially awarded costs to the employer under the prior law, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed that costs order. The court held that the 1987 amendment applies because the right to recover costs does not arise until a party prevails on appeal, which occurred after the amendment's effective date, and therefore the application is prospective. The decision rests on the principle that legislation is construed to operate prospectively absent contrary legislative intent, and no vested right to costs exists until recovery in the suit.

labor & employmentprocedure