J. R. Campbell

The case involved a defendant charged with second-degree theft for shoplifting who objected at trial to the prosecutor's use of her prior shoplifting conviction to impeach her credibility on cross-examination. The court held that the prior conviction was admissible under the 1986 amendment to OEC 609(1) and that applying the amended rule did not violate ex post facto principles. The core reasoning was that voters' addition of the word "dishonesty" to the evidence rule reflected an intent to expand the category of impeachable convictions beyond those involving only false statements, making second-degree theft admissible for credibility purposes. The court also upheld the denial of a mistrial because the questioning was proper.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with first-degree robbery who was convicted of the lesser offense of second-degree robbery after a co-defendant testified in rebuttal at trial. The trial court limited the scope of the defendant's cross-examination of that witness, and the defendant challenged the limitation on appeal. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the conviction, holding that the appellate court should not have addressed the issue because the defendant failed to make an offer of proof at trial regarding the excluded testimony and did not properly raise the statutory issue below. The court reasoned that an offer of proof is required even on cross-examination to create an adequate record for appellate review under the state constitution and overruled prior cases holding otherwise.

criminal lawprocedure

In Soursby v. Hawkins, the plaintiffs sought to rescind their purchase of undeveloped land after learning that zoning ordinances prohibited residential use, contrary to an innocent misrepresentation by the defendants' real estate agent that the property was suitable for building a home. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on grounds including waiver, a disclaimer in the earnest money agreement, and the plaintiffs' failure to investigate zoning, but the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court affirmed, remanding for trial. The court held that factual issues existed as to whether the disclaimer merged into the deed and whether the plaintiffs' reliance was reasonable, so the defendants had not shown entitlement to judgment as a matter of law under ORCP 47C.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether an Oregon defendant convicted of initiating a false report, a Class C misdemeanor, could refuse a sentence of probation and instead demand that the court impose a jail sentence. After trial, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on five years' probation with conditions including 30 days' jail time (credited as served) and no contact with a named individual; the defendant objected and stated he would not comply with probation. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that a convicted defendant has the right to elect to refuse probation and require the court to impose sentence instead. The court reached this conclusion after examining the relevant statutes governing sentencing and probation, prior case law, and the absence of any statutory requirement that a defendant accept probation, while declining to address other issues raised on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a Hillsboro city ordinance that criminalized uninvited door-to-door solicitation for the sale of goods violated Article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution. Defendants were convicted in municipal court for selling household products door-to-door, and the circuit court affirmed those convictions. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The court reasoned that the ordinance, modeled on the "Green River" type, constituted a content-based restriction targeting commercial speech and sales activity, which exceeded the city's authority to regulate nuisances because it broadly prohibited protected expression without being limited to specific harms.

free speechbusiness & regulatorycriminal law

In Fromme v. Fred Meyer, Inc., a workers' compensation claimant petitioned for judicial review of a board order in 1986, and while the appeal was pending the legislature amended ORS 656.236(2) to bar employers from recovering court costs from unsuccessful claimants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the board and initially awarded costs to the employer under the prior law, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed that costs order. The court held that the 1987 amendment applies because the right to recover costs does not arise until a party prevails on appeal, which occurred after the amendment's effective date, and therefore the application is prospective. The decision rests on the principle that legislation is construed to operate prospectively absent contrary legislative intent, and no vested right to costs exists until recovery in the suit.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned damage to the Barneses' concrete-block house from blasting operations by Wildish Construction Company during a sewer project; the homeowners' insurer paid for initial repairs and then sued Wildish, while the Barneses cross-claimed for additional damages. The trial court granted Wildish a directed verdict at the close of the Barneses' case, finding no evidence offered under the correct measure of damages. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court, holding that the proper measure for permanent damage to real property is the diminution in fair market value rather than cost of restoration or replacement, and that the Barneses' evidence of repair costs and replacement estimates was legally insufficient to prove that measure.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether a document labeled as a motion for a new trial, filed after a circuit court affirmed a city civil service commission's termination of the plaintiff's employment in a writ of review proceeding, qualified as a motion for new trial under ORCP 64 and thereby extended the time to file a notice of appeal. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the appeal as untimely, holding that no motion for a new trial is available in writ of review proceedings. The court reasoned that ORCP 64 defines a new trial as a reexamination of an issue of fact, but writ of review proceedings under ORS 34.010 to 34.100 involve only review of the existing record for legal, jurisdictional, or constitutional errors without taking new evidence or deciding facts. Because the rules of civil procedure do not create a motion for new trial where the nature of the proceeding makes it impossible, the filing did not extend the appeal deadline.

procedurelabor & employment

The case involved a defendant charged with driving while suspended who raised an affirmative defense of lack of notice under former ORS 811.180. The trial court and Court of Appeals found her guilty, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she did not receive a pink slip notifying her of certified mail regarding the suspension. The core reasoning followed the precedent in State v. DeMello, which interpreted the notice requirements under the motor vehicle code, and emphasized that the affirmative defense statute places this evidentiary burden on the defendant rather than the state, even when the suspension letter was returned unclaimed and no evidence addressed postal practices.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether an injured worker could pursue contract and tort claims in circuit court against a vocational rehabilitation organization and its employee for allegedly inadequate assistance in securing suitable employment, or whether such claims fell exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation Department and Board. The plaintiff, employed by a self-insured company, alleged that the organization failed to fulfill contractual obligations to provide rehabilitation leading to employment at a specified wage and was negligent in its representations and services. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the claims against the rehabilitation organization and its employee, reversing the dismissal as to those defendants while affirming dismissal of claims against the employer. The court reasoned that the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act protect only employers, insurers, and the department itself, with no statutory language extending exclusivity to third-party contractors, and that the department lacks authority to adjudicate contract or negligence remedies. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned whether a self-insured employer could unilaterally stop paying permanent partial disability benefits awarded in a workers’ compensation determination order after later discovering and denying a noncompensable medical condition that contributed to the disability. The court held that the employer was not authorized to terminate the payments based on its partial denial and that penalties and attorney fees were properly assessed for the failure to continue payments both before and during appeals. The reasoning rested on the principle that an accepted claim cannot be later denied absent fraud or misrepresentation, combined with statutory provisions (including former ORS 656.313) that prohibit staying compensation payments pending review or appeal of a determination order.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned a workers' compensation dispute in which an employer appealed a referee's award of interim compensation to a claimant for the period between filing a stress-related occupational disease claim and its denial, and refused to pay pending review. The court held that payment of interim compensation is not stayed during the employer's appeal. It reasoned that interim compensation under ORS 656.262 qualifies as compensation within the meaning of ORS 656.313(1) and (4), which explicitly bars stays on payment of enumerated benefits, and that the statutory scheme requires prompt periodic payments to avoid delays during appeals.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a products liability claim under Oregon law by Mandy Senn, who suffered severe brain damage after receiving a DTP vaccine as an infant; only two manufacturers could have supplied the vaccine, but she could not identify which one. The certified questions asked whether the burden of proof on causation should shift to the defendants under an alternative liability theory, and whether mandatory state immunization requirements affected liability for failure to warn. The court held that Oregon does not recognize alternative liability in this context, so the burden does not shift and the plaintiff must still prove which defendant caused the injury, and that the mandatory nature of the vaccination program does not shield the manufacturers from potential liability. The reasoning centered on the absence of Oregon precedent or statutes adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(3), distinctions from cases like Summers v. Tice involving intrinsically defective products, and the need for evidence showing more than a possibility of causation.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This post-conviction case concerned whether jury instructions on lesser-included offenses in Tarwater's 1978 trial for kidnapping, rape, and sodomy were improper 'acquittal first' instructions under State v. Allen and State v. Ogden, and whether his trial counsel provided inadequate assistance by requesting them. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the instructions violated the rule by requiring the jury to acquit on the greater offense before considering lesser ones, and that requesting them constituted inadequate assistance of counsel. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the post-conviction court's dismissal in relevant part, finding the instructions coercive and prejudicial. The decision rested on the established precedent prohibiting such sequencing in jury deliberations and the constitutional standard for effective representation in criminal trials.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a defendant charged with sodomy and sexual abuse who sought access to Children's Services Division (CSD) files containing notes from interviews with the victim and her mother, who were witnesses for the state. The trial court denied the discovery motion, but the Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court held that the files are subject to discovery through an in camera review by the trial judge. The court's reasoning centered on the discovery statute ORS 135.815 requiring disclosure of memoranda of witness statements, combined with the fact that CSD confidentiality is not absolute and the files are effectively under the control of the prosecution, necessitating a balance to protect confidentiality while allowing access to relevant evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Graville, the defendant faced charges of first-degree sodomy and sexual abuse involving her child and sought access to the full Children's Services Division case file on the victim to support her defense. The trial court denied the discovery request after the prosecutor reviewed the file and found no exculpatory material, but the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court held that CSD files are subject to discovery under ORS 135.815 for any written or recorded witness statements, which must be reviewed in camera by the trial court to protect confidentiality. It further ruled that due process under Pennsylvania v. Ritchie requires an in camera inspection of relevant portions of the files for exculpatory evidence material to guilt or punishment, with any such evidence potentially leading to a new trial if warranted.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Ratliff, the defendant was stopped and arrested for suspected DUII, refused a breath test, and had his license suspended after a DMV administrative hearing where the officer found the stop and arrest invalid due to lack of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The defendant was later charged criminally with DUII in district court, which refused to apply collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of the arrest's validity and ultimately convicted him after finding the stop justified. The Oregon Supreme Court accepted review to decide whether the DMV hearing's ruling could preclude the state from relitigating the issue in the criminal case. The court held that it could not, because constitutional double jeopardy principles do not apply to administrative proceedings, the relevant statute requires a prior court or judicial decision, and common-law collateral estoppel is inappropriate given the informal nature of DMV hearings, which lack full party participation, attorney representation for the state, and other formal safeguards. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions allowing relitigation.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Lyon, the Oregon Supreme Court considered whether polygraph test results could be introduced as evidence in a criminal murder trial where the defendant had signed a pre-examination stipulation agreeing to their admissibility before being charged or represented by counsel. The trial court had allowed the unfavorable results into evidence, contributing to the defendant's conviction, and the Court of Appeals had upheld that ruling. The Supreme Court held that polygraph evidence is inadmissible in any civil or criminal proceeding in Oregon courts, even when the parties stipulate to its use. The court reasoned that under OEC 403 the evidence's potential for unfair prejudice and jury confusion substantially outweighs its probative value, and that a stipulation neither improves the test's inherent reliability nor estops a party from objecting to its fundamental flaws.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, the sellers under a 1977 land sale contract sued the assignees of the original buyer's interest for specific performance after the assignees defaulted on payments and taxes in 1984. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Oregon Supreme Court accepted review to address when assignees of a land sale contract assume the buyer's obligations. The court held that the assignment's broad language transferring "all right, title and interest" in the contract and property, combined with the assignees' actions such as taking exclusive possession, making payments, mortgaging the land, and seeking lot releases, created a presumption that they had assumed the contractual duties. This presumption, drawn from contract interpretation principles and analogous rules in the UCC and Restatement, made the sellers third-party beneficiaries entitled to enforce the obligations, leading the court to affirm the judgment.

property

This case involves a workers' compensation dispute arising from multiple back injuries sustained by the claimant while employed by different companies, where Ebbtide Enterprises' insurer (EBI) issued a backup denial of a previously accepted 1982 claim after the claimant sought additional compensation for a worsened condition in 1983. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the Bauman v. SAIF rule, which bars retroactive denials of accepted claims more than 60 days after notice absent fraud, misrepresentation, or other illegality, applies to backup denials of responsibility between insurers even when the claimant's benefits are not affected. The court reasoned that the statutory scheme under ORS 656.262 envisions speedy resolution of claims and that the claimant's nondisclosure of a 1977 injury was not a material misrepresentation justifying the denial. It concluded that EBI remained responsible for the aggravation claim under the last injurious exposure rule and that remand to the Board was unnecessary given the evidence presented.

labor & employment