Susan P. Graber

This case involves an interstate child custody dispute in which a mother sought to modify a California custody decree in an Oregon court after moving with the child to Oregon. The Oregon Supreme Court held that Oregon lacked authority to modify the decree under the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). The court reasoned that California retains continuing jurisdiction because the father still resides there, the original decree was issued consistently with the statutes, and California has not declined to exercise jurisdiction or transferred the matter. Accordingly, the court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court.

family lawfederal power

This case involved unmarried parents seeking to modify a child custody order for their daughter, after the mother had hidden the child from the father for several years and was convicted of custodial interference. The Oregon Supreme Court held that a change in circumstances sufficient to reopen a custody determination can arise regardless of whether it stems from a parent's illegal conduct, and that a parent's past actions should factor into the best-interests analysis only if they are causing or may cause emotional or physical harm to the child under ORS 107.137(3). Applying the two-step custody-modification test, the court found the requisite change in circumstances existed and affirmed the trial court's award of legal custody to the mother, relying on expert evidence that the child's best interests favored remaining with her. The decision turned on statutory interpretation of custody-modification standards rather than equitable disqualification of changes caused by custodial interference.

family law

This case concerned a dispute between neighboring property owners in a beachfront subdivision over whether short-term vacation rentals of a house violated a restrictive covenant requiring that lots be used exclusively for residential purposes and prohibiting any commercial enterprise. The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs, concluding that the defendants' rental activity amounted to a commercial rental business. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that decision, entering judgment for the defendants. The court determined that the covenant's key terms were ambiguous as applied to temporary rentals and applied the maxim of strict construction against restrictions on land use, under which the activity was permissible because it was not plainly prohibited by the covenant's text.

property

The case concerned a plaintiff seeking access across neighboring land to a public road for his otherwise landlocked parcel, asserting claims for an express easement, a prescriptive easement, or alternatively a statutory way of necessity under ORS chapter 376. A court-appointed surveyor recommended a route over property owned by the Thorp group, who were then joined as parties and defended against the necessity claim. The trial court granted the plaintiff an express easement over a different parcel and dismissed the necessity claim without awarding fees, but the Court of Appeals and Oregon Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must pay the Thorp group's reasonable attorney fees and costs. The core reasoning was that ORS 376.175(2)(e) plainly requires the petitioner to pay fees incurred by every landowner whose property was subject to the way-of-necessity action, irrespective of which route was ultimately chosen or whether the necessity claim was reached on the merits.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Webb, the case concerned whether an Oregon district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to convict the defendant of a Class A misdemeanor (theft in the second degree) after the 1993 legislature raised the maximum fine for such offenses to $5,000 without updating the $3,000 limit in ORS 46.040. The Court of Appeals had reversed the conviction, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated the district court's judgment. Applying statutory interpretation principles from PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, the court examined the text and context of ORS 46.040 (1993) and concluded that it granted district courts two separate forms of jurisdiction, including the same criminal jurisdiction as justice courts, which had no fine limit applicable to misdemeanors. Therefore, the district court retained authority over the case regardless of the increased fine maximum.

criminal lawprocedure

In this mandamus proceeding, Marion County District Attorney Dale Penn sought to compel a circuit court judge to vacate a post-verdict dismissal, sentence defendant Vasquez-Hernandez, and enter judgment on his convictions for attempted aggravated murder, attempted assault, and unlawful weapon use after a jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial judge had dismissed the case under ORS 135.755 in furtherance of justice, citing errors in denying a pretrial suppression motion and nondisclosure of civil investigative materials. The Oregon Supreme Court held that ORS 135.755 authorizes dismissal only before trial, based on its text, historical placement in the Deady Code among pretrial speedy-trial provisions, and context showing it is not available after a valid verdict. The court therefore directed issuance of a peremptory writ requiring the judge to vacate the dismissal and proceed to sentencing and judgment.

criminal lawprocedure