Susan P. Graber

This case involves an interstate child custody dispute in which a mother sought to modify a California custody decree in an Oregon court after moving with the child to Oregon. The Oregon Supreme Court held that Oregon lacked authority to modify the decree under the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). The court reasoned that California retains continuing jurisdiction because the father still resides there, the original decree was issued consistently with the statutes, and California has not declined to exercise jurisdiction or transferred the matter. Accordingly, the court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court.

family lawfederal power

This case involved unmarried parents seeking to modify a child custody order for their daughter, after the mother had hidden the child from the father for several years and was convicted of custodial interference. The Oregon Supreme Court held that a change in circumstances sufficient to reopen a custody determination can arise regardless of whether it stems from a parent's illegal conduct, and that a parent's past actions should factor into the best-interests analysis only if they are causing or may cause emotional or physical harm to the child under ORS 107.137(3). Applying the two-step custody-modification test, the court found the requisite change in circumstances existed and affirmed the trial court's award of legal custody to the mother, relying on expert evidence that the child's best interests favored remaining with her. The decision turned on statutory interpretation of custody-modification standards rather than equitable disqualification of changes caused by custodial interference.

family law

This case concerned a dispute between neighboring property owners in a beachfront subdivision over whether short-term vacation rentals of a house violated a restrictive covenant requiring that lots be used exclusively for residential purposes and prohibiting any commercial enterprise. The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs, concluding that the defendants' rental activity amounted to a commercial rental business. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that decision, entering judgment for the defendants. The court determined that the covenant's key terms were ambiguous as applied to temporary rentals and applied the maxim of strict construction against restrictions on land use, under which the activity was permissible because it was not plainly prohibited by the covenant's text.

property

The case concerned a plaintiff seeking access across neighboring land to a public road for his otherwise landlocked parcel, asserting claims for an express easement, a prescriptive easement, or alternatively a statutory way of necessity under ORS chapter 376. A court-appointed surveyor recommended a route over property owned by the Thorp group, who were then joined as parties and defended against the necessity claim. The trial court granted the plaintiff an express easement over a different parcel and dismissed the necessity claim without awarding fees, but the Court of Appeals and Oregon Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must pay the Thorp group's reasonable attorney fees and costs. The core reasoning was that ORS 376.175(2)(e) plainly requires the petitioner to pay fees incurred by every landowner whose property was subject to the way-of-necessity action, irrespective of which route was ultimately chosen or whether the necessity claim was reached on the merits.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Webb, the case concerned whether an Oregon district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to convict the defendant of a Class A misdemeanor (theft in the second degree) after the 1993 legislature raised the maximum fine for such offenses to $5,000 without updating the $3,000 limit in ORS 46.040. The Court of Appeals had reversed the conviction, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated the district court's judgment. Applying statutory interpretation principles from PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, the court examined the text and context of ORS 46.040 (1993) and concluded that it granted district courts two separate forms of jurisdiction, including the same criminal jurisdiction as justice courts, which had no fine limit applicable to misdemeanors. Therefore, the district court retained authority over the case regardless of the increased fine maximum.

criminal lawprocedure

In this mandamus proceeding, Marion County District Attorney Dale Penn sought to compel a circuit court judge to vacate a post-verdict dismissal, sentence defendant Vasquez-Hernandez, and enter judgment on his convictions for attempted aggravated murder, attempted assault, and unlawful weapon use after a jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial judge had dismissed the case under ORS 135.755 in furtherance of justice, citing errors in denying a pretrial suppression motion and nondisclosure of civil investigative materials. The Oregon Supreme Court held that ORS 135.755 authorizes dismissal only before trial, based on its text, historical placement in the Deady Code among pretrial speedy-trial provisions, and context showing it is not available after a valid verdict. The court therefore directed issuance of a peremptory writ requiring the judge to vacate the dismissal and proceed to sentencing and judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a defamation claim brought by an AT&T supervisor against a coworker who also served as a union steward. The coworker reported to the plaintiff's supervisors complaints about the plaintiff's work performance and a statement from another employee alleging that the plaintiff was a substance abuser. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the defamation claims, but the Court of Appeals reversed as to the claim for defamation with actual malice. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a defamatory statement by one employee to a supervisor about another employee's work-related conduct can be actionable and that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether any qualified privilege was overcome by improper motive or recklessness.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

This case involved a union seeking certification from the Oregon Employment Relations Board (ERB) as the exclusive bargaining representative for teachers and support staff at Central Catholic High School, a private school operated by the Archdiocese of Portland. ERB dismissed the petition after concluding it lacked jurisdiction because the Archdiocese is not an "employer" under ORS 663.005(4), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, first holding that judicial review of the ERB order was available under ORS 663.220, then agreeing that ERB properly dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction over the religious employer. The reasoning centered on statutory interpretation of the state labor relations laws, which were modeled on the federal NLRA, and on the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago limiting jurisdiction over parochial schools.

labor & employmentreligious libertyprocedure

This case concerned the interpretation of the attorney fees provision in ORS 279.067(4) in the context of a public contracting bid dispute. Steelman-Duff, an unsuccessful bidder, sued the Oregon Department of Transportation and J.C. Compton Contractor, Inc., the next-lowest bidder, alleging that ODOT had improperly rejected its bid on a construction project. After the trial court ruled against Steelman-Duff and ODOT awarded the contract to Compton, Compton sought attorney fees as a successful party under the statute, but the trial court and Court of Appeals denied the request. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that Compton qualified as a successful party in a suit brought under ORS 279.067 because it prevailed in defending the award of the contract. The court reasoned that the statute's plain text permits an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs to such a party on trial and appeal.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved defendant Charboneau, who was convicted by a jury of aggravated murder, multiple counts of murder, felony murder, kidnapping, assault, and abuse of a corpse, all related to the death of a single victim, Misty Largo. The trial court imposed a death sentence on the murder-related counts after the jury's penalty-phase findings and consecutive prison terms on the remaining counts. On automatic direct review, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the convictions on the murder counts but affirmed the convictions on all other counts. The core reasoning centered on the improper admission of portions of a state's witness plea agreement during redirect examination, which implicated evidentiary rules under OEC 608 and OEC 106 as well as potential constitutional concerns regarding self-incrimination and the right to counsel.

criminal lawprocedure

In McIntire v. Forbes, petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the light rail funding provisions in Oregon Senate Bill 1156, enacted in 1995, claiming violations of several state constitutional provisions. The Oregon Supreme Court held that sections 1 to 17 of the Act are invalid because the bill as a whole violates the one-subject requirement of Article IV, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. The court's reasoning focused on the Act combining unrelated provisions without a unifying subject, as shown by the legislative text and context granting the court jurisdiction to resolve all such challenges promptly.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether a creditor could use a writ of continuing garnishment under ORS 29.401 to 29.415 to reach future contract payments owed by Zidell Marine Corp. to West Painting, Inc., an independent contractor, for incomplete work on a barge under a turnkey purchase order that included both labor and materials. After Miller obtained judgments against West and its owners and served writs on Zidell, Zidell interpleaded the disputed funds, and Capital Resource Finance Corp. claimed priority based on a perfected security interest in West's accounts receivable. The trial court ruled for Capital, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a writ of continuing garnishment is unavailable because the statutes apply only to wages owed to an employee for personal services and do not cover payments due to an independent contractor under an executory contract. The court's reasoning rested on the text of the garnishment statutes, particularly the form and scope provisions that repeatedly refer to “wages,” as interpreted under the PGE framework.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case was a wrongful death action arising from a 1989 truck accident on Interstate 5 in which a truck driver, aware of faulty brakes, collided with a van and killed a nearly 10-month-old child; the parents, as personal representative of the estate, sued the driver and his employer for loss of society, companionship, and pecuniary damages. The jury awarded $100,000 in economic damages and $1.5 million in noneconomic damages, but the trial court applied ORS 18.560 to cap noneconomic damages at $500,000. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in full, holding that the statutory cap applies to this statutory wrongful death claim and does not violate Article VII (Amended), section 3, or other provisions of the Oregon Constitution as applied here, while also upholding the admission of federal regulations as evidence of negligence.

torts & liability

This case involved challenges by two petitioners to the ballot title for a proposed Oregon constitutional amendment that would limit the legislature's role in regulating initiative and referendum powers and processes, nullify certain post-1995 provisions on those topics unless enacted by initiative, and require administrative actions to use the least restrictive means to allow exercise of those powers. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the Attorney General's certified ballot title under statutory standards for captions, questions, summaries, and readability. The court concluded that the caption failed to reasonably identify the full subject of the measure because it did not adequately convey provisions nullifying certain laws or affecting processes as well as powers, leading to modifications of the caption and conforming changes to the question, while finding the summary substantially compliant and readability adequate. The court certified the revised ballot title for use on the ballot.

elections

This case concerned an employee's claims against her supervisor and employer, a collection agency, arising from alleged sexual harassment including unwanted advances and physical contact. The plaintiff asserted claims including intentional interference with economic relations against the supervisor, and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress and wrongful discharge against both defendants. The court held that the trial court properly dismissed the interference claim because the supervisor was not a third party to the employment relationship but erred in dismissing the other two claims. It reasoned that the complaint adequately alleged the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress and that the harassment made working conditions intolerable, leading to constructive discharge. The decision focused on the sufficiency of the pleadings under Oregon rules for those torts.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In GTE Northwest, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission, GTE challenged PUC rules under ORS 183.400 that required local exchange carriers to permit enhanced service providers to collocate their equipment on LEC property as part of an Open Network Architecture framework for telecommunications competition. The Court of Appeals upheld the rules, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding the collocation provisions invalid. The court reasoned that the rules effect a physical occupation of LEC property by third parties, constituting a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the PUC lacked the express eminent domain authority needed to authorize such a taking. Judicial review was limited to the face of the rules and applicable law, without considering specific applications or compensation adequacy.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved petitioner Brentmar's challenge to Jackson County's denial of a conditional use permit for an agricultural and horticultural school and related facilities in an exclusive farm use (EFU) zone, based on local land development ordinance criteria regarding traffic, groundwater, rural needs, and agricultural impacts. The Land Use Board of Appeals and Court of Appeals upheld the denial, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed. The court held that ORS 215.213 and 215.283, which state that certain uses "may be established" in EFU zones, establish the controlling standards for permitted and conditional uses; counties may not impose additional, more restrictive local criteria beyond those in the statutes and ORS 215.296. The decision rested on statutory interpretation of the text, context, and legislative history, distinguishing between outright permitted uses and those subject only to specified state standards.

environmentproperty

The case concerned a lawsuit by plaintiff Boytano to prevent defendant Fritz, the Klamath Falls elections officer, from placing a proposed city charter amendment on the ballot; the measure would bar the city from enacting or enforcing ordinances that extend minority status or protections based on homosexuality or sexual orientation. The trial court modified the ballot title but otherwise denied relief and certified the measure, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the challenge presented a justiciable controversy because it raised questions about whether the measure qualified as municipal legislation under Article IV, section 1(5), of the Oregon Constitution and complied with procedural requirements for initiatives, rather than attacking its substantive validity if enacted. The court concluded that the proposed measure was a proper subject for a local initiative and did not suffer from disqualifying flaws extraneous to its text, such as procedural defects or failure to constitute legislation.

electionscivil rights

The case was an original proceeding in which two sets of petitioners challenged the Attorney General's certified ballot title for a proposed initiative amending the Oregon Constitution to ban second- and third-trimester abortions except when necessary to save the mother's life, require the legislature to enact deterring statutes in the next session, and grant standing to every Oregon resident and nonprofit to sue. One petitioner argued that the question and summary should use the term 'mother' rather than 'pregnant woman,' while the other petitioners contended that all three parts of the ballot title failed to mention the standing provision. The court held that the Attorney General's phrasing was accurate and substantially compliant but that the standing grant was a chief purpose and major effect that must be disclosed, so it modified the question and summary accordingly while leaving the caption unchanged and certified the revised ballot title.

abortionelections

This case concerned a challenge by students and their parents to regulations adopted by the Tigard-Tualatin School District that required prior approval and allowed censorship of both official school newspapers and unofficial student publications, along with potential discipline for violations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief plus nominal damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging violations of free speech rights. The Court of Appeals had dismissed the claims sua sponte as non-justiciable because several senior plaintiffs had graduated, rendering their claims for prospective relief moot. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in part: claims for declaratory and injunctive relief became moot upon graduation, but the section 1983 claims for nominal damages remained justiciable and could proceed; the claims of the remaining junior-high plaintiff were unaffected by mootness. The court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the surviving claims.

free speechcivil rightsprocedure