This case was an original mandamus proceeding in the Oregon Supreme Court brought by the Lane County District Attorney against the presiding circuit judge, seeking an order to discharge a grand jury empaneled in April 1956. The petition alleged that the judge had improperly directed the preparation of the 1956 jury list by ignoring statutory requirements and inserting specific names, rendering the grand jury illegally constituted. The court sustained the respondent's demurrer and quashed the writ. It reasoned that mandamus is unavailable to control judicial discretion and that a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy existed in the ordinary course of the law, such as through motions in the trial court. The decision emphasized that the statute governing mandamus explicitly limits its use in cases involving judicial functions.
In this case, the vendors under a land sale contract appealed the denial of attorney’s fees in a strict foreclosure decree against the vendee who defaulted. The contract provided that the vendee would pay reasonable attorney’s fees if a suit was brought to foreclose the contract. The trial court awarded the fees conditionally but ultimately disallowed them when the vendee failed to pay the balance and the property was foreclosed. The appellate court reversed, holding that the contract's promise for attorney’s fees was unconditional and must be enforced as written without adding exceptions.
The case concerned whether four electric refrigerators and ranges installed in apartments above a bakery shop were personal property or fixtures that became part of the real estate subject to a mortgage held by the Elliotts. After the owners went bankrupt and the mortgage was foreclosed, the bankruptcy trustee claimed the appliances as personal property while the Elliotts asserted they were part of the realty. The court held that the appliances remained personal property. It applied the three-part test from prior precedent—annexation, adaptation, and intention—finding that the items were plugged into sockets and removable without material injury to themselves or the premises, making intention irrelevant where the first two factors were clear. The decision reversed the lower court ruling.
The case concerned a priority dispute in the insolvent estate of Anie M. Brown between federal tax liens for unpaid taxes and Title & Trust Company's claim for unpaid rent secured by a contractual lien on furniture and equipment in a pre-existing lease. The court held that the federal tax liens were superior. It reasoned that Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes grants the United States priority in insolvency situations over competing creditors, particularly when the competing lien is inchoate. The decision reversed the lower court's ruling in favor of the lessor.
This case involved a dispute over title to 160 acres of real property in Douglas County, Oregon, originally owned by John F. Pettingill and later acquired by Lilla G. Putnam. The plaintiffs, George and Gladys Putnam, sought to quiet title based on inheritance from their father, George H. Putnam, claiming the property passed to him under Lilla Putnam's will. The intervenor, Katherine A. Pettingill (Lilla's sister), argued that the will specifically excepted the property, directing its sale with proceeds (after certain debts) paid to her as a specific legacy. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and ordered the property sold and proceeds distributed according to the will; the appellate court affirmed, holding that the will's description sufficiently identified the parcel despite minor omissions, that the specific legacy to the sister was not subject to certain estate charges, and that delays in probate did not alter the outcome in this instance.
The case involved William Frank Cory, who was convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon under Oregon law and then charged as a habitual criminal based on three prior out-of-state felony convictions, resulting in an increased sentence of 15 years. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the habitual criminal conviction and sentence, ordering reinstatement of the original four-year term. The court held that the 1951 amendment to the habitual criminal statute was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions because it granted district attorneys unfettered discretion to pursue enhanced penalties in non-violent felony cases without any statutory standards or classification, allowing arbitrary application to similarly situated defendants. The prior convictions here did not involve violence or threats, so the discretionary provision directly applied and rendered the proceedings void. The court distinguished this from valid classifications and cited its prior ruling in State v. Pirkey to support striking down the statute's selective enforcement mechanism.